Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete

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The valley was so very important, however, to the Confederate army that,
contrary to our expectations, they determined to make one more strike,
and save it if possible before the supplies should be all destroyed.
Reinforcements were sent therefore to Early, and this before any of our
troops had been withdrawn. Early prepared to strike Sheridan at
Harrisonburg; but the latter had not remained there.

On the 6th of October Sheridan commenced retiring down the valley,
taking or destroying all the food and forage and driving the cattle
before him, Early following. At Fisher's Hill Sheridan turned his
cavalry back on that of Early, which, under the lead of Rosser, was
pursuing closely, and routed it most completely, capturing eleven guns
and a large number of prisoners. Sheridan lost only about sixty men.
His cavalry pursued the enemy back some twenty-five miles. On the 10th
of October the march down the valley was again resumed, Early again
following.

I now ordered Sheridan to halt, and to improve the opportunity if
afforded by the enemy's having been sufficiently weakened, to move back
again and cut the James River Canal and Virginia Central Railroad. But
this order had to go through Washington where it was intercepted; and
when Sheridan received what purported to be a statement of what I wanted
him to do it was something entirely different. Halleck informed
Sheridan that it was my wish for him to hold a forward position as a
base from which to act against Charlottesville and Gordonsville; that he
should fortify this position and provision it.

Sheridan objected to this most decidedly; and I was impelled to
telegraph him, on the 14th, as follows:

CITY POINT, VA., October 14, 1864.--12.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Cedar Creek, Va.

What I want is for you to threaten the Virginia Central Railroad and
canal in the manner your judgment tells you is best, holding yourself
ready to advance, if the enemy draw off their forces. If you make the
enemy hold a force equal to your own for the protection of those
thoroughfares, it will accomplish nearly as much as their destruction.
If you cannot do this, then the next best thing to do is to send here
all the force you can. I deem a good cavalry force necessary for your
offensive, as well as defensive operations. You need not therefore send
here more than one division of cavalry.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

Sheridan having been summoned to Washington City, started on the 15th
leaving Wright in command. His army was then at Cedar Creek, some
twenty miles south of Winchester. The next morning while at Front
Royal, Sheridan received a dispatch from Wright, saying that a dispatch
from Longstreet to Early had been intercepted. It directed the latter
to be ready to move and to crush Sheridan as soon as he, Longstreet,
arrived. On the receipt of this news Sheridan ordered the cavalry up
the valley to join Wright.

On the 18th of October Early was ready to move, and during the night
succeeded in getting his troops in the rear of our left flank, which
fled precipitately and in great confusion down the valley, losing
eighteen pieces of artillery and a thousand or more prisoners. The
right under General Getty maintained a firm and steady front, falling
back to Middletown where it took a position and made a stand. The
cavalry went to the rear, seized the roads leading to Winchester and
held them for the use of our troops in falling back, General Wright
having ordered a retreat back to that place.

Sheridan having left Washington on the 18th, reached Winchester that
night. The following morning he started to join his command. He had
scarcely got out of town, when he met his men returning in panic from
the front and also heard heavy firing to the south. He immediately
ordered the cavalry at Winchester to be deployed across the valley to
stop the stragglers. Leaving members of his staff to take care of
Winchester and the public property there, he set out with a small escort
directly for the scene of battle. As he met the fugitives he ordered
them to turn back, reminding them that they were going the wrong way.
His presence soon restored confidence. Finding themselves worse
frightened than hurt the men did halt and turn back. Many of those who
had run ten miles got back in time to redeem their reputation as gallant
soldiers before night.

When Sheridan got to the front he found Getty and Custer still holding
their ground firmly between the Confederates and our retreating troops.
Everything in the rear was now ordered up. Sheridan at once proceeded to
intrench his position; and he awaited an assault from the enemy. This
was made with vigor, and was directed principally against Emory's corps,
which had sustained the principal loss in the first attack. By one
o'clock the attack was repulsed. Early was so badly damaged that he
seemed disinclined to make another attack, but went to work to intrench
himself with a view to holding the position he had already gained. He
thought, no doubt, that Sheridan would be glad enough to leave him
unmolested; but in this he was mistaken.

About the middle of the afternoon Sheridan advanced. He sent his
cavalry by both flanks, and they penetrated to the enemy's rear. The
contest was close for a time, but at length the left of the enemy broke,
and disintegration along the whole line soon followed. Early tried to
rally his men, but they were followed so closely that they had to give
way very quickly every time they attempted to make a stand. Our
cavalry, having pushed on and got in the rear of the Confederates,
captured twenty-four pieces of artillery, besides retaking what had been
lost in the morning. This victory pretty much closed the campaigning in
the Valley of Virginia. All the Confederate troops were sent back to
Richmond with the exception of one division of infantry and a little
cavalry. Wright's corps was ordered back to the Army of the Potomac,
and two other divisions were withdrawn from the valley. Early had lost
more men in killed, wounded and captured in the valley than Sheridan had
commanded from first to last.

On more than one occasion in these engagements General R. B. Hayes, who
succeeded me as President of the United States, bore a very honorable
part. His conduct on the field was marked by conspicuous gallantry as
well as the display of qualities of a higher order than that of mere
personal daring. This might well have been expected of one who could
write at the time he is said to have done so: "Any officer fit for duty
who at this crisis would abandon his post to electioneer for a seat in
Congress, ought to be scalped." Having entered the army as a Major of
Volunteers at the beginning of the war, General Hayes attained by
meritorious service the rank of Brevet Major-General before its close.

On the north side of the James River the enemy attacked Kautz's cavalry
on the 7th of October, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed,
wounded and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery. This was
followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was
repulsed with severe slaughter. On the 13th a reconnoissance was sent
out by General Butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new
works he was constructing, which resulted in heavy loss to us.

On the 24th I ordered General Meade to attempt to get possession of the
South Side Railroad, and for that purpose to advance on the 27th. The
attempt proved a failure, however, the most advanced of our troops not
getting nearer than within six miles of the point aimed for. Seeing the
impossibility of its accomplishment I ordered the troops to withdraw,
and they were all back in their former positions the next day.

Butler, by my directions, also made a demonstration on the north side of
the James River in order to support this move, by detaining there the
Confederate troops who were on that side. He succeeded in this, but
failed of further results by not marching past the enemy's left before
turning in on the Darby road and by reason of simply coming up against
their lines in place.

This closed active operations around Richmond for the winter. Of course
there was frequent skirmishing between pickets, but no serious battle
was fought near either Petersburg or Richmond. It would prolong this
work to give a detailed account of all that took place from day to day
around Petersburg and at other parts of my command, and it would not
interest the general reader if given. All these details can be found by
the military student in a series of books published by the Scribners,
Badeau's history of my campaigns, and also in the publications of the
War Department, including both the National and Confederate reports.

In the latter part of November General Hancock was relieved from the
command of the 2d corps by the Secretary of War and ordered to
Washington, to organize and command a corps of veteran troops to be
designated the 1st corps. It was expected that this would give him a
large command to co-operate with in the spring. It was my expectation,
at the time, that in the final operations Hancock should move either up
the valley, or else east of the Blue Ridge to Lynchburg; the idea being
to make the spring campaign the close of the war. I expected, with
Sherman coming up from the South, Meade south of Petersburg and around
Richmond, and Thomas's command in Tennessee with depots of supplies
established in the eastern part of that State, to move from the
direction of Washington or the valley towards Lynchburg. We would then
have Lee so surrounded that his supplies would be cut off entirely,
making it impossible for him to support his army.

General Humphreys, chief-of-staff of the Army of the Potomac, was
assigned to the command of the 2d corps, to succeed Hancock.

CHAPTER LIX.

THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA--SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA--WAR ANECDOTES--THE
MARCH ON SAVANNAH--INVESTMENT OF SAVANNAH--CAPTURE OF SAVANNAH.

Let us now return to the operations in the military division of the
Mississippi, and accompany Sherman in his march to the sea.

The possession of Atlanta by us narrowed the territory of the enemy very
materially and cut off one of his two remaining lines of roads from east
to west.

A short time after the fall of Atlanta Mr. Davis visited Palmetto and
Macon and made speeches at each place. He spoke at Palmetto on the 20th
of September, and at Macon on the 22d. Inasmuch as he had relieved
Johnston and appointed Hood, and Hood had immediately taken the
initiative, it is natural to suppose that Mr. Davis was disappointed
with General Johnston's policy. My own judgment is that Johnston acted
very wisely: he husbanded his men and saved as much of his territory as
he could, without fighting decisive battles in which all might be lost.
As Sherman advanced, as I have show, his army became spread out, until,
if this had been continued, it would have been easy to destroy it in
detail. I know that both Sherman and I were rejoiced when we heard of
the change. Hood was unquestionably a brave, gallant soldier and not
destitute of ability; but unfortunately his policy was to fight the
enemy wherever he saw him, without thinking much of the consequences of
defeat.

In his speeches Mr. Davis denounced Governor Brown, of Georgia, and
General Johnston in unmeasured terms, even insinuating that their
loyalty to the Southern cause was doubtful. So far as General Johnston
is concerned, I think Davis did him a great injustice in this
particular. I had know the general before the war and strongly believed
it would be impossible for him to accept a high commission for the
purpose of betraying the cause he had espoused. There, as I have said,
I think that his policy was the best one that could have been pursued by
the whole South--protract the war, which was all that was necessary to
enable them to gain recognition in the end. The North was already
growing weary, as the South evidently was also, but with this
difference. In the North the people governed, and could stop
hostilities whenever they chose to stop supplies. The South was a
military camp, controlled absolutely by the government with soldiers to
back it, and the war could have been protracted, no matter to what
extent the discontent reached, up to the point of open mutiny of the
soldiers themselves. Mr. Davis's speeches were frank appeals to the
people of Georgia and that portion of the South to come to their relief.
He tried to assure his frightened hearers that the Yankees were rapidly
digging their own graves; that measures were already being taken to cut
them off from supplies from the North; and that with a force in front,
and cut off from the rear, they must soon starve in the midst of a
hostile people. Papers containing reports of these speeches immediately
reached the Northern States, and they were republished. Of course, that
caused no alarm so long as telegraphic communication was kept up with
Sherman.

When Hood was forced to retreat from Atlanta he moved to the south-west
and was followed by a portion of Sherman's army. He soon appeared upon
the railroad in Sherman's rear, and with his whole army began destroying
the road. At the same time also the work was begun in Tennessee and
Kentucky which Mr. Davis had assured his hearers at Palmetto and Macon
would take place. He ordered Forrest (about the ablest cavalry general
in the South) north for this purpose; and Forrest and Wheeler carried
out their orders with more or less destruction, occasionally picking up
a garrison. Forrest indeed performed the very remarkable feat of
capturing, with cavalry, two gunboats and a number of transports,
something the accomplishment of which is very hard to account for.
Hood's army had been weakened by Governor Brown's withdrawing the
Georgia State troops for the purpose of gathering in the season's crops
for the use of the people and for the use of the army. This not only
depleted Hood's forces but it served a most excellent purpose in
gathering in supplies of food and forage for the use of our army in its
subsequent march. Sherman was obliged to push on with his force and go
himself with portions of it hither and thither, until it was clearly
demonstrated to him that with the army he then had it would be
impossible to hold the line from Atlanta back and leave him any force
whatever with which to take the offensive. Had that plan been adhered
to, very large reinforcements would have been necessary; and Mr. Davis's
prediction of the destruction of the army would have been realized, or
else Sherman would have been obliged to make a successful retreat, which
Mr. Davis said in his speeches would prove more disastrous than
Napoleon's retreat from Moscow.

These speeches of Mr. Davis were not long in reaching Sherman. He took
advantage of the information they gave, and made all the preparation
possible for him to make to meet what now became expected, attempts to
break his communications. Something else had to be done: and to
Sherman's sensible and soldierly mind the idea was not long in dawning
upon him, not only that something else had to be done, but what that
something else should be.

On September 10th I telegraphed Sherman as follows:

CITY POINT, VA., Sept. 10, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN, Atlanta, Georgia.

So soon as your men are sufficiently rested, and preparations can be
made, it is desirable that another campaign should be commenced. We
want to keep the enemy constantly pressed to the end of the war. If we
give him no peace whilst the war lasts, the end cannot be distant. Now
that we have all of Mobile Bay that is valuable, I do not know but it
will be the best move to transfer Canby's troops to act upon Savannah,
whilst you move on Augusta. I should like to hear from you, however, in
this matter.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

Sherman replied promptly:

"If I could be sure of finding provisions and ammunition at Augusta, or
Columbus, Georgia, I can march to Milledgeville, and compel Hood to give
up Augusta or Macon, and then turn on the other. * * * If you can
manage to take the Savannah River as high up as Augusta, or the
Chattahoochee as far up as Columbus, I can sweep the whole State of
Georgia."

On the 12th I sent a special messenger, one of my own staff, with a
letter inviting Sherman's views about the next campaign.

CITY POINT, VA., Sept. 12, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Mill Division of the
Mississippi.

I send Lieutenant-Colonel Porter, of my staff, with this. Colonel Porter
will explain to you the exact condition of affairs here better than I
can do in the limits of a letter. Although I feel myself strong enough
for offensive operations, I am holding on quietly to get advantage of
recruits and convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly. My
lines are necessarily very long, extending from Deep Bottom north of the
James across the peninsula formed by the Appomattox and the James, and
south of the Appomattox to the Weldon Road. This line is very strongly
fortified, and can be held with comparatively few men, but from its
great length takes many in the aggregate. I propose, when I do move, to
extend my left so as to control what is known as the South Side, or
Lynchburg and Petersburg Road, then if possible to keep the Danville
Road cut. At the same time this move is made, I want to send a force of
from six to ten thousand men against Wilmington.

The way I propose to do this is to land the men north of Fort Fisher,
and hold that point. At the same time a large naval fleet will be
assembled there, and the iron-clads will run the batteries as they did
at Mobile. This will give us the same control of the harbor of
Wilmington that we now have of the harbor of Mobile. What you are to do
with the forces at your command, I do not see. The difficulties of
supplying your army, except when you are constantly moving, beyond where
you are, I plainly see. If it had not been for Price's movements Canby
would have sent twelve thousand more men to Mobile. From your command
on the Mississippi an equal number could have been taken. With these
forces my idea would have been to divide them, sending one half to
Mobile and the other half to Savannah. You could then move as proposed
in your telegram, so as to threaten Macon and Augusta equally.
Whichever was abandoned by the enemy you could take and open up a new
base of supplies. My object now in sending a staff officer is not so
much to suggest operations for you, as to get your views and have plans
matured by the time everything can be got ready. It will probably be
the 5th of October before any of the plans herein indicated will be
executed.

If you have any promotions to recommend, send the names forward and I
will approve them. * * *

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

This reached Sherman on September 20th.

On the 25th of September Sherman reported to Washington that Hood's
troops were in his rear. He had provided against this by sending a
division to Chattanooga and a division to Rome, Georgia, which was in
the rear of Hood, supposing that Hood would fall back in the direction
from which he had come to reach the railroad. At the same time Sherman
and Hood kept up a correspondence relative to the exchange of prisoners,
the treatment of citizens, and other matters suitable to be arranged
between hostile commanders in the field. On the 27th of September I
telegraphed Sherman as follows:

CITY POINT, VA., September 27, 1864--10.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN:

I have directed all recruits and new troops from the Western States to
be sent to Nashville, to receive their further orders from you. * * *

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

On the 29th Sherman sent Thomas back to Chattanooga, and afterwards to
Nashville, with another division (Morgan's) of the advanced army.
Sherman then suggested that, when he was prepared, his movements should
take place against Milledgeville and then to Savannah. His expectation
at that time was, to make this movement as soon as he could get up his
supplies. Hood was moving in his own country, and was moving light so
that he could make two miles to Sherman's one. He depended upon the
country to gather his supplies, and so was not affected by delays.

As I have said, until this unexpected state of affairs happened, Mobile
had been looked upon as the objective point of Sherman's army. It had
been a favorite move of mine from 1862, when I first suggested to the
then commander-in-chief that the troops in Louisiana, instead of
frittering away their time in the trans-Mississippi, should move
against Mobile. I recommended this from time to time until I came into
command of the army, the last of March 1864. Having the power in my own
hands, I now ordered the concentration of supplies, stores and troops,
in the department of the Gulf about New Orleans, with a view to a move
against Mobile, in support of, and in conjunction with, the other armies
operating in the field. Before I came into command, these troops had
been scattered over the trans-Mississippi department in such a way that
they could not be, or were not, gotten back in time to take any part in
the original movement; hence the consideration, which had caused Mobile
to be selected as the objective point for Sherman's army to find his
next base of supplies after having cut loose from Atlanta, no longer
existed.

General G. M. Dodge, an exceedingly efficient officer, having been badly
wounded, had to leave the army about the first of October. He was in
command of two divisions of the 16th corps, consolidated into one.
Sherman then divided his army into the right and left wings the right
commanded by General O. O. Howard and the left by General Slocum.
General Dodge's two divisions were assigned, one to each of these wings.
Howard's command embraced the 15th and 17th corps, and Slocum's the 14th
and 20th corps, commanded by Generals Jeff. C. Davis and A. S. Williams.
Generals Logan and Blair commanded the two corps composing the right
wing. About this time they left to take part in the presidential
election, which took place that year, leaving their corps to Osterhaus
and Ransom. I have no doubt that their leaving was at the earnest
solicitation of the War Department. General Blair got back in time to
resume his command and to proceed with it throughout the march to the
sea and back to the grand review at Washington. General Logan did not
return to his command until after it reached Savannah.

Logan felt very much aggrieved at the transfer of General Howard from
that portion of the Army of the Potomac which was then with the Western
Army, to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, with which army
General Logan had served from the battle of Belmont to the fall of
Atlanta--having passed successively through all grades from colonel
commanding a regiment to general commanding a brigade, division and army
corps, until upon the death of McPherson the command of the entire Army
of the Tennessee devolved upon him in the midst of a hotly contested
battle. He conceived that he had done his full duty as commander in
that engagement; and I can bear testimony, from personal observation,
that he had proved himself fully equal to all the lower positions which
he had occupied as a soldier. I will not pretend to question the motive
which actuated Sherman in taking an officer from another army to
supersede General Logan. I have no doubt, whatever, that he did this
for what he considered would be to the good of the service, which was
more important than that the personal feelings of any individual should
not be aggrieved; though I doubt whether he had an officer with him who
could have filled the place as Logan would have done. Differences of
opinion must exist between the best of friends as to policies in war,
and of judgment as to men's fitness. The officer who has the command,
however, should be allowed to judge of the fitness of the officers under
him, unless he is very manifestly wrong.

Sherman's army, after all the depletions, numbered about sixty thousand
effective men. All weak men had been left to hold the rear, and those
remaining were not only well men, but strong and hardy, so that he had
sixty thousand as good soldiers as ever trod the earth; better than any
European soldiers, because they not only worked like a machine but the
machine thought. European armies know very little what they are fighting
for, and care less. Included in these sixty thousand troops, there were
two small divisions of cavalry, numbering altogether about four thousand
men. Hood had about thirty-five to forty thousand men, independent of
Forrest, whose forces were operating in Tennessee and Kentucky, as Mr.
Davis had promised they should. This part of Mr. Davis's military plan
was admirable, and promised the best results of anything he could have
done, according to my judgment. I say this because I have criticised his
military judgment in the removal of Johnston, and also in the
appointment of Hood. I am aware, however, that there was high feeling
existing at that time between Davis and his subordinate, whom I regarded
as one of his ablest lieutenants.