Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete

U >> Ulysses S. Grant >> Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 37 | 38 | 39 | 40 | 41 | 42 | 43 | 44 | 45 | 46 | 47 | 48 | 49 | 50 | 51 | 52 | 53 | 54 | 55 | 56 | 57 | 58 | 59 | 60 | 61 | 62 | 63 | 64

Cerro Gordo is one of the higher spurs of the mountains some twelve to
fifteen miles east of Jalapa, and Santa Anna had selected this point as
the easiest to defend against an invading army. The road, said to have
been built by Cortez, zigzags around the mountain-side and was defended
at every turn by artillery. On either side were deep chasms or mountain
walls. A direct attack along the road was an impossibility. A flank
movement seemed equally impossible. After the arrival of the
commanding-general upon the scene, reconnoissances were sent out to
find, or to make, a road by which the rear of the enemy's works might be
reached without a front attack. These reconnoissances were made under
the supervision of Captain Robert E. Lee, assisted by Lieutenants P. G.
T. Beauregard, Isaac I. Stevens, Z. B. Tower, G. W. Smith, George B.
McClellan, and J. G. Foster, of the corps of engineers, all officers who
attained rank and fame, on one side or the other, in the great conflict
for the preservation of the unity of the nation. The reconnoissance was
completed, and the labor of cutting out and making roads by the flank of
the enemy was effected by the 17th of the month. This was accomplished
without the knowledge of Santa Anna or his army, and over ground where
he supposed it impossible. On the same day General Scott issued his
order for the attack on the 18th.

The attack was made as ordered, and perhaps there was not a battle of
the Mexican war, or of any other, where orders issued before an
engagement were nearer being a correct report of what afterwards took
place. Under the supervision of the engineers, roadways had been opened
over chasms to the right where the walls were so steep that men could
barely climb them. Animals could not. These had been opened under
cover of night, without attracting the notice of the enemy. The
engineers, who had directed the opening, led the way and the troops
followed. Artillery was let down the steep slopes by hand, the men
engaged attaching a strong rope to the rear axle and letting the guns
down, a piece at a time, while the men at the ropes kept their ground on
top, paying out gradually, while a few at the front directed the course
of the piece. In like manner the guns were drawn by hand up the
opposite slopes. In this way Scott's troops reached their assigned
position in rear of most of the intrenchments of the enemy, unobserved.
The attack was made, the Mexican reserves behind the works beat a hasty
retreat, and those occupying them surrendered. On the left General
Pillow's command made a formidable demonstration, which doubtless held a
part of the enemy in his front and contributed to the victory. I am not
pretending to give full details of all the battles fought, but of the
portion that I saw. There were troops engaged on both sides at other
points in which both sustained losses; but the battle was won as here
narrated.

The surprise of the enemy was complete, the victory overwhelming; some
three thousand prisoners fell into Scott's hands, also a large amount of
ordnance and ordnance stores. The prisoners were paroled, the artillery
parked and the small arms and ammunition destroyed. The battle of Buena
Vista was probably very important to the success of General Scott at
Cerro Gordo and in his entire campaign from Vera Cruz to the great
plains reaching to the City of Mexico. The only army Santa Anna had to
protect his capital and the mountain passes west of Vera Cruz, was the
one he had with him confronting General Taylor. It is not likely that he
would have gone as far north as Monterey to attack the United States
troops when he knew his country was threatened with invasion further
south. When Taylor moved to Saltillo and then advanced on to Buena
Vista, Santa Anna crossed the desert confronting the invading army,
hoping no doubt to crush it and get back in time to meet General Scott
in the mountain passes west of Vera Cruz. His attack on Taylor was
disastrous to the Mexican army, but, notwithstanding this, he marched
his army to Cerro Gordo, a distance not much short of one thousand miles
by the line he had to travel, in time to intrench himself well before
Scott got there. If he had been successful at Buena Vista his troops
would no doubt have made a more stubborn resistance at Cerro Gordo. Had
the battle of Buena Vista not been fought Santa Anna would have had time
to move leisurely to meet the invader further south and with an army not
demoralized nor depleted by defeat.

After the battle the victorious army moved on to Jalapa, where it was in
a beautiful, productive and healthy country, far above the fevers of the
coast. Jalapa, however, is still in the mountains, and between there
and the great plain the whole line of the road is easy of defence. It
was important, therefore, to get possession of the great highway between
the sea-coast and the capital up to the point where it leaves the
mountains, before the enemy could have time to re-organize and fortify
in our front. Worth's division was selected to go forward to secure this
result. The division marched to Perote on the great plain, not far from
where the road debouches from the mountains. There is a low, strong
fort on the plain in front of the town, known as the Castle of Perote.
This, however, offered no resistance and fell into our hands, with its
armament.

General Scott having now only nine or ten thousand men west of Vera
Cruz, and the time of some four thousand of them being about to expire,
a long delay was the consequence. The troops were in a healthy climate,
and where they could subsist for an indefinite period even if their line
back to Vera Cruz should be cut off. It being ascertained that the men
whose time would expire before the City of Mexico could possibly fall
into the hands of the American army, would not remain beyond the term
for which they had volunteered, the commanding-general determined to
discharge them at once, for a delay until the expiration of their time
would have compelled them to pass through Vera Cruz during the season of
the vomito. This reduced Scott's force in the field to about five
thousand men.

Early in May, Worth, with his division, left Perote and marched on to
Puebla. The roads were wide and the country open except through one
pass in a spur of mountains coming up from the south, through which the
road runs. Notwithstanding this the small column was divided into two
bodies, moving a day apart. Nothing occurred on the march of special
note, except that while lying at the town of Amozoque--an easy day's
march east of Puebla--a body of the enemy's cavalry, two or three
thousand strong, was seen to our right, not more than a mile away. A
battery or two, with two or three infantry regiments, was sent against
them and they soon disappeared. On the 15th of May we entered the city
of Puebla.

General Worth was in command at Puebla until the latter end of May, when
General Scott arrived. Here, as well as on the march up, his
restlessness, particularly under responsibilities, showed itself.
During his brief command he had the enemy hovering around near the city,
in vastly superior numbers to his own. The brigade to which I was
attached changed quarters three different times in about a week,
occupying at first quarters near the plaza, in the heart of the city;
then at the western entrance; then at the extreme east. On one occasion
General Worth had the troops in line, under arms, all day, with three
days' cooked rations in their haversacks. He galloped from one command
to another proclaiming the near proximity of Santa Anna with an army
vastly superior to his own. General Scott arrived upon the scene the
latter part of the month, and nothing more was heard of Santa Anna and
his myriads. There were, of course, bodies of mounted Mexicans hovering
around to watch our movements and to pick up stragglers, or small bodies
of troops, if they ventured too far out. These always withdrew on the
approach of any considerable number of our soldiers. After the arrival
of General Scott I was sent, as quartermaster, with a large train of
wagons, back two days' march at least, to procure forage. We had less
than a thousand men as escort, and never thought of danger. We procured
full loads for our entire train at two plantations, which could easily
have furnished as much more.

There had been great delay in obtaining the authority of Congress for
the raising of the troops asked for by the administration. A bill was
before the National Legislature from early in the session of 1846-7,
authorizing the creation of ten additional regiments for the war to be
attached to the regular army, but it was the middle of February before
it became a law. Appointments of commissioned officers had then to be
made; men had to be enlisted, the regiments equipped and the whole
transported to Mexico. It was August before General Scott received
reinforcement sufficient to warrant an advance. His moving column, not
even now more than ten thousand strong, was in four divisions, commanded
by Generals Twiggs, Worth, Pillow and Quitman. There was also a cavalry
corps under General Harney, composed of detachments of the 1st, 2d, and
3d dragoons. The advance commenced on the 7th of August with Twiggs's
division in front. The remaining three divisions followed, with an
interval of a day between. The marches were short, to make
concentration easier in case of attack.

I had now been in battle with the two leading commanders conducting
armies in a foreign land. The contrast between the two was very marked.
General Taylor never wore uniform, but dressed himself entirely for
comfort. He moved about the field in which he was operating to see
through his own eyes the situation. Often he would be without staff
officers, and when he was accompanied by them there was no prescribed
order in which they followed. He was very much given to sit his horse
side-ways--with both feet on one side--particularly on the battlefield.
General Scott was the reverse in all these particulars. He always wore
all the uniform prescribed or allowed by law when he inspected his
lines; word would be sent to all division and brigade commanders in
advance, notifying them of the hour when the commanding general might be
expected. This was done so that all the army might be under arms to
salute their chief as he passed. On these occasions he wore his dress
uniform, cocked hat, aiguillettes, sabre and spurs. His staff proper,
besides all officers constructively on his staff--engineers, inspectors,
quartermasters, etc., that could be spared--followed, also in uniform
and in prescribed order. Orders were prepared with great care and
evidently with the view that they should be a history of what followed.

In their modes of expressing thought, these two generals contrasted
quite as strongly as in their other characteristics. General Scott was
precise in language, cultivated a style peculiarly his own; was proud of
his rhetoric; not averse to speaking of himself, often in the third
person, and he could bestow praise upon the person he was talking about
without the least embarrassment. Taylor was not a conversationalist,
but on paper he could put his meaning so plainly that there could be no
mistaking it. He knew how to express what he wanted to say in the
fewest well-chosen words, but would not sacrifice meaning to the
construction of high-sounding sentences. But with their opposite
characteristics both were great and successful soldiers; both were true,
patriotic and upright in all their dealings. Both were pleasant to
serve under--Taylor was pleasant to serve with. Scott saw more through
the eyes of his staff officers than through his own. His plans were
deliberately prepared, and fully expressed in orders. Taylor saw for
himself, and gave orders to meet the emergency without reference to how
they would read in history.

CHAPTER XI.

ADVANCE ON THE CITY OF MEXICO--BATTLE OF CONTRERAS--ASSAULT AT
CHURUBUSCO--NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE--BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL REY--STORMING
OF CHAPULTEPEC--SAN COSME--EVACUATION OF THE CITY--HALLS OF THE
MONTEZUMAS.

The route followed by the army from Puebla to the City of Mexico was
over Rio Frio mountain, the road leading over which, at the highest
point, is about eleven thousand feet above tide water. The pass through
this mountain might have been easily defended, but it was not; and the
advanced division reached the summit in three days after leaving Puebla.
The City of Mexico lies west of Rio Frio mountain, on a plain backed by
another mountain six miles farther west, with others still nearer on the
north and south. Between the western base of Rio Frio and the City of
Mexico there are three lakes, Chalco and Xochimilco on the left and
Texcoco on the right, extending to the east end of the City of Mexico.
Chalco and Texcoco are divided by a narrow strip of land over which the
direct road to the city runs. Xochimilco is also to the left of the
road, but at a considerable distance south of it, and is connected with
Lake Chalco by a narrow channel. There is a high rocky mound, called El
Penon, on the right of the road, springing up from the low flat ground
dividing the lakes. This mound was strengthened by intrenchments at its
base and summit, and rendered a direct attack impracticable.

Scott's army was rapidly concentrated about Ayotla and other points near
the eastern end of Lake Chalco. Reconnoissances were made up to within
gun-shot of El Penon, while engineers were seeking a route by the south
side of Lake Chalco to flank the city, and come upon it from the south
and south-west. A way was found around the lake, and by the 18th of
August troops were in St. Augustin Tlalpam, a town about eleven miles
due south from the plaza of the capital. Between St. Augustin Tlalpam
and the city lie the hacienda of San Antonio and the village of
Churubusco, and south-west of them is Contreras. All these points,
except St. Augustin Tlalpam, were intrenched and strongly garrisoned.
Contreras is situated on the side of a mountain, near its base, where
volcanic rocks are piled in great confusion, reaching nearly to San
Antonio. This made the approach to the city from the south very
difficult.

The brigade to which I was attached--Garland's, of Worth's division--was
sent to confront San Antonio, two or three miles from St. Augustin
Tlalpam, on the road to Churubusco and the City of Mexico. The ground
on which San Antonio stands is completely in the valley, and the surface
of the land is only a little above the level of the lakes, and, except
to the south-west, it was cut up by deep ditches filled with water. To
the south-west is the Pedregal--the volcanic rock before spoken of--over
which cavalry or artillery could not be passed, and infantry would make
but poor progress if confronted by an enemy. From the position occupied
by Garland's brigade, therefore, no movement could be made against the
defences of San Antonio except to the front, and by a narrow causeway,
over perfectly level ground, every inch of which was commanded by the
enemy's artillery and infantry. If Contreras, some three miles west and
south, should fall into our hands, troops from there could move to the
right flank of all the positions held by the enemy between us and the
city. Under these circumstances General Scott directed the holding of
the front of the enemy without making an attack until further orders.

On the 18th of August, the day of reaching San Augustin Tlalpam,
Garland's brigade secured a position within easy range of the advanced
intrenchments of San Antonio, but where his troops were protected by an
artificial embankment that had been thrown up for some other purpose
than defense. General Scott at once set his engineers reconnoitring the
works about Contreras, and on the 19th movements were commenced to get
troops into positions from which an assault could be made upon the force
occupying that place. The Pedregal on the north and north-east, and the
mountain on the south, made the passage by either flank of the enemy's
defences difficult, for their work stood exactly between those natural
bulwarks; but a road was completed during the day and night of the 19th,
and troops were got to the north and west of the enemy.

This affair, like that of Cerro Gordo, was an engagement in which the
officers of the engineer corps won special distinction. In fact, in
both cases, tasks which seemed difficult at first sight were made easier
for the troops that had to execute them than they would have been on an
ordinary field. The very strength of each of these positions was, by
the skill of the engineers, converted into a defence for the assaulting
parties while securing their positions for final attack. All the troops
with General Scott in the valley of Mexico, except a part of the
division of General Quitman at San Augustin Tlalpam and the brigade of
Garland (Worth's division) at San Antonio, were engaged at the battle of
Contreras, or were on their way, in obedience to the orders of their
chief, to reinforce those who were engaged. The assault was made on the
morning of the 20th, and in less than half an hour from the sound of the
advance the position was in our hands, with many prisoners and large
quantities of ordnance and other stores. The brigade commanded by
General Riley was from its position the most conspicuous in the final
assault, but all did well, volunteers and regulars.

From the point occupied by Garland's brigade we could see the progress
made at Contreras and the movement of troops toward the flank and rear
of the enemy opposing us. The Mexicans all the way back to the city
could see the same thing, and their conduct showed plainly that they did
not enjoy the sight. We moved out at once, and found them gone from our
immediate front. Clarke's brigade of Worth's division now moved west
over the point of the Pedregal, and after having passed to the north
sufficiently to clear San Antonio, turned east and got on the causeway
leading to Churubusco and the City of Mexico. When he approached
Churubusco his left, under Colonel Hoffman, attacked a tete-de-pont at
that place and brought on an engagement. About an hour after, Garland
was ordered to advance directly along the causeway, and got up in time
to take part in the engagement. San Antonio was found evacuated, the
evacuation having probably taken place immediately upon the enemy seeing
the stars and stripes waving over Contreras.

The troops that had been engaged at Contreras, and even then on their
way to that battle-field, were moved by a causeway west of, and parallel
to the one by way of San Antonio and Churubusco. It was expected by the
commanding general that these troops would move north sufficiently far
to flank the enemy out of his position at Churubusco, before turning
east to reach the San Antonio road, but they did not succeed in this,
and Churubusco proved to be about the severest battle fought in the
valley of Mexico. General Scott coming upon the battle-field about this
juncture, ordered two brigades, under Shields, to move north and turn
the right of the enemy. This Shields did, but not without hard fighting
and heavy loss. The enemy finally gave way, leaving in our hands
prisoners, artillery and small arms. The balance of the causeway held
by the enemy, up to the very gates of the city, fell in like manner. I
recollect at this place that some of the gunners who had stood their
ground, were deserters from General Taylor's army on the Rio Grande.

Both the strategy and tactics displayed by General Scott in these
various engagements of the 20th of August, 1847, were faultless as I
look upon them now, after the lapse of so many years. As before stated,
the work of the engineer officers who made the reconnoissances and led
the different commands to their destinations, was so perfect that the
chief was able to give his orders to his various subordinates with all
the precision he could use on an ordinary march. I mean, up to the
points from which the attack was to commence. After that point is
reached the enemy often induces a change of orders not before
contemplated. The enemy outside the city outnumbered our soldiery quite
three to one, but they had become so demoralized by the succession of
defeats this day, that the City of Mexico could have been entered
without much further bloodshed. In fact, Captain Philip Kearney
--afterwards a general in the war of the rebellion--rode with a squadron
of cavalry to the very gates of the city, and would no doubt have
entered with his little force, only at that point he was badly wounded,
as were several of his officers. He had not heard the call for a halt.

General Franklin Pierce had joined the army in Mexico, at Puebla, a
short time before the advance upon the capital commenced. He had
consequently not been in any of the engagements of the war up to the
battle of Contreras. By an unfortunate fall of his horse on the
afternoon of the 19th he was painfully injured. The next day, when his
brigade, with the other troops engaged on the same field, was ordered
against the flank and rear of the enemy guarding the different points of
the road from San Augustin Tlalpam to the city, General Pierce attempted
to accompany them. He was not sufficiently recovered to do so, and
fainted. This circumstance gave rise to exceedingly unfair and unjust
criticisms of him when he became a candidate for the Presidency.
Whatever General Pierce's qualifications may have been for the
Presidency, he was a gentleman and a man of courage. I was not a
supporter of him politically, but I knew him more intimately than I did
any other of the volunteer generals.

General Scott abstained from entering the city at this time, because Mr.
Nicholas P. Trist, the commissioner on the part of the United States to
negotiate a treaty of peace with Mexico, was with the army, and either
he or General Scott thought--probably both of them--that a treaty would
be more possible while the Mexican government was in possession of the
capital than if it was scattered and the capital in the hands of an
invader. Be this as it may, we did not enter at that time. The army
took up positions along the slopes of the mountains south of the city,
as far west as Tacubaya. Negotiations were at once entered into with
Santa Anna, who was then practically THE GOVERNMENT and the immediate
commander of all the troops engaged in defence of the country. A truce
was signed which denied to either party the right to strengthen its
position, or to receive reinforcements during the continuance of the
armistices, but authorized General Scott to draw supplies for his army
from the city in the meantime.

Negotiations were commenced at once and were kept up vigorously between
Mr. Trist and the commissioners appointed on the part of Mexico, until
the 2d of September. At that time Mr. Trist handed in his ultimatum.
Texas was to be given up absolutely by Mexico, and New Mexico and
California ceded to the United States for a stipulated sum to be
afterwards determined. I do not suppose Mr. Trist had any discretion
whatever in regard to boundaries. The war was one of conquest, in the
interest of an institution, and the probabilities are that private
instructions were for the acquisition of territory out of which new
States might be carved. At all events the Mexicans felt so outraged at
the terms proposed that they commenced preparations for defence, without
giving notice of the termination of the armistice. The terms of the
truce had been violated before, when teams had been sent into the city
to bring out supplies for the army. The first train entering the city
was very severely threatened by a mob. This, however, was apologized for
by the authorities and all responsibility for it denied; and thereafter,
to avoid exciting the Mexican people and soldiery, our teams with their
escorts were sent in at night, when the troops were in barracks and the
citizens in bed. The circumstance was overlooked and negotiations
continued. As soon as the news reached General Scott of the second
violation of the armistice, about the 4th of September, he wrote a
vigorous note to President Santa Anna, calling his attention to it, and,
receiving an unsatisfactory reply, declared the armistice at an end.

General Scott, with Worth's division, was now occupying Tacubaya, a
village some four miles south-west of the City of Mexico, and extending
from the base up the mountain-side for the distance of half a mile.
More than a mile west, and also a little above the plain, stands Molino
del Rey. The mill is a long stone structure, one story high and several
hundred feet in length. At the period of which I speak General Scott
supposed a portion of the mill to be used as a foundry for the casting
of guns. This, however, proved to be a mistake. It was valuable to the
Mexicans because of the quantity of grain it contained. The building is
flat roofed, and a line of sand-bags over the outer walls rendered the
top quite a formidable defence for infantry. Chapultepec is a mound
springing up from the plain to the height of probably three hundred
feet, and almost in a direct line between Molino del Rey and the western
part of the city. It was fortified both on the top and on the rocky and
precipitous sides.