Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete

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"2d. That you abandon Texas entirely, with the exception of your hold
upon the Rio Grande. This can be held with four thousand men, if they
will turn their attention immediately to fortifying their positions. At
least one-half of the force required for this service might be taken
from the colored troops.

"3d. By properly fortifying on the Mississippi River, the force to
guard it from Port Hudson to New Orleans can be reduced to ten thousand
men, if not to a less number. Six thousand more would then hold all the
rest of the territory necessary to hold until active operations can
again be resumed west of the river. According to your last return, this
would give you a force of over thirty thousand effective men with which
to move against Mobile. To this I expect to add five thousand men from
Missouri. If however, you think the force here stated too small to hold
the territory regarded as necessary to hold possession of, I would say
concentrate at least twenty-five thousand men of your present command
for operations against Mobile. With these and such additions as I can
give you from elsewhere, lose no time in making a demonstration, to be
followed by an attack upon Mobile. Two or more iron-clads will be
ordered to report to Admiral Farragut. This gives him a strong naval
fleet with which to co-operate. You can make your own arrangements with
the admiral for his co-operation, and select your own line of approach.
My own idea of the matter is that Pascagoula should be your base; but,
from your long service in the Gulf Department, you will know best about
the matter. It is intended that your movements shall be co-operative
with movements elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon. All I
would now add is, that you commence the concentration of your forces at
once. Preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend doing, and start
at the earliest possible moment.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL N. P. BANKS."

Major-General Meade was instructed that Lee's army would be his
objective point; that wherever Lee went he would go also. For his
movement two plans presented themselves: One to cross the Rapidan below
Lee, moving by his right flank; the other above, moving by his left.
Each presented advantages over the other, with corresponding objections.
By crossing above, Lee would be cut off from all chance of ignoring
Richmond or going north on a raid. But if we took this route, all we
did would have to be done whilst the rations we started with held out;
besides, it separated us from Butler, so that he could not be directed
how to cooperate. If we took the other route, Brandy Station could be
used as a base of supplies until another was secured on the York or
James rivers. Of these, however, it was decided to take the lower
route.

The following letter of instruction was addressed to Major-General B. F.
Butler:

"FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA, April 2, 1864.

"GENERAL:-In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence
at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have cooperative
action of all the armies in the field, as far as this object can be
accomplished.

"It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large
ones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holding
on to the territory already taken from the enemy. But, generally
speaking, concentration can be practically effected by armies moving to
the interior of the enemy's country from the territory they have to
guard. By such movement, they interpose themselves between the enemy
and the country to be guarded, thereby reducing the number necessary to
guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of a part of
the enemy's force, if no greater object is gained. Lee's army and
Richmond being the greater objects towards which our attention must be
directed in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the force we
can against them. The necessity of covering Washington with the Army of
the Potomac, and of covering your department with your army, makes it
impossible to unite these forces at the beginning of any move. I
propose, therefore, what comes nearest this of anything that seems
practicable: The Army of the Potomac will act from its present base,
Lee's army being the objective point. You will collect all the forces
from your command that can be spared from garrison duty--I should say
not less than twenty thousand effective men--to operate on the south
side of James River, Richmond being your objective point. To the force
you already have will be added about ten thousand men from South
Carolina, under Major-General Gillmore, who will command them in person.
Major-General W. F. Smith is ordered to report to you, to command the
troops sent into the field from your own department.

"General Gillmore will be ordered to report to you at Fortress Monroe,
with all the troops on transports, by the 18th instant, or as soon
thereafter as practicable. Should you not receive notice by that time
to move, you will make such disposition of them and your other forces as
you may deem best calculated to deceive the enemy as to the real move to
be made.

"When you are notified to move, take City Point with as much force as
possible. Fortify, or rather intrench, at once, and concentrate all
your troops for the field there as rapidly as you can. From City Point
directions cannot be given at this time for your further movements.

"The fact that has already been stated--that is, that Richmond is to be
your objective point, and that there is to be co-operation between your
force and the Army of the Potomac--must be your guide. This indicates
the necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the James River
as you advance. Then, should the enemy be forced into his intrenchments
in Richmond, the Army of the Potomac would follow, and by means of
transports the two armies would become a unit.

"All the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your
direction. If, however, you think it practicable to use your cavalry
south of you, so as to cut the railroad about Hicksford, about the time
of the general advance, it would be of immense advantage.

"You will please forward for my information, at the earliest practicable
day, all orders, details, and instructions you may give for the
execution of this order.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER."

On the 16th these instructions were substantially reiterated. On the
19th, in order to secure full co-operation between his army and that of
General Meade, he was informed that I expected him to move from Fort
Monroe the same day that General Meade moved from Culpeper. The exact
time I was to telegraph him as soon as it was fixed, and that it would
not be earlier than the 27th of April; that it was my intention to fight
Lee between Culpeper and Richmond, if he would stand. Should he,
however, fall back into Richmond, I would follow up and make a junction
with his (General Butler's) army on the James River; that, could I be
certain he would be able to invest Richmond on the south side, so as to
have his left resting on the James, above the city, I would form the
junction there; that circumstances might make this course advisable
anyhow; that he should use every exertion to secure footing as far up
the south side of the river as he could, and as soon as possible after
the receipt of orders to move; that if he could not carry the city, he
should at least detain as large a force there as possible.

In co-operation with the main movements against Lee and Johnston, I was
desirous of using all other troops necessarily kept in departments
remote from the fields of immediate operations, and also those kept in
the background for the protection of our extended lines between the
loyal States and the armies operating against them.

A very considerable force, under command of Major-General Sigel, was so
held for the protection of West Virginia, and the frontiers of Maryland
and Pennsylvania. Whilst these troops could not be withdrawn to distant
fields without exposing the North to invasion by comparatively small
bodies of the enemy, they could act directly to their front, and give
better protection than if lying idle in garrison. By such a movement
they would either compel the enemy to detach largely for the protection
of his supplies and lines of communication, or he would lose them.
General Sigel was therefore directed to organize all his available force
into two expeditions, to move from Beverly and Charleston, under command
of Generals Ord and Crook, against the East Tennessee and Virginia
Railroad. Subsequently, General Ord having been relieved at his own
request, General Sigel was instructed at his own suggestion, to give up
the expedition by Beverly, and to form two columns, one under General
Crook, on the Kanawha, numbering about ten thousand men, and one on the
Shenandoah, numbering about seven thousand men. The one on the
Shenandoah to assemble between Cumberland and the Shenandoah, and the
infantry and artillery advanced to Cedar Creek with such cavalry as
could be made available at the moment, to threaten the enemy in the
Shenandoah Valley, and advance as far as possible; while General Crook
would take possession of Lewisburg with part of his force and move down
the Tennessee Railroad, doing as much damage as he could, destroying the
New River Bridge and the salt-works, at Saltville, Va.

Owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, operations were
delayed until the 1st of May, when, everything being in readiness and
the roads favorable, orders were given for a general movement of all the
armies not later than the 4th of May.

My first object being to break the military power of the rebellion, and
capture the enemy's important strongholds, made me desirous that General
Butler should succeed in his movement against Richmond, as that would
tend more than anything else, unless it were the capture of Lee's army,
to accomplish this desired result in the East. If he failed, it was my
determination, by hard fighting, either to compel Lee to retreat, or to
so cripple him that he could not detach a large force to go north, and
still retain enough for the defence of Richmond. It was well
understood, by both Generals Butler and Meade, before starting on the
campaign, that it was my intention to put both their armies south of the
James River, in case of failure to destroy Lee without it.

Before giving General Butler his instructions, I visited him at Fort
Monroe, and in conversation pointed out the apparent importance of
getting possession of Petersburg, and destroying railroad communication
as far south as possible. Believing, however, in the practicability of
capturing Richmond unless it was reinforced, I made that the objective
point of his operations. As the Army of the Potomac was to move
simultaneously with him, Lee could not detach from his army with safety,
and the enemy did not have troops elsewhere to bring to the defence of
the city in time to meet a rapid movement from the north of James River.

I may here state that, commanding all the armies as I did, I tried, as
far as possible, to leave General Meade in independent command of the
Army of the Potomac. My instructions for that army were all through
him, and were general in their nature, leaving all the details and the
execution to him. The campaigns that followed proved him to be the
right man in the right place. His commanding always in the presence of
an officer superior to him in rank, has drawn from him much of that
public attention that his zeal and ability entitle him to, and which he
would otherwise have received.

The movement of the Army of the Potomac commenced early on the morning
of the 4th of May, under the immediate direction and orders of
Major-General Meade, pursuant to instructions. Before night, the whole
army was across the Rapidan (the fifth and sixth corps crossing at
Germania Ford, and the second corps at Ely's Ford, the cavalry, under
Major-General Sheridan, moving in advance,) with the greater part of its
trains, numbering about four thousand wagons, meeting with but slight
opposition. The average distance travelled by the troops that day was
about twelve miles. This I regarded as a great success, and it removed
from my mind the most serious apprehensions I had entertained, that of
crossing the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and
ably commanded army, and how so large a train was to be carried through
a hostile country, and protected. Early on the 5th, the advance corps
(the fifth, Major-General G. K. Warren commanding) met and engaged the
enemy outside his intrenchments near Mine Run. The battle raged
furiously all day, the whole army being brought into the fight as fast
as the corps could be got upon the field, which, considering the density
of the forest and narrowness of the roads, was done with commendable
promptness.

General Burnside, with the ninth corps, was, at the time the Army of the
Potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at the crossing of the
Rappahannock River and Alexandria Railroad, holding the road back to
Bull Run, with instructions not to move until he received notice that a
crossing of the Rapidan was secured, but to move promptly as soon as
such notice was received. This crossing he was apprised of on the
afternoon of the 4th. By six o'clock of the morning of the 6th he was
leading his corps into action near the Wilderness Tavern, some of his
troops having marched a distance of over thirty miles, crossing both the
Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers. Considering that a large proportion,
probably two-thirds of his command, was composed of new troops,
unaccustomed to marches, and carrying the accoutrements of a soldier,
this was a remarkable march.

The battle of the Wilderness was renewed by us at five o'clock on the
morning of the 6th, and continued with unabated fury until darkness set
in, each army holding substantially the same position that they had on
the evening of the 5th. After dark, the enemy made a feeble attempt to
turn our right flank, capturing several hundred prisoners and creating
considerable confusion. But the promptness of General Sedgwick, who was
personally present and commanded that part of our line, soon reformed it
and restored order. On the morning of the 7th, reconnoissances showed
that the enemy had fallen behind his intrenched lines, with pickets to
the front, covering a part of the battle-field. From this it was
evident to my mind that the two days' fighting had satisfied him of his
inability to further maintain the contest in the open field,
notwithstanding his advantage of position, and that he would wait an
attack behind his works. I therefore determined to push on and put my
whole force between him and Richmond; and orders were at once issued for
a movement by his right flank. On the night of the 7th, the march was
commenced towards Spottsylvania Court House, the fifth corps moving on
the most direct road. But the enemy having become apprised of our
movement, and having the shorter line, was enabled to reach there first.
On the 8th, General Warren met a force of the enemy, which had been sent
out to oppose and delay his advance, to gain time to fortify the line
taken up at Spottsylvania. This force was steadily driven back on the
main force, within the recently constructed works, after considerable
fighting, resulting in severe loss to both sides. On the morning of the
9th, General Sheridan started on a raid against the enemy's lines of
communication with Richmond. The 9th, 10th, and 11th were spent in
manoeuvring and fighting, without decisive results. Among the killed on
the 9th was that able and distinguished soldier Major-General John
Sedgwick, commanding the sixth army corps. Major-General H. G. Wright
succeeded him in command. Early on the morning of the 12th a general
attack was made on the enemy in position. The second corps,
Major-General Hancock commanding, carried a salient of his line,
capturing most of Johnson's division of Ewell's corps and twenty pieces
of artillery. But the resistance was so obstinate that the advantage
gained did not prove decisive. The 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and
18th, were consumed in manoeuvring and awaiting the arrival of
reinforcements from Washington. Deeming it impracticable to make any
further attack upon the enemy at Spottsylvania Court House, orders were
issued on the 15th with a view to a movement to the North Anna, to
commence at twelve o'clock on the night of the 19th. Late in the
afternoon of the 19th, Ewell's corps came out of its works on our
extreme right flank; but the attack was promptly repulsed, with heavy
loss. This delayed the movement to the North Anna until the night of the
21st, when it was commenced. But the enemy again, having the shorter
line, and being in possession of the main roads, was enabled to reach
the North Anna in advance of us, and took position behind it. The fifth
corps reached the North Anna on the afternoon of the 23d, closely
followed by the sixth corps. The second and ninth corps got up about the
same time, the second holding the railroad bridge, and the ninth lying
between that and Jericho Ford. General Warren effected a crossing the
same afternoon, and got a position without much opposition. Soon after
getting into position he was violently attacked, but repulsed the enemy
with great slaughter. On the 25th, General Sheridan rejoined the Army
of the Potomac from the raid on which he started from Spottsylvania,
having destroyed the depots at Beaver Dam and Ashland stations, four
trains of cars, large supplies of rations, and many miles of
railroad-track; recaptured about four hundred of our men on their way to
Richmond as prisoners of war; met and defeated the enemy's cavalry at
Yellow Tavern; carried the first line of works around Richmond (but
finding the second line too strong to be carried by assault), recrossed
to the north bank of the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge under heavy fire,
and moved by a detour to Haxall's Landing, on the James River, where he
communicated with General Butler. This raid had the effect of drawing
off the whole of the enemy's cavalry force, making it comparatively easy
to guard our trains.

General Butler moved his main force up the James River, in pursuance of
instructions, on the 4th of May, General Gillmore having joined him with
the tenth corps. At the same time he sent a force of one thousand eight
hundred cavalry, by way of West Point, to form a junction with him
wherever he might get a foothold, and a force of three thousand cavalry,
under General Kautz, from Suffolk, to operate against the road south of
Petersburg and Richmond. On the 5th, he occupied, without opposition,
both City Point and Bermuda Hundred, his movement being a complete
surprise. On the 6th, he was in position with his main army, and
commenced intrenching. On the 7th he made a reconnoissance against the
Petersburg and Richmond Railroad, destroying a portion of it after some
fighting. On the 9th he telegraphed as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS, NEAR BERMUDA LANDING, May 9, 1864.

"HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

"Our operations may be summed up in a few words. With one thousand
seven hundred cavalry we have advanced up the Peninsula, forced the
Chickahominy, and have safely, brought them to their present position.
These were colored cavalry, and are now holding our advance pickets
towards Richmond.

"General Kautz, with three thousand cavalry from Suffolk, on the same
day with our movement up James River, forced the Black Water, burned the
railroad bridge at Stony Creek, below Petersburg, cutting into
Beauregard's force at that point.

"We have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles of
railroad, and got a position which, with proper supplies, we can hold
out against the whole of Lee's army. I have ordered up the supplies.

"Beauregard, with a large portion of his force, was left south by the
cutting of the railroads by Kautz. That portion which reached
Petersburg under Hill I have whipped to-day, killing and wounding many,
and taking many prisoners, after a severe and well-contested fight.

"General Grant will not be troubled with any further reinforcements to
Lee from Beauregard's force.

"BENJ. F. BUTLER, Major-General."

On the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a portion
of the enemy's first line of defences at Drury's Bluff, or Fort Darling,
with small loss. The time thus consumed from the 6th lost to us the
benefit of the surprise and capture of Richmond and Petersburg,
enabling, as it did, Beauregard to collect his loose forces in North and
South Carolina, and bring them to the defence of those places. On the
16th, the enemy attacked General Butler in his position in front of
Drury's Bluff. He was forced back, or drew back, into his intrenchments
between the forks of the James and Appomattox rivers, the enemy
intrenching strongly in his front, thus covering his railroads, the
city, and all that was valuable to him. His army, therefore, though in
a position of great security, was as completely shut off from further
operations directly against Richmond as if it had been in a bottle
strongly corked. It required but a comparatively small force of the
enemy to hold it there.

On the 12th, General Kautz, with his cavalry, was started on a raid
against the Danville Railroad, which he struck at Coalfield, Powhatan,
and Chula Stations, destroying them, the railroad-track, two freight
trains, and one locomotive, together with large quantities of commissary
and other stores; thence, crossing to the South Side Road, struck it at
Wilson's, Wellsville, and Black's and White's Stations, destroying the
road and station-houses; thence he proceeded to City Point, which he
reached on the 18th.

On the 19th of April, and prior to the movement of General Butler, the
enemy, with a land force under General Hoke and an iron-clad ram,
attacked Plymouth, N. C., commanded by General H. W. Wessells, and our
gunboats there, and, after severe fighting, the place was carried by
assault, and the entire garrison and armament captured. The gunboat
Smithfield was sunk, and the Miami disabled.

The army sent to operate against Richmond having hermetically sealed
itself up at Bermuda Hundred, the enemy was enabled to bring the most,
if not all, the reinforcements brought from the south by Beauregard
against the Army of the Potomac. In addition to this reinforcement, a
very considerable one, probably not less than fifteen thousand men, was
obtained by calling in the scattered troops under Breckinridge from the
western part of Virginia.

The position of Bermuda Hundred was as easy to defend as it was
difficult to operate from against the enemy. I determined, therefore,
to bring from it all available forces, leaving enough only to secure
what had been gained; and accordingly, on the 22d, I directed that they
be sent forward, under command of Major-General W. F. Smith, to join the
Army of the Potomac.

On the 24th of May, the 9th army corps, commanded by Major-General A. E.
Burnside, was assigned to the Army of the Potomac, and from this time
forward constituted a portion of Major-General Meade's command.

Finding the enemy's position on the North Anna stronger than either of
his previous ones, I withdrew on the night of the 26th to the north bank
of the North Anna, and moved via Hanover Town to turn the enemy's
position by his right.

Generals Torbert's and Merritt's divisions of cavalry, under Sheridan,
and the 6th corps, led the advance, crossed the Pamunkey River at
Hanover Town, after considerable fighting, and on the 28th the two
divisions of cavalry had a severe, but successful engagement with the
enemy at Hawes's Shop. On the 29th and 30th we advanced, with heavy
skirmishing, to the Hanover Court House and Cold Harbor Road, and
developed the enemy's position north of the Chickahominy. Late on the
evening of the last day the enemy came out and attacked our left, but
was repulsed with very considerable loss. An attack was immediately
ordered by General Meade, along his whole line, which resulted in
driving the enemy from a part of his intrenched skirmish line.

On the 31st, General Wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the railroad
bridges over the South Anna River, after defeating the enemy's cavalry.
General Sheridan, on the same day, reached Cold Harbor, and held it
until relieved by the 6th corps and General Smith's command, which had
just arrived, via White House, from General Butler's army.

On the 1st day of June an attack was made at five P.M. by the 6th corps
and the troops under General Smith, the other corps being held in
readiness to advance on the receipt of orders. This resulted in our
carrying and holding the enemy's first line of works in front of the
right of the 6th corps, and in front of General Smith. During the
attack the enemy made repeated assaults on each of the corps not engaged
in the main attack, but was repulsed with heavy loss in every instance.
That night he made several assaults to regain what he had lost in the
day, but failed. The 2d was spent in getting troops into position for
an attack on the 3d. On the 3d of June we again assaulted the enemy's
works, in the hope of driving him from his position. In this attempt
our loss was heavy, while that of the enemy, I have reason to believe,
was comparatively light. It was the only general attack made from the
Rapidan to the James which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to
compensate for our own losses. I would not be understood as saying that
all previous attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplished
as much as I had hoped from them; but they inflicted upon the enemy
severe losses, which tended, in the end, to the complete overthrow of
the rebellion.