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Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete

U >> Ulysses S. Grant >> Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete




"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."


On the 25th I received a dispatch from General Sheridan, inquiring where
Sherman was aiming for, and if I could give him definite information as
to the points he might be expected to move on, this side of Charlotte,
North Carolina. In answer, the following telegram was sent him:


"CITY POINT, VA., February 25, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Sherman's movements will depend on the amount of opposition
he meets with from the enemy. If strongly opposed, he may possibly have
to fall back to Georgetown, S. C., and fit out for a new start. I
think, however, all danger for the necessity of going to that point has
passed. I believe he has passed Charlotte. He may take Fayetteville on
his way to Goldsboro'. If you reach Lynchburg, you will have to be
guided in your after movements by the information you obtain. Before
you could possibly reach Sherman, I think you would find him moving from
Goldsboro' towards Raleigh, or engaging the enemy strongly posted at one
or the other of these places, with railroad communications opened from
his army to Wilmington or New Bern.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."


General Sheridan moved from Winchester on the 27th of February, with two
divisions of cavalry, numbering about five thousand each. On the 1st of
March he secured the bridge, which the enemy attempted to destroy,
across the middle fork of the Shenandoah, at Mount Crawford, and entered
Staunton on the 2d, the enemy having retreated to Waynesboro'. Thence
he pushed on to Waynesboro', where he found the enemy in force in an
intrenched position, under General Early. Without stopping to make a
reconnoissance, an immediate attack was made, the position was carried,
and sixteen hundred prisoners, eleven pieces of artillery, with horses
and caissons complete, two hundred wagons and teams loaded with
subsistence, and seventeen battle-flags, were captured. The prisoners,
under an escort of fifteen hundred men, were sent back to Winchester.
Thence he marched on Charlottesville, destroying effectually the
railroad and bridges as he went, which place he reached on the 3d. Here
he remained two days, destroying the railroad towards Richmond and
Lynchburg, including the large iron bridges over the north and south
forks of the Rivanna River and awaited the arrival of his trains. This
necessary delay caused him to abandon the idea of capturing Lynchburg.
On the morning of the 6th, dividing his force into two columns, he sent
one to Scottsville, whence it marched up the James River Canal to New
Market, destroying every lock, and in many places the bank of the canal.
From here a force was pushed out from this column to Duiguidsville, to
obtain possession of the bridge across the James River at that place,
but failed. The enemy burned it on our approach. The enemy also burned
the bridge across the river at Hardwicksville. The other column moved
down the railroad towards Lynchburg, destroying it as far as Amherst
Court House, sixteen miles from Lynchburg; thence across the country,
uniting with the column at New Market. The river being very high, his
pontoons would not reach across it; and the enemy having destroyed the
bridges by which he had hoped to cross the river and get on the South
Side Railroad about Farmville, and destroy it to Appomattox Court House,
the only thing left for him was to return to Winchester or strike a base
at the White House. Fortunately, he chose the latter. From New Market
he took up his line of march, following the canal towards Richmond,
destroying every lock upon it and cutting the banks wherever
practicable, to a point eight miles east of Goochland, concentrating the
whole force at Columbia on the 10th. Here he rested one day, and sent
through by scouts information of his whereabouts and purposes, and a
request for supplies to meet him at White House, which reached me on the
night of the 12th. An infantry force was immediately sent to get
possession of White House, and supplies were forwarded. Moving from
Columbia in a direction to threaten Richmond, to near Ashland Station,
he crossed the Annas, and after having destroyed all the bridges and
many miles of the railroad, proceeded down the north bank of the
Pamunkey to White House, which place he reached on the 19th.

Previous to this the following communication was sent to General Thomas:


"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, March 7, 1865--9.30 A.M.

"GENERAL:--I think it will be advisable now for you to repair the
railroad in East Tennessee, and throw a good force up to Bull's Gap and
fortify there. Supplies at Knoxville could always be got forward as
required. With Bull's Gap fortified, you can occupy as outposts about
all of East Tennessee, and be prepared, if it should be required of you
in the spring, to make a campaign towards Lynchburg, or into North
Carolina. I do not think Stoneman should break the road until he gets
into Virginia, unless it should be to cut off rolling-stock that may be
caught west of that.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THOMAS."


Thus it will be seen that in March, 1865, General Canby was moving an
adequate force against Mobile and the army defending it under General
Dick Taylor; Thomas was pushing out two large and well-appointed cavalry
expeditions--one from Middle Tennessee under Brevet Major-General Wilson
against the enemy's vital points in Alabama, the other from East
Tennessee, under Major-General Stoneman, towards Lynchburg--and
assembling the remainder of his available forces, preparatory to
commence offensive operations from East Tennessee; General Sheridan's
cavalry was at White House; the armies of the Potomac and James were
confronting the enemy, under Lee, in his defences of Richmond and
Petersburg; General Sherman with his armies, reinforced by that of
General Schofield, was at Goldsboro'; General Pope was making
preparations for a spring campaign against the enemy under Kirby Smith
and Price, west of the Mississippi; and General Hancock was
concentrating a force in the vicinity of Winchester, Virginia, to guard
against invasion or to operate offensively, as might prove necessary.

After the long march by General Sheridan's cavalry over winter roads, it
was necessary to rest and refit at White House. At this time the
greatest source of uneasiness to me was the fear that the enemy would
leave his strong lines about Petersburg and Richmond for the purpose of
uniting with Johnston, and before he was driven from them by battle, or
I was prepared to make an effectual pursuit. On the 24th of March,
General Sheridan moved from White House, crossed the James River at
Jones's Landing, and formed a junction with the Army of the Potomac in
front of Petersburg on the 27th. During this move, General Ord sent
forces to cover the crossings of the Chickahominy.

On the 24th of March the following instructions for a general movement
of the armies operating against Richmond were issued:


"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, March 24, 1865.

"GENERAL: On the 29th instant the armies operating against Richmond
will be moved by our left, for the double purpose of turning the enemy
out of his present position around Petersburg, and to insure the success
of the cavalry under General Sheridan, which will start at the same
time, in its efforts to reach and destroy the South Side and Danville
railroads. Two corps of the Army of the Potomac will be moved at first
in two columns, taking the two roads crossing Hatcher's Run, nearest
where the present line held by us strikes that stream, both moving
towards Dinwiddie Court House.

"The cavalry under General Sheridan, joined by the division now under
General Davies, will move at the same time by the Weldon Road and the
Jerusalem Plank Road, turning west from the latter before crossing the
Nottoway, and west with the whole column before reaching Stony Creek.
General Sheridan will then move independently, under other instructions
which will be given him. All dismounted cavalry belonging to the Army
of the Potomac, and the dismounted cavalry from the Middle Military
Division not required for guarding property belonging to their arm of
service, will report to Brigadier-General Benham, to be added to the
defences of City Point. Major-General Parke will be left in command of
all the army left for holding the lines about Petersburg and City Point,
subject of course to orders from the commander of the Army of the
Potomac. The 9th army corps will be left intact, to hold the present
line of works so long as the whole line now occupied by us is held. If,
however, the troops to the left of the 9th corps are withdrawn, then the
left of the corps may be thrown back so as to occupy the position held
by the army prior to the capture of the Weldon Road. All troops to the
left of the 9th corps will be held in readiness to move at the shortest
notice by such route as may be designated when the order is given.

"General Ord will detach three divisions, two white and one colored, or
so much of them as he can, and hold his present lines, and march for the
present left of the Army of the Potomac. In the absence of further
orders, or until further orders are given, the white divisions will
follow the left column of the Army of the Potomac, and the colored
division the right column. During the movement Major-General Weitzel
will be left in command of all the forces remaining behind from the Army
of the James.

"The movement of troops from the Army of the James will commence on the
night of the 27th instant. General Ord will leave behind the minimum
number of cavalry necessary for picket duty, in the absence of the main
army. A cavalry expedition, from General Ord's command, will also be
started from Suffolk, to leave there on Saturday, the 1st of April,
under Colonel Sumner, for the purpose of cutting the railroad about
Hicksford. This, if accomplished, will have to be a surprise, and
therefore from three to five hundred men will be sufficient. They
should, however, be supported by all the infantry that can be spared
from Norfolk and Portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavalry crosses
the Blackwater. The crossing should probably be at Uniten. Should
Colonel Sumner succeed in reaching the Weldon Road, he will be
instructed to do all the damage possible to the triangle of roads
between Hicksford, Weldon, and Gaston. The railroad bridge at Weldon
being fitted up for the passage of carriages, it might be practicable to
destroy any accumulation of supplies the enemy may have collected south
of the Roanoke. All the troops will move with four days' rations in
haversacks and eight days' in wagons. To avoid as much hauling as
possible, and to give the Army of the James the same number of days'
supplies with the Army of the Potomac, General Ord will direct his
commissary and quartermaster to have sufficient supplies delivered at
the terminus of the road to fill up in passing. Sixty rounds of
ammunition per man will be taken in wagons, and as much grain as the
transportation on hand will carry, after taking the specified amount of
other supplies. The densely wooded country in which the army has to
operate making the use of much artillery impracticable, the amount taken
with the army will be reduced to six or eight guns to each division, at
the option of the army commanders.

"All necessary preparations for carrying these directions into operation
may be commenced at once. The reserves of the 9th corps should be
massed as much as possible. While I would not now order an
unconditional attack on the enemy's line by them, they should be ready
and should make the attack if the enemy weakens his line in their front,
without waiting for orders. In case they carry the line, then the whole
of the 9th corps could follow up so as to join or co-operate with the
balance of the army. To prepare for this, the 9th corps will have
rations issued to them, same as the balance of the army. General
Weitzel will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found at all
practicable to break through at any point, he will do so. A success
north of the James should be followed up with great promptness. An
attack will not be feasible unless it is found that the enemy has
detached largely. In that case it may be regarded as evident that the
enemy are relying upon their local reserves principally for the defence
of Richmond. Preparations may be made for abandoning all the line north
of the James, except inclosed works only to be abandoned, however, after
a break is made in the lines of the enemy.

"By these instructions a large part of the armies operating against
Richmond is left behind. The enemy, knowing this, may, as an only
chance, strip their lines to the merest skeleton, in the hope of
advantage not being taken of it, while they hurl everything against the
moving column, and return. It cannot be impressed too strongly upon
commanders of troops left in the trenches not to allow this to occur
without taking advantage of it. The very fact of the enemy coming out
to attack, if he does so, might be regarded as almost conclusive
evidence of such a weakening of his lines. I would have it particularly
enjoined upon corps commanders that, in case of an attack from the
enemy, those not attacked are not to wait for orders from the commanding
officer of the army to which they belong, but that they will move
promptly, and notify the commander of their action. I would also enjoin
the same action on the part of division commanders when other parts of
their corps are engaged. In like manner, I would urge the importance of
following up a repulse of the enemy.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERALS MEADE, ORD, AND SHERIDAN."


Early on the morning of the 25th the enemy assaulted our lines in front
of the 9th corps (which held from the Appomattox River towards our
left), and carried Fort Stedman, and a part of the line to the right and
left of it, established themselves and turned the guns of the fort
against us, but our troops on either flank held their ground until the
reserves were brought up, when the enemy was driven back with a heavy
loss in killed and wounded, and one thousand nine hundred prisoners.
Our loss was sixty-eight killed, three hundred and thirty-seven wounded,
and five hundred and six missing. General Meade at once ordered the
other corps to advance and feel the enemy in their respective fronts.
Pushing forward, they captured and held the enemy's strongly intrenched
picket-line in front of the 2d and 6th corps, and eight hundred and
thirty-four prisoners. The enemy made desperate attempts to retake this
line, but without success. Our loss in front of these was fifty-two
killed, eight hundred and sixty-four wounded, and two hundred and seven
missing. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far greater.

General Sherman having got his troops all quietly in camp about
Goldsboro', and his preparations for furnishing supplies to them
perfected, visited me at City Point on the 27th of March, and stated
that he would be ready to move, as he had previously written me, by the
10th of April, fully equipped and rationed for twenty days, if it should
become necessary to bring his command to bear against Lee's army, in
co-operation with our forces in front of Richmond and Petersburg.
General Sherman proposed in this movement to threaten Raleigh, and then,
by turning suddenly to the right, reach the Roanoke at Gaston or
thereabouts, whence he could move on to the Richmond and Danville
Railroad, striking it in the vicinity of Burkesville, or join the armies
operating against Richmond, as might be deemed best. This plan he was
directed to carry into execution, if he received no further directions
in the meantime. I explained to him the movement I had ordered to
commence on the 29th of March. That if it should not prove as entirely
successful as I hoped, I would cut the cavalry loose to destroy the
Danville and South Side railroads, and thus deprive the enemy of further
supplies, and also to prevent the rapid concentration of Lee's and
Johnston's armies.

I had spent days of anxiety lest each morning should bring the report
that the enemy had retreated the night before. I was firmly convinced
that Sherman's crossing the Roanoke would be the signal for Lee to
leave. With Johnston and him combined, a long, tedious, and expensive
campaign, consuming most of the summer, might become necessary. By
moving out I would put the army in better condition for pursuit, and
would at least, by the destruction of the Danville Road, retard the
concentration of the two armies of Lee and Johnston, and cause the enemy
to abandon much material that he might otherwise save. I therefore
determined not to delay the movement ordered.

On the night of the 27th, Major-General Ord, with two divisions of the
24th corps, Major-General Gibbon commanding, and one division of the
25th corps, Brigadier-General Birney commanding, and MacKenzie's
cavalry, took up his line of march in pursuance of the foregoing
instructions, and reached the position assigned him near Hatcher's Run
on the morning of the 29th. On the 28th the following instructions were
given to General Sheridan:


"CITY POINT, VA., March 28, 1865.

"GENERAL:--The 5th army corps will move by the Vaughn Road at three A.M.
to-morrow morning. The 2d moves at about nine A.M., having but about
three miles to march to reach the point designated for it to take on the
right of the 5th corps, after the latter reaching Dinwiddie Court House.
Move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and without being
confined to any particular road or roads. You may go out by the nearest
roads in rear of the 5th corps, pass by its left, and passing near to or
through Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the enemy as soon as you
can. It is not the intention to attack the enemy in his intrenched
position, but to force him out, if possible. Should he come out and
attack us, or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with your
entire force in your own way, and with the full reliance that the army
will engage or follow, as circumstances will dictate. I shall be on the
field, and will probably be able to communicate with you. Should I not
do so, and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched
line, you may cut loose and push for the Danville Road. If you find it
practicable, I would like you to cross the South Side Road, between
Petersburg and Burkesville, and destroy it to some extent. I would not
advise much detention, however, until you reach the Danville Road, which
I would like you to strike as near to the Appomattox as possible. Make
your destruction on that road as complete as possible. You can then
pass on to the South Side Road, west of Burkesville, and destroy that in
like manner.

"After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads, which
are now the only avenues of supply to Lee's army, you may return to this
army, selecting your road further south, or you may go on into North
Carolina and join General Sherman. Should you select the latter course,
get the information to me as early as possible, so that I may send
orders to meet you at Goldsboro'.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."


On the morning of the 29th the movement commenced. At night the cavalry
was at Dinwiddie Court House, and the left of our infantry line extended
to the Quaker Road, near its intersection with the Boydton Plank Road.
The position of the troops from left to right was as follows: Sheridan,
Warren, Humphreys, Ord, Wright, Parke.

Everything looked favorable to the defeat of the enemy and the capture
of Petersburg and Richmond, if the proper effort was made. I therefore
addressed the following communication to General Sheridan, having
previously informed him verbally not to cut loose for the raid
contemplated in his orders until he received notice from me to do so:


"GRAVELLY CREEK, March 29, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Our line is now unbroken from the Appomattox to Dinwiddie.
We are all ready, however, to give up all, from the Jerusalem Plank Road
to Hatcher's Run, whenever the forces can be used advantageously. After
getting into line south of Hatcher's, we pushed forward to find the
enemy's position. General Griffin was attacked near where the Quaker
Road intersects the Boydton Road, but repulsed it easily, capturing
about one hundred men. Humphreys reached Dabney's Mill, and was pushing
on when last heard from.

"I now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before
going back. I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after the
enemy's roads at present. In the morning push around the enemy, if you
can, and get on to his right rear. The movements of the enemy's cavalry
may, of course, modify your action. We will act all together as one
army here, until it is seen what can be done with the enemy. The
signal-officer at Cobb's Hill reported, at half-past eleven A.M., that a
cavalry column had passed that point from Richmond towards Petersburg,
taking forty minutes to pass.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."


From the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st the rain fell in
such torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled vehicle, except
as corduroy roads were laid in front of them. During the 30th, Sheridan
advanced from Dinwiddie Court House towards Five Forks, where he found
the enemy in full force. General Warren advanced and extended his line
across the Boydton Plank Road to near the White Oak Road, with a view of
getting across the latter; but, finding the enemy strong in his front
and extending beyond his left, was directed to hold on where he was, and
fortify. General Humphreys drove the enemy from his front into his main
line on the Hatcher, near Burgess's Mills. Generals Ord, Wright, and
Parke made examinations in their fronts to determine the feasibility of
an assault on the enemy's lines. The two latter reported favorably.
The enemy confronting us as he did, at every point from Richmond to our
extreme left, I conceived his lines must be weakly held, and could be
penetrated if my estimate of his forces was correct. I determined,
therefore, to extend our line no farther, but to reinforce General
Sheridan with a corps of infantry, and thus enable him to cut loose and
turn the enemy's right flank, and with the other corps assault the
enemy's lines. The result of the offensive effort of the enemy the week
before, when he assaulted Fort Stedman, particularly favored this. The
enemy's intrenched picket-line captured by us at that time threw the
lines occupied by the belligerents so close together at some points that
it was but a moment's run from one to the other. Preparations were at
once made to relieve General Humphreys's corps, to report to General
Sheridan; but the condition of the roads prevented immediate movement.
On the morning of the 31st, General Warren reported favorably to getting
possession of the White Oak Road, and was directed to do so. To
accomplish this, he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps,
which was attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven back on the
2d division before it had time to form, and it, in turn, forced back
upon the 3d division, when the enemy was checked. A division of the 2d
corps was immediately sent to his support, the enemy driven back with
heavy loss, and possession of the White Oak Road gained. Sheridan
advanced, and with a portion of his cavalry got possession of the Five
Forks; but the enemy, after the affair with the 5th corps, reinforced
the rebel cavalry, defending that point with infantry, and forced him
back towards Dinwiddie Court House. Here General Sheridan displayed
great generalship. Instead of retreating with his whole command on the
main army, to tell the story of superior forces encountered, he deployed
his cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough to take charge of
the horses. This compelled the enemy to deploy over a vast extent of
wooded and broken country, and made his progress slow. At this juncture
he dispatched to me what had taken place, and that he was dropping back
slowly on Dinwiddie Court House. General Mackenzie's cavalry and one
division of the 5th corps were immediately ordered to his assistance.
Soon after receiving a report from General Meade that Humphreys could
hold our position on the Boydton Road, and that the other two divisions
of the 5th corps could go to Sheridan, they were so ordered at once.
Thus the operations of the day necessitated the sending of Warren,
because of his accessibility, instead of Humphreys, as was intended, and
precipitated intended movements. On the morning of the 1st of April,
General Sheridan, reinforced by General Warren, drove the enemy back on
Five Forks, where, late in the evening, he assaulted and carried his
strongly fortified position, capturing all his artillery and between
five and six thousand prisoners.

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