Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete

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I then, on the 14th, took a steamer and ran up to Bermuda Hundred to see
General Butler for the purpose of directing a movement against
Petersburg, while our troops of the Army of the Potomac were crossing.

I had sent General W. F. Smith back from Cold Harbor by the way of White
House, thence on steamers to City Point for the purpose of giving
General Butler more troops with which to accomplish this result.
General Butler was ordered to send Smith with his troops reinforced, as
far as that could be conveniently done, from other parts of the Army of
the James. He gave Smith about six thousand reinforcements, including
some twenty-five hundred cavalry under Kautz, and about thirty-five
hundred colored infantry under Hinks.

The distance which Smith had to move to reach the enemy's lines was
about six miles, and the Confederate advance line of works was but two
miles outside of Petersburg. Smith was to move under cover of night, up
close to the enemy's works, and assault as soon as he could after
daylight. I believed then, and still believe, that Petersburg could
have been easily captured at that time. It only had about 2,500 men in
the defences besides some irregular troops, consisting of citizens and
employees in the city who took up arms in case of emergency. Smith
started as proposed, but his advance encountered a rebel force
intrenched between City Point and their lines outside of Petersburg.
This position he carried, with some loss to the enemy; but there was so
much delay that it was daylight before his troops really got off from
there. While there I informed General Butler that Hancock's corps would
cross the river and move to Petersburg to support Smith in case the
latter was successful, and that I could reinforce there more rapidly
than Lee could reinforce from his position.

I returned down the river to where the troops of the Army of the Potomac
now were, communicated to General Meade, in writing, the directions I
had given to General Butler and directed him (Meade) to cross Hancock's
corps over under cover of night, and push them forward in the morning to
Petersburg; halting them, however, at a designated point until they
could hear from Smith. I also informed General Meade that I had ordered
rations from Bermuda Hundred for Hancock's corps, and desired him to
issue them speedily, and to lose no more time than was absolutely
necessary. The rations did not reach him, however, and Hancock, while
he got all his corps over during the night, remained until half-past ten
in the hope of receiving them. He then moved without them, and on the
road received a note from General W. F. Smith, asking him to come on.
This seems to be the first information that General Hancock had received
of the fact that he was to go to Petersburg, or that anything particular
was expected of him. Otherwise he would have been there by four o'clock
in the afternoon.

Smith arrived in front of the enemy's lines early in the forenoon of the
15th, and spent the day until after seven o'clock in the evening in
reconnoitering what appeared to be empty works. The enemy's line
consisted of redans occupying commanding positions, with rifle-pits
connecting them. To the east side of Petersburg, from the Appomattox
back, there were thirteen of these redans extending a distance of
several miles, probably three. If they had been properly manned they
could have held out against any force that could have attacked them, at
least until reinforcements could have got up from the north of Richmond.

Smith assaulted with the colored troops, and with success. By nine
o'clock at night he was in possession of five of these redans and, of
course, of the connecting lines of rifle-pits. All of them contained
artillery, which fell into our hands. Hancock came up and proposed to
take any part assigned to him; and Smith asked him to relieve his men
who were in the trenches.

Next morning, the 16th, Hancock himself was in command, and captured
another redan. Meade came up in the afternoon and succeeded Hancock,
who had to be relieved, temporarily, from the command of his corps on
account of the breaking out afresh of the wound he had received at
Gettysburg. During the day Meade assaulted and carried one more redan
to his right and two to his left. In all this we lost very heavily.
The works were not strongly manned, but they all had guns in them which
fell into our hands, together with the men who were handling them in the
effort to repel these assaults.

Up to this time Beauregard, who had commanded south of Richmond, had
received no reinforcements, except Hoke's division from Drury's
Bluff,(*37) which had arrived on the morning of the 16th; though he had
urged the authorities very strongly to send them, believing, as he did,
that Petersburg would be a valuable prize which we might seek.

During the 17th the fighting was very severe and the losses heavy; and
at night our troops occupied about the same position they had occupied
in the morning, except that they held a redan which had been captured by
Potter during the day. During the night, however, Beauregard fell back
to the line which had been already selected, and commenced fortifying
it. Our troops advanced on the 18th to the line which he had abandoned,
and found that the Confederate loss had been very severe, many of the
enemy's dead still remaining in the ditches and in front of them.

Colonel J. L. Chamberlain, of the 20th Maine, was wounded on the 18th.
He was gallantly leading his brigade at the time, as he had been in
the habit of doing in all the engagements in which he had previously
been engaged. He had several times been recommended for a
brigadier-generalcy for gallant and meritorious conduct. On this
occasion, however, I promoted him on the spot, and forwarded a copy of
my order to the War Department, asking that my act might be confirmed
and Chamberlain's name sent to the Senate for confirmation without any
delay. This was done, and at last a gallant and meritorious officer
received partial justice at the hands of his government, which he had
served so faithfully and so well.

If General Hancock's orders of the 15th had been communicated to him,
that officer, with his usual promptness, would undoubtedly have been
upon the ground around Petersburg as early as four o'clock in the
afternoon of the 15th. The days were long and it would have given him
considerable time before night. I do not think there is any doubt that
Petersburg itself could have been carried without much loss; or, at
least, if protected by inner detached works, that a line could have been
established very much in rear of the one then occupied by the enemy.
This would have given us control of both the Weldon and South Side
railroads. This would also have saved an immense amount of hard
fighting which had to be done from the 15th to the 18th, and would have
given us greatly the advantage in the long siege which ensued.

I now ordered the troops to be put under cover and allowed some of the
rest which they had so long needed. They remained quiet, except that
there was more or less firing every day, until the 22d, when General
Meade ordered an advance towards the Weldon Railroad. We were very
anxious to get to that road, and even round to the South Side Railroad
if possible.

Meade moved Hancock's corps, now commanded by Birney, to the left, with
a view to at least force the enemy to stay within the limits of his own
line. General Wright, with the 6th corps, was ordered by a road farther
south, to march directly for the Weldon road. The enemy passed in
between these two corps and attacked vigorously, and with very serious
results to the National troops, who were then withdrawn from their
advanced position.

The Army of the Potomac was given the investment of Petersburg, while
the Army of the James held Bermuda Hundred and all the ground we
possessed north of the James River. The 9th corps, Burnside's, was
placed upon the right at Petersburg; the 5th, Warren's, next; the 2d,
Birney's, next; then the 6th, Wright's, broken off to the left and
south. Thus began the siege of Petersburg.

CHAPTER LVII.

RAID ON THE VIRGINIA CENTRAL RAILROAD--RAID ON THE WELDON RAILROAD
--EARLY 'S MOVEMENT UPON WASHINGTON--MINING THE WORKS BEFORE PETERSBURG
--EXPLOSION OF THE MINE BEFORE PETERSBURG--CAMPAIGN IN THE SHENANDOAH
VALLEY--CAPTURE OF THE WELDON RAILROAD.

On the 7th of June, while at Cold Harbor, I had as already indicated
sent Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry to destroy as much as he
could of the Virginia Central Railroad. General Hunter had been
operating up the Shenandoah Valley with some success, having fought a
battle near Staunton where he captured a great many prisoners, besides
killing and wounding a good many men. After the battle he formed a
junction at Staunton with Averell and Crook, who had come up from the
Kanawha, or Gauley River. It was supposed, therefore, that General
Hunter would be about Charlottesville, Virginia, by the time Sheridan
could get there, doing on the way the damage that he was sent to do.

I gave Sheridan instructions to have Hunter, in case he should meet him
about Charlottesville, join and return with him to the Army of the
Potomac. Lee, hearing of Hunter's success in the valley, started
Breckinridge out for its defence at once. Learning later of Sheridan's
going with two divisions, he also sent Hampton with two divisions of
cavalry, his own and Fitz-Hugh Lee's.

Sheridan moved to the north side of the North Anna to get out west, and
learned of the movement of these troops to the south side of the same
stream almost as soon as they had started. He pushed on to get to
Trevilian Station to commence his destruction at that point. On the
night of the 10th he bivouacked some six or seven miles east of
Trevilian, while Fitz-Hugh Lee was the same night at Trevilian Station
and Hampton but a few miles away.

During the night Hampton ordered an advance on Sheridan, hoping, no
doubt, to surprise and very badly cripple him. Sheridan, however, by a
counter move sent Custer on a rapid march to get between the two
divisions of the enemy and into their rear. This he did successfully, so
that at daylight, when the assault was made, the enemy found himself at
the same time resisted in front and attacked in rear, and broke in some
confusion. The losses were probably very light on both sides in killed
and wounded, but Sheridan got away with some five hundred prisoners and
sent them to City Point.

During that day, the 11th, Sheridan moved into Trevilian Station, and
the following day proceeded to tear up the road east and west. There
was considerable fighting during the whole of the day, but the work of
destruction went on. In the meantime, at night, the enemy had taken
possession of the crossing which Sheridan had proposed to take to go
north when he left Trevilian. Sheridan learned, however, from some of
the prisoners he had captured here, that General Hunter was about
Lynchburg, and therefore that there was no use of his going on to
Charlottesville with a view to meet him.

Sheridan started back during the night of the 12th, and made his way
north and farther east, coming around by the north side of White House,
and arriving there on the 21st. Here he found an abundance of forage
for his animals, food for his men, and security while resting. He had
been obliged to leave about ninety of his own men in the field-hospital
which he had established near Trevilian, and these necessarily fell into
the hands of the enemy.

White House up to this time had been a depot; but now that our troops
were all on the James River, it was no longer wanted as a store of
supplies. Sheridan was, therefore, directed to break it up; which he
did on the 22d of June, bringing the garrison and an immense wagon train
with him. All these were over the James River by the 26th of the month,
and Sheridan ready to follow.

In the meantime Meade had sent Wilson's division on a raid to destroy
the Weldon and South Side roads. Now that Sheridan was safe and Hampton
free to return to Richmond with his cavalry, Wilson's position became
precarious. Meade therefore, on the 27th, ordered Sheridan over the
river to make a demonstration in favor of Wilson. Wilson got back,
though not without severe loss, having struck both roads, but the damage
done was soon repaired.

After these events comparative quiet reigned about Petersburg until late
in July. The time, however, was spent in strengthening the
intrenchments and making our position generally more secure against a
sudden attack. In the meantime I had to look after other portions of my
command, where things had not been going on so favorably, always, as I
could have wished.

General Hunter who had been appointed to succeed Sigel in the Shenandoah
Valley immediately took up the offensive. He met the enemy on the 5th
of June at Piedmont, and defeated him. On the 8th he formed a junction
with Crook and Averell at Staunton, from which place he moved direct on
Lynchburg, via Lexington, which he reached and invested on the 16th. Up
to this time he was very successful; and but for the difficulty of
taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through
a hostile country, he would, no doubt, have captured Lynchburg. The
destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories had been very
great. To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Lee sent
Early with his corps, a part of which reached Lynchburg before Hunter.
After some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to a
want of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place.
Unfortunately, this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for
his return but by the way of the Gauley and Kanawha rivers, thence up
the Ohio River, returning to Harper's Ferry by way of the Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad. A long time was consumed in making this movement.
Meantime the valley was left open to Early's troops, and others in that
quarter; and Washington also was uncovered. Early took advantage of this
condition of affairs and moved on Washington.

In the absence of Hunter, General Lew Wallace, with headquarters at
Baltimore, commanded the department in which the Shenandoah lay. His
surplus of troops with which to move against the enemy was small in
number. Most of these were raw and, consequently, very much inferior to
our veterans and to the veterans which Early had with him; but the
situation of Washington was precarious, and Wallace moved with
commendable promptitude to meet the enemy at the Monocacy. He could
hardly have expected to defeat him badly, but he hoped to cripple and
delay him until Washington could be put into a state of preparation for
his reception. I had previously ordered General Meade to send a
division to Baltimore for the purpose of adding to the defences of
Washington, and he had sent Ricketts's division of the 6th corps
(Wright's), which arrived in Baltimore on the 8th of July. Finding that
Wallace had gone to the front with his command, Ricketts immediately
took the cars and followed him to the Monocacy with his entire division.
They met the enemy and, as might have been expected, were defeated; but
they succeeded in stopping him for the day on which the battle took
place. The next morning Early started on his march to the capital of
the Nation, arriving before it on the 11th.

Learning of the gravity of the situation I had directed General Meade to
also order Wright with the rest of his corps directly to Washington for
the relief of that place, and the latter reached there the very day that
Early arrived before it. The 19th corps, which had been stationed in
Louisiana, having been ordered up to reinforce the armies about
Richmond, had about this time arrived at Fortress Monroe, on their way
to join us. I diverted them from that point to Washington, which place
they reached, almost simultaneously with Wright, on the 11th. The 19th
corps was commanded by Major-General Emory.

Early made his reconnoissance with a view of attacking on the following
morning, the 12th; but the next morning he found our intrenchments,
which were very strong, fully manned. He at once commenced to retreat,
Wright following. There is no telling how much this result was
contributed to by General Lew Wallace's leading what might well be
considered almost a forlorn hope. If Early had been but one day earlier
he might have entered the capital before the arrival of the
reinforcements I had sent. Whether the delay caused by the battle
amounted to a day or not, General Wallace contributed on this occasion,
by the defeat of the troops under him a greater benefit to the cause
than often falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force to render
by means of a victory.

Farther west also the troubles were threatening. Some time before,
Forrest had met Sturgis in command of some of our cavalry in Mississippi
and handled him very roughly, gaining a very great victory over him.
This left Forrest free to go almost where he pleased, and to cut the
roads in rear of Sherman who was then advancing. Sherman was abundantly
able to look after the army that he was immediately with, and all of his
military division so long as he could communicate with it; but it was my
place to see that he had the means with which to hold his rear. Two
divisions under A. J. Smith had been sent to Banks in Louisiana some
months before. Sherman ordered these back, with directions to attack
Forrest. Smith met and defeated him very badly. I then directed that
Smith should hang to Forrest and not let him go; and to prevent by all
means his getting upon the Memphis and Nashville Railroad. Sherman had
anticipated me in this matter, and given the same orders in substance;
but receiving my directions for this order to Smith, he repeated it.

On the 25th of June General Burnside had commenced running a mine from
about the centre of his front under the Confederate works confronting
him. He was induced to do this by Colonel Pleasants, of the
Pennsylvania Volunteers, whose regiment was mostly composed of miners,
and who was himself a practical miner. Burnside had submitted the
scheme to Meade and myself, and we both approved of it, as a means of
keeping the men occupied. His position was very favorable for carrying
on this work, but not so favorable for the operations to follow its
completion. The position of the two lines at that point were only about
a hundred yards apart with a comparatively deep ravine intervening. In
the bottom of this ravine the work commenced. The position was
unfavorable in this particular: that the enemy's line at that point was
re-entering, so that its front was commanded by their own lines both to
the right and left. Then, too, the ground was sloping upward back of
the Confederate line for a considerable distance, and it was presumable
that the enemy had, at least, a detached work on this highest point.
The work progressed, and on the 23d of July the mine was finished ready
for charging; but I had this work of charging deferred until we were
ready for it.

On the 17th of July several deserters came in and said that there was
great consternation in Richmond, and that Lee was coming out to make an
attack upon us the object being to put us on the defensive so that he
might detach troops to go to Georgia where the army Sherman was
operating against was said to be in great trouble. I put the army
commanders, Meade and Butler, on the lookout, but the attack was not
made.

I concluded, then, a few days later, to do something in the way of
offensive movement myself, having in view something of the same object
that Lee had had. Wright's and Emory's corps were in Washington, and
with this reduction of my force Lee might very readily have spared some
troops from the defences to send West. I had other objects in view,
however, besides keeping Lee where he was. The mine was constructed and
ready to be exploded, and I wanted to take that occasion to carry
Petersburg if I could. It was the object, therefore, to get as many of
Lee's troops away from the south side of the James River as possible.
Accordingly, on the 26th, we commenced a movement with Hancock's corps
and Sheridan's cavalry to the north side by the way of Deep Bottom,
where Butler had a pontoon bridge laid. The plan, in the main, was to
let the cavalry cut loose and, joining with Kautz's cavalry of the Army
of the James, get by Lee's lines and destroy as much as they could of
the Virginia Central Railroad, while, in the mean time, the infantry was
to move out so as to protect their rear and cover their retreat back
when they should have got through with their work. We were successful
in drawing the enemy's troops to the north side of the James as I
expected. The mine was ordered to be charged, and the morning of the
30th of July was the time fixed for its explosion. I gave Meade minute
orders (*38) on the 24th directing how I wanted the assault conducted,
which orders he amplified into general instructions for the guidance of
the troops that were to be engaged.

Meade's instructions, which I, of course, approved most heartily, were
all that I can see now was necessary. The only further precaution which
he could have taken, and which he could not foresee, would have been to
have different men to execute them.

The gallery to the mine was over five hundred feet long from where it
entered the ground to the point where it was under the enemy's works,
and with a cross gallery of something over eighty feet running under
their lines. Eight chambers had been left, requiring a ton of powder
each to charge them. All was ready by the time I had prescribed; and on
the 29th Hancock and Sheridan were brought back near the James River
with their troops. Under cover of night they started to recross the
bridge at Deep Bottom, and to march directly for that part of our lines
in front of the mine.

Warren was to hold his line of intrenchments with a sufficient number of
men and concentrate the balance on the right next to Burnside's corps,
while Ord, now commanding the 18th corps, temporarily under Meade, was
to form in the rear of Burnside to support him when he went in. All
were to clear off the parapets and the _abatis_ in their front so as to
leave the space as open as possible, and be able to charge the moment
the mine had been sprung and Burnside had taken possession. Burnside's
corps was not to stop in the crater at all but push on to the top of the
hill, supported on the right and left by Ord's and Warren's corps.

Warren and Ord fulfilled their instructions perfectly so far as making
ready was concerned. Burnside seemed to have paid no attention whatever
to the instructions, and left all the obstruction in his own front for
his troops to get over in the best way they could. The four divisions
of his corps were commanded by Generals Potter, Willcox, Ledlie and
Ferrero. The last was a colored division; and Burnside selected it to
make the assault. Meade interfered with this. Burnside then took
Ledlie's division--a worse selection than the first could have been. In
fact, Potter and Willcox were the only division commanders Burnside had
who were equal to the occasion. Ledlie besides being otherwise
inefficient, proved also to possess disqualification less common among
soldiers.

There was some delay about the explosion of the mine so that it did not
go off until about five o'clock in the morning. When it did explode it
was very successful, making a crater twenty feet deep and something like
a hundred feet in length. Instantly one hundred and ten cannon and
fifty mortars, which had been placed in the most commanding positions
covering the ground to the right and left of where the troops were to
enter the enemy's lines, commenced playing. Ledlie's division marched
into the crater immediately on the explosion, but most of the men
stopped there in the absence of any one to give directions; their
commander having found some safe retreat to get into before they
started. There was some delay on the left and right in advancing, but
some of the troops did get in and turn to the right and left, carrying
the rifle-pits as I expected they would do.

There had been great consternation in Petersburg, as we were well aware,
about a rumored mine that we were going to explode. They knew we were
mining, and they had failed to cut our mine off by countermining, though
Beauregard had taken the precaution to run up a line of intrenchments to
the rear of that part of their line fronting where they could see that
our men were at work. We had learned through deserters who had come in
that the people had very wild rumors about what was going on on our
side. They said that we had undermined the whole of Petersburg; that
they were resting upon a slumbering volcano and did not know at what
moment they might expect an eruption. I somewhat based my calculations
upon this state of feeling, and expected that when the mine was exploded
the troops to the right and left would flee in all directions, and that
our troops, if they moved promptly, could get in and strengthen
themselves before the enemy had come to a realization of the true
situation. It was just as I expected it would be. We could see the men
running without any apparent object except to get away. It was half an
hour before musketry firing, to amount to anything, was opened upon our
men in the crater. It was an hour before the enemy got artillery up to
play upon them; and it was nine o'clock before Lee got up reinforcements
from his right to join in expelling our troops.