Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete

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The army evacuated Alexandria on the 14th of May, after considerable
skirmishing with the enemy's advance, and reached Morganzia and Point
Coupee near the end of the month. The disastrous termination of this
expedition, and the lateness of the season, rendered impracticable the
carrying out of my plans of a movement in force sufficient to insure the
capture of Mobile.

On the 23d of March, Major-General Steele left Little Rock with the 7th
army corps, to cooperate with General Banks's expedition on the Red
River, and reached Arkadelphia on the 28th. On the 16th of April, after
driving the enemy before him, he was joined, near Elkin's Ferry, in
Washita County, by General Thayer, who had marched from Fort Smith.
After several severe skirmishes, in which the enemy was defeated,
General Steele reached Camden, which he occupied about the middle of
April.

On learning the defeat and consequent retreat of General Banks on Red
River, and the loss of one of his own trains at Mark's Mill, in Dallas
County, General Steele determined to fall back to the Arkansas River.
He left Camden on the 26th of April, and reached Little Rock on the 2d
of May. On the 30th of April, the enemy attacked him while crossing
Saline River at Jenkins's Ferry, but was repulsed with considerable
loss. Our loss was about six hundred in killed, wounded and prisoners.

Major-General Canby, who had been assigned to the command of the
"Military Division of the West Mississippi," was therefore directed to
send the 19th army corps to join the armies operating against Richmond,
and to limit the remainder of his command to such operations as might be
necessary to hold the positions and lines of communications he then
occupied.

Before starting General A. J. Smith's troops back to Sherman, General
Canby sent a part of it to disperse a force of the enemy that was
collecting near the Mississippi River. General Smith met and defeated
this force near Lake Chicot on the 5th of June. Our loss was about
forty killed and seventy wounded.

In the latter part of July, General Canby sent Major-General Gordon
Granger, with such forces as he could collect, to co-operate with
Admiral Farragut against the defences of Mobile Bay. On the 8th of
August, Fort Gaines surrendered to the combined naval and land forces.
Fort Powell was blown up and abandoned.

On the 9th, Fort Morgan was invested, and, after a severe bombardment,
surrendered on the 23d. The total captures amounted to one thousand
four hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and one hundred and four pieces
of artillery.

About the last of August, it being reported that the rebel General
Price, with a force of about ten thousand men, had reached Jacksonport,
on his way to invade Missouri, General A. J. Smith's command, then en
route from Memphis to join Sherman, was ordered to Missouri. A cavalry
force was also, at the same time, sent from Memphis, under command of
Colonel Winslow. This made General Rosecrans's forces superior to those
of Price, and no doubt was entertained he would be able to check Price
and drive him back; while the forces under General Steele, in Arkansas,
would cut off his retreat. On the 26th day of September, Price attacked
Pilot Knob and forced the garrison to retreat, and thence moved north to
the Missouri River, and continued up that river towards Kansas. General
Curtis, commanding Department of Kansas, immediately collected such
forces as he could to repel the invasion of Kansas, while General
Rosecrans's cavalry was operating in his rear.

The enemy was brought to battle on the Big Blue and defeated, with the
loss of nearly all his artillery and trains and a large number of
prisoners. He made a precipitate retreat to Northern Arkansas. The
impunity with which Price was enabled to roam over the State of Missouri
for a long time, and the incalculable mischief done by him, show to how
little purpose a superior force may be used. There is no reason why
General Rosecrans should not have concentrated his forces, and beaten
and driven Price before the latter reached Pilot Knob.

September 20th, the enemy's cavalry, under Forrest, crossed the
Tennessee near Waterloo, Alabama, and on the 23d attacked the garrison
at Athens, consisting of six hundred men, which capitulated on the 24th.
Soon after the surrender two regiments of reinforcements arrived, and
after a severe fight were compelled to surrender. Forrest destroyed the
railroad westward, captured the garrison at Sulphur Branch trestle,
skirmished with the garrison at Pulaski on the 27th, and on the same day
cut the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad near Tullahoma and Dechard.
On the morning of the 30th, one column of Forrest's command, under
Buford, appeared before Huntsville, and summoned the surrender of the
garrison. Receiving an answer in the negative, he remained in the
vicinity of the place until next morning, when he again summoned its
surrender, and received the same reply as on the night before. He
withdrew in the direction of Athens which place had been regarrisoned,
and attacked it on the afternoon of the 1st of October, but without
success. On the morning of the 2d he renewed his attack, but was
handsomely repulsed.

Another column under Forrest appeared before Columbia on the morning of
the 1st, but did not make an attack. On the morning of the 3d he moved
towards Mount Pleasant. While these operations were going on, every
exertion was made by General Thomas to destroy the forces under Forrest
before he could recross the Tennessee, but was unable to prevent his
escape to Corinth, Mississippi.

In September, an expedition under General Burbridge was sent to destroy
the saltworks at Saltville, Virginia. He met the enemy on the 2d of
October, about three miles and a half from Saltville, and drove him into
his strongly intrenched position around the salt-works, from which he
was unable to dislodge him. During the night he withdrew his command
and returned to Kentucky.

General Sherman, immediately after the fall of Atlanta, put his armies
in camp in and about the place, and made all preparations for refitting
and supplying them for future service. The great length of road from
Atlanta to the Cumberland River, however, which had to be guarded,
allowed the troops but little rest.

During this time Jefferson Davis made a speech in Macon, Georgia, which
was reported in the papers of the South, and soon became known to the
whole country, disclosing the plans of the enemy, thus enabling General
Sherman to fully meet them. He exhibited the weakness of supposing that
an army that had been beaten and fearfully decimated in a vain attempt
at the defensive, could successfully undertake the offensive against the
army that had so often defeated it.

In execution of this plan, Hood, with this army, was soon reported to
the south-west of Atlanta. Moving far to Sherman's right, he succeeded
in reaching the railroad about Big Shanty, and moved north on it.

General Sherman, leaving a force to hold Atlanta, with the remainder of
his army fell upon him and drove him to Gadsden, Alabama. Seeing the
constant annoyance he would have with the roads to his rear if he
attempted to hold Atlanta, General Sherman proposed the abandonment and
destruction of that place, with all the railroads leading to it, and
telegraphed me as follows:

"CENTREVILLE, GEORGIA", October 10--noon.

"Dispatch about Wilson just received. Hood is now crossing Coosa River,
twelve miles below Rome, bound west. If he passes over the Mobile and
Ohio road, had I not better execute the plan of my letter sent by
Colonel Porter, and leave General Thomas with the troops now in
Tennessee to defend the State? He will have an ample force when the
reinforcements ordered reach Nashville.

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT."

For a full understanding of the plan referred to in this dispatch, I
quote from the letter sent by Colonel Porter:

"I will therefore give my opinion, that your army and Canby's should be
reinforced to the maximum; that after you get Wilmington, you strike for
Savannah and the river; that Canby be instructed to hold the Mississippi
River, and send a force to get Columbus, Georgia, either by the way of
the Alabama or the Appalachicola, and that I keep Hood employed and put
my army in final order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston,
to be ready as soon as Wilmington is sealed as to commerce and the city
of Savannah is in our possession." This was in reply to a letter of
mine of date September 12th, in answer to a dispatch of his containing
substantially the same proposition, and in which I informed him of a
proposed movement against Wilmington, and of the situation in Virginia,
etc.

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,

"October 11, 1864--11 A.M.

"Your dispatch of October 10th received. Does it not look as if Hood
was going to attempt the invasion of Middle Tennessee, using the Mobile
and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston roads to supply his base on the
Tennessee River, about Florence or Decatur? If he does this, he ought
to be met and prevented from getting north of the Tennessee River. If
you were to cut loose, I do not believe you would meet Hood's army, but
would be bushwhacked by all the old men and little boys, and such
railroad guards as are still left at home. Hood would probably strike
for Nashville, thinking that by going north he could inflict greater
damage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south. If there
is any way of getting at Hood's army, I would prefer that, but I must
trust to your own judgment. I find I shall not be able to send a force
from here to act with you on Savannah. Your movements, therefore, will
be independent of mine; at least until the fall of Richmond takes place.
I am afraid Thomas, with such lines of road as he has to protect, could
not prevent Hood from going north. With Wilson turned loose, with all
your cavalry, you will find the rebels put much more on the defensive
than heretofore.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."

"KINGSTON, GEORGIA, "October 11--11 A.M.

"Hood moved his army from Palmetto Station across by Dallas and
Cedartown, and is now on the Coosa River, south of Rome. He threw one
corps on my road at Acworth, and I was forced to follow. I hold Atlanta
with the 20th corps, and have strong detachments along my line. This
reduces my active force to a comparatively small army. We cannot remain
here on the defensive. With the twenty-five thousand men, and the bold
cavalry he has, he can constantly break my roads. I would infinitely
prefer to make a wreck of the road, and of the country from Chattanooga
to Atlanta including the latter city send back all my wounded and
worthless, and with my effective army, move through Georgia, smashing
things, to the sea. Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I
believe he will be forced to follow me. Instead of my being on the
defensive, I would be on the offensive; instead of guessing at what he
means to do, he would have to guess at my plans. The difference in war
is full twenty-five per cent. I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the
mouth of the Chattahoochee.

"Answer quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long.

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT."

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, "October 11,1864--11.30 P.M.

"Your dispatch of to-day received. If you are satisfied the trip to the
sea-coast can be made, holding the line of the Tennessee River firmly,
you may make it, destroying all the railroad south of Dalton or
Chattanooga, as you think best.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."

It was the original design to hold Atlanta, and by getting through to
the coast, with a garrison left on the southern railroads, leading east
and west, through Georgia, to effectually sever the east from the west.
In other words, cut the would-be Confederacy in two again, as it had
been cut once by our gaining possession of the Mississippi River.
General Sherman's plan virtually effected this object.

General Sherman commenced at once his preparations for his proposed
movement, keeping his army in position in the meantime to watch Hood.
Becoming satisfied that Hood had moved westward from Gadsden across Sand
Mountain, General Sherman sent the 4th corps, Major-General Stanley
commanding, and the 23d corps, Major-General Schofield commanding, back
to Chattanooga to report to Major-General Thomas, at Nashville, whom he
had placed in command of all the troops of his military division, save
the four army corps and cavalry division he designed to move with
through Georgia. With the troops thus left at his disposal, there was
little doubt that General Thomas could hold the line of the Tennessee,
or, in the event Hood should force it, would be able to concentrate and
beat him in battle. It was therefore readily consented to that Sherman
should start for the sea-coast.

Having concentrated his troops at Atlanta by the 14th of November, he
commenced his march, threatening both Augusta and Macon. His coming-out
point could not be definitely fixed. Having to gather his subsistence as
he marched through the country, it was not impossible that a force
inferior to his own might compel him to head for such point as he could
reach, instead of such as he might prefer. The blindness of the enemy,
however, in ignoring his movement, and sending Hood's army, the only
considerable force he had west of Richmond and east of the Mississippi
River, northward on an offensive campaign, left the whole country open,
and Sherman's route to his own choice.

How that campaign was conducted, how little opposition was met with, the
condition of the country through which the armies passed, the capture of
Fort McAllister, on the Savannah River, and the occupation of Savannah
on the 21st of December, are all clearly set forth in General Sherman's
admirable report.

Soon after General Sherman commenced his march from Atlanta, two
expeditions, one from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and one from Vicksburg,
Mississippi, were started by General Canby to cut the enemy's lines of
communication with Mobile and detain troops in that field. General
Foster, commanding Department of the South, also sent an expedition, via
Broad River, to destroy the railroad between Charleston and Savannah.
The expedition from Vicksburg, under command of Brevet Brigadier-General
E. D. Osband (colonel 3d United States colored cavalry), captured, on
the 27th of November, and destroyed the Mississippi Central Railroad
bridge and trestle-work over Big Black River, near Canton, thirty miles
of the road, and two locomotives, besides large amounts of stores. The
expedition from Baton Rouge was without favorable results. The
expedition from the Department of the South, under the immediate command
of Brigadier-General John P. Hatch, consisting of about five thousand
men of all arms, including a brigade from the navy, proceeded up Broad
River and debarked at Boyd's Neck on the 29th of November, from where it
moved to strike the railroad at Grahamsville. At Honey Hill, about
three miles from Grahamsville, the enemy was found and attacked in a
strongly fortified position, which resulted, after severe fighting, in
our repulse with a loss of seven hundred and forty-six in killed,
wounded, and missing. During the night General Hatch withdrew. On the
6th of December General Foster obtained a position covering the
Charleston and Savannah Railroad, between the Coosawhatchie and
Tulifinny rivers.

Hood, instead of following Sherman, continued his move northward, which
seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. At all events, had I
had the power to command both armies, I should not have changed the
orders under which he seemed to be acting. On the 26th of October, the
advance of Hood's army attacked the garrison at Decatur, Alabama, but
failing to carry the place, withdrew towards Courtland, and succeeded,
in the face of our cavalry, in effecting a lodgment on the north side of
the Tennessee River, near Florence. On the 28th, Forrest reached the
Tennessee, at Fort Heiman, and captured a gunboat and three transports.
On the 2d of November he planted batteries above and below Johnsonville,
on the opposite side of the river, isolating three gunboats and eight
transports. On the 4th the enemy opened his batteries upon the place,
and was replied to from the gunboats and the garrison. The gunboats
becoming disabled were set on fire, as also were the transports, to
prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. About a million and
a half dollars' worth of store and property on the levee and in
storehouses was consumed by fire. On the 5th the enemy disappeared and
crossed to the north side of the Tennessee River, above Johnsonville,
moving towards Clifton, and subsequently joined Hood. On the night of
the 5th, General Schofield, with the advance of the 23d corps, reached
Johnsonville, but finding the enemy gone, was ordered to Pulaski, and
was put in command of all the troopers there, with instruction to watch
the movements of Hood and retard his advance, but not to risk a general
engagement until the arrival of General A. J. Smith's command from
Missouri, and until General Wilson could get his cavalry remounted.

On the 19th, General Hood continued his advance. General Thomas,
retarding him as much as possible, fell back towards Nashville for the
purpose of concentrating his command and gaining time for the arrival of
reinforcements. The enemy coming up with our main force, commanded by
General Schofield, at Franklin, on the 30th, assaulted our works
repeatedly during the afternoon until late at night, but were in every
instance repulsed. His loss in this battle was one thousand seven
hundred and fifty killed, seven hundred and two prisoners, and three
thousand eight hundred wounded. Among his losses were six general
officers killed, six wounded, and one captured. Our entire loss was two
thousand three hundred. This was the first serious opposition the enemy
met with, and I am satisfied was the fatal blow to all his expectations.
During the night, General Schofield fell back towards Nashville. This
left the field to the enemy--not lost by battle, but voluntarily
abandoned--so that General Thomas's whole force might be brought
together. The enemy followed up and commenced the establishment of his
line in front of Nashville on the 2d of December.

As soon as it was ascertained that Hood was crossing the Tennessee
River, and that Price was going out of Missouri, General Rosecrans was
ordered to send to General Thomas the troops of General A. J. Smith's
command, and such other troops as he could spare. The advance of this
reinforcement reached Nashville on the 30th of November.

On the morning of the 15th December, General Thomas attacked Hood in
position, and, in a battle lasting two days, defeated and drove him from
the field in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hand most of his
artillery and many thousand prisoners, including four general officers.

Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient over, as it
appeared to me, the unnecessary delay. This impatience was increased
upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavalry across the
Cumberland into Kentucky. I feared Hood would cross his whole army and
give us great trouble there. After urging upon General Thomas the
necessity of immediately assuming the offensive, I started West to
superintend matters there in person. Reaching Washington City, I
received General Thomas's dispatch announcing his attack upon the enemy,
and the result as far as the battle had progressed. I was delighted.
All fears and apprehensions were dispelled. I am not yet satisfied but
that General Thomas, immediately upon the appearance of Hood before
Nashville, and before he had time to fortify, should have moved out with
his whole force and given him battle, instead of waiting to remount his
cavalry, which delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made it
impracticable to attack earlier than he did. But his final defeat of
Hood was so complete, that it will be accepted as a vindication of that
distinguished officer's judgment.

After Hood's defeat at Nashville he retreated, closely pursued by
cavalry and infantry, to the Tennessee River, being forced to abandon
many pieces of artillery and most of his transportation. On the 28th of
December our advanced forces ascertained that he had made good his
escape to the south side of the river.

About this time, the rains having set in heavily in Tennessee and North
Alabama, making it difficult to move army transportation and artillery,
General Thomas stopped the pursuit by his main force at the Tennessee
River. A small force of cavalry, under Colonel W. J. Palmer, 15th
Pennsylvania Volunteers, continued to follow Hood for some distance,
capturing considerable transportation and all the enemy's
pontoon-bridge. The details of these operations will be found
clearly set forth in General Thomas's report.

A cavalry expedition, under Brevet Major-General Grierson, started from
Memphis on the 21st of December. On the 25th he surprised and captured
Forrest's dismounted camp at Verona, Mississippi, on the Mobile and Ohio
Railroad, destroyed the railroad, sixteen cars loaded with wagons and
pontoons for Hood's army, four thousand new English carbines, and large
amounts of public stores. On the morning of the 28th he attacked and
captured a force of the enemy at Egypt, and destroyed a train of
fourteen cars; thence turning to the south-west, he struck the
Mississippi Central Railroad at Winona, destroyed the factories and
large amounts of stores at Bankston, and the machine-shops and public
property at Grenada, arriving at Vicksburg January 5th.

During the operations in Middle Tennessee, the enemy, with a force under
General Breckinridge, entered East Tennessee. On the 13th of November
he attacked General Gillem, near Morristown, capturing his artillery and
several hundred prisoners. Gillem, with what was left of his command,
retreated to Knoxville. Following up his success, Breckinridge moved to
near Knoxville, but withdrew on the 18th, followed by General Ammen.
Under the directions of General Thomas, General Stoneman concentrated
the commands of Generals Burbridge and Gillem near Bean's Station to
operate against Breckinridge, and destroy or drive him into Virginia
--destroy the salt-works at Saltville, and the railroad into Virginia
as far as he could go without endangering his command. On the 12th of
December he commenced his movement, capturing and dispersing the enemy's
forces wherever he met them. On the 16th he struck the enemy, under
Vaughn, at Marion, completely routing and pursuing him to Wytheville,
capturing all his artillery, trains, and one hundred and ninety-eight
prisoners; and destroyed Wytheville, with its stores and supplies, and
the extensive lead-works near there. Returning to Marion, he met a force
under Breckinridge, consisting, among other troops, of the garrison of
Saltville, that had started in pursuit. He at once made arrangements to
attack it the next morning; but morning found Breckinridge gone. He
then moved directly to Saltville, and destroyed the extensive salt-works
at that place, a large amount of stores, and captured eight pieces of
artillery. Having thus successfully executed his instructions, he
returned General Burbridge to Lexington and General Gillem to Knoxville.

Wilmington, North Carolina, was the most important sea-coast port left
to the enemy through which to get supplies from abroad, and send cotton
and other products out by blockade-runners, besides being a place of
great strategic value. The navy had been making strenuous exertions to
seal the harbor of Wilmington, but with only partial effect. The nature
of the outlet of Cape Fear River was such, that it required watching for
so great a distance that, without possession of the land north of New
Inlet, or Fort Fisher, it was impossible for the navy to entirely close
the harbor against the entrance of blockade-runners.

To secure the possession of this land required the co-operation of a
land force, which I agreed to furnish. Immediately commenced the
assemblage in Hampton Roads, under Admiral D. D. Porter, of the most
formidable armada ever collected for concentration upon one given point.
This necessarily attracted the attention of the enemy, as well as that
of the loyal North; and through the imprudence of the public press, and
very likely of officers of both branches of service, the exact object of
the expedition became a subject of common discussion in the newspapers
both North and South. The enemy, thus warned, prepared to meet it.
This caused a postponement of the expedition until the later part of
November, when, being again called upon by Hon. G. V. Fox, Assistant
Secretary of the Navy, I agreed to furnish the men required at once, and
went myself, in company with Major-General Butler, to Hampton Roads,
where we had a conference with Admiral Porter as to the force required
and the time of starting. A force of six thousand five hundred men was
regarded as sufficient. The time of starting was not definitely
arranged, but it was thought all would be ready by the 6th of December,
if not before. Learning, on the 30th of November, that Bragg had gone
to Georgia, taking with him most of the forces about Wilmington, I
deemed it of the utmost importance that the expedition should reach its
destination before the return of Bragg, and directed General Butler to
make all arrangements for the departure of Major-General Weitzel, who
had been designated to command the land forces, so that the navy might
not be detained one moment.