Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete

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Fighting was substantially over by half-past seven in the morning. At
eleven o'clock I started to visit all the corps commanders to see for
myself the different positions gained and to get their opinion of the
practicability of doing anything more in their respective fronts.

Hancock gave the opinion that in his front the enemy was too strong to
make any further assault promise success. Wright thought he could gain
the lines of the enemy, but it would require the cooperation of
Hancock's and Smith's corps. Smith thought a lodgment possible, but was
not sanguine: Burnside thought something could be done in his front,
but Warren differed. I concluded, therefore to make no more assaults,
and a little after twelve directed in the following letter that all
offensive action should cease.

COLD HARBOR, June 3, 1864.-12.30 P.M. MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,

Commanding A. P.

The opinion of corps commanders not being sanguine of success in case an
assault is ordered, you may direct a suspension of farther advance for
the present. Hold our most advanced positions and strengthen them.
Whilst on the defensive our line may be contracted from the right if
practicable.

Reconnoissances should be made in front of every corps and advances made
to advantageous positions by regular approaches. To aid the expedition
under General Hunter it is necessary that we should detain all the army
now with Lee until the former gets well on his way to Lynchburg. To do
this effectually it will be better to keep the enemy out of the
intrenchments of Richmond than to have them go back there.

Wright and Hancock should be ready to assault in case the enemy should
break through General Smith's lines, and all should be ready to resist
an assault.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

The remainder of the day was spent in strengthening the line we now
held. By night we were as strong against Lee as he was against us.

During the night the enemy quitted our right front, abandoning some of
their wounded, and without burying their dead. These we were able to
care for. But there were many dead and wounded men between the lines of
the contending forces, which were now close together, who could not be
cared for without a cessation of hostilities.

So I wrote the following:

COLD HARBOR, VA., June 5, 1864.

GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding Confederate Army.

It is reported to me that there are wounded men, probably of both
armies, now lying exposed and suffering between the lines occupied
respectively by the two armies. Humanity would dictate that some
provision should be made to provide against such hardships. I would
propose, therefore, that hereafter, when no battle is raging, either
party be authorized to send to any point between the pickets or skirmish
lines, unarmed men bearing litters to pick up their dead or wounded,
without being fired upon by the other party. Any other method, equally
fair to both parties, you may propose for meeting the end desired will
be accepted by me.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

Lee replied that he feared such an arrangement would lead to
misunderstanding, and proposed that in future, when either party wished
to remove their dead and wounded, a flag of truce be sent. I answered
this immediately by saying:

COLD HARBOR, VA., June 6, 1864.

GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding Army of N. Va.

Your communication of yesterday's date is received. I will send
immediately, as you propose, to collect the dead and wounded between the
lines of the two armies, and will also instruct that you be allowed to
do the same. I propose that the time for doing this be between the
hours of 12 M. and 3 P.M. to-day. I will direct all parties going out
to bear a white flag, and not to attempt to go beyond where we have dead
or wounded, and not beyond or on ground occupied by your troops.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

Lee's response was that he could not consent to the burial of the dead
and removal of the wounded in the way I proposed, but when either party
desired such permission it should be asked for by flag of truce and he
had directed that any parties I may have sent out, as mentioned in my
letter, to be turned back. I answered:

COLD HARBOR, VA, June 6, 1864.

GENERAL R. E. LEE. Commanding Army, N. Va.

The knowledge that wounded men are now suffering from want of attention,
between the two armies, compels me to ask a suspension of hostilities
for sufficient time to collect them in, say two hours. Permit me to say
that the hours you may fix upon for this will be agreeable to me, and
the same privilege will be extended to such parties as you may wish to
send out on the same duty without further application.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

Lee acceded to this; but delays in transmitting the correspondence
brought it to the 7th of June--forty-eight hours after it commenced
--before parties were got out to collect the men left upon the field.
In the meantime all but two of the wounded had died. And I wrote to
Lee:

COLD HARBOR, VA., June 7, 1864. 10.30 A.M.

GEN. R. E. LEE, Commanding Army of N. Va.

I regret that your note of seven P.M. yesterday should have been
received at the nearest corps headquarters, to where it was delivered,
after the hour which had been given for the removal of the dead and
wounded had expired; 10.45 P.M. was the hour at which it was received at
corps headquarters, and between eleven and twelve it reached my
headquarters. As a consequence, it was not understood by the troops of
this army that there was a cessation of hostilities for the purpose of
collecting the dead and wounded, and none were collected. Two officers
and six men of the 8th and 25th North Carolina Regts., who were out in
search of the bodies of officers of their respective regiments, were
captured and brought into our lines, owing to this want of
understanding. I regret this, but will state that as soon as I learned
the fact, I directed that they should not be held as prisoners, but must
be returned to their commands. These officers and men having been
carelessly brought through our lines to the rear have not determined
whether they will be sent back the way they came, or whether they will
be sent by some other route.

Regretting that all my efforts for alleviating the sufferings of wounded
men left upon the battle-field have been rendered nugatory, I remain,
&c.,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever
made. I might say the same thing of the assault of the 22d of May,
1863, at Vicksburg. At Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was gained to
compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed, the advantages
other than those of relative losses, were on the Confederate side.
Before that, the Army of Northern Virginia seemed to have acquired a
wholesome regard for the courage, endurance, and soldierly qualities
generally of the Army of the Potomac. They no longer wanted to fight
them "one Confederate to five Yanks." Indeed, they seemed to have given
up any idea of gaining any advantage of their antagonist in the open
field. They had come to much prefer breastworks in their front to the
Army of the Potomac. This charge seemed to revive their hopes
temporarily; but it was of short duration. The effect upon the Army of
the Potomac was the reverse. When we reached the James River, however,
all effects of the battle of Cold Harbor seemed to have disappeared.

There was more justification for the assault at Vicksburg. We were in a
Southern climate, at the beginning of the hot season. The Army of the
Tennessee had won five successive victories over the garrison of
Vicksburg in the three preceding weeks. They had driven a portion of
that army from Port Gibson with considerable loss, after having flanked
them out of their stronghold at Grand Gulf. They had attacked another
portion of the same army at Raymond, more than fifty miles farther in
the interior of the State, and driven them back into Jackson with great
loss in killed, wounded, captured and missing, besides loss of large and
small arms: they had captured the capital of the State of Mississippi,
with a large amount of materials of war and manufactures. Only a few
days before, they had beaten the enemy then penned up in the town first
at Champion's Hill, next at Big Black River Bridge, inflicting upon him
a loss of fifteen thousand or more men (including those cut off from
returning) besides large losses in arms and ammunition. The Army of the
Tennessee had come to believe that they could beat their antagonist
under any circumstances. There was no telling how long a regular siege
might last. As I have stated, it was the beginning of the hot season in
a Southern climate. There was no telling what the casualties might be
among Northern troops working and living in trenches, drinking surface
water filtered through rich vegetation, under a tropical sun. If
Vicksburg could have been carried in May, it would not only have saved
the army the risk it ran of a greater danger than from the bullets of
the enemy, but it would have given us a splendid army, well equipped and
officered, to operate elsewhere with. These are reasons justifying the
assault. The only benefit we gained--and it was a slight one for so
great a sacrifice--was that the men worked cheerfully in the trenches
after that, being satisfied with digging the enemy out. Had the assault
not been made, I have no doubt that the majority of those engaged in the
siege of Vicksburg would have believed that had we assaulted it would
have proven successful, and would have saved life, health and comfort.

CHAPTER LVI.

LEFT FLANK MOVEMENT ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES--GENERAL LEE
--VISIT TO BUTLER--THE MOVEMENT ON PETERSBURG--THE INVESTMENT OF
PETERSBURG.

Lee's position was now so near Richmond, and the intervening swamps of
the Chickahominy so great an obstacle to the movement of troops in the
face of an enemy, that I determined to make my next left flank move
carry the Army of the Potomac south of the James River. (*34)
Preparations for this were promptly commenced. The move was a hazardous
one to make: the Chickahominy River, with its marshy and heavily
timbered approaches, had to be crossed; all the bridges over it east of
Lee were destroyed; the enemy had a shorter line and better roads to
travel on to confront me in crossing; more than fifty miles intervened
between me and Butler, by the roads I should have to travel, with both
the James and the Chickahominy unbridged to cross; and last, the Army of
the Potomac had to be got out of a position but a few hundred yards from
the enemy at the widest place. Lee, if he did not choose to follow me,
might, with his shorter distance to travel and his bridges over the
Chickahominy and the James, move rapidly on Butler and crush him before
the army with me could come to his relief. Then too he might spare
troops enough to send against Hunter who was approaching Lynchburg,
living upon the country he passed through, and without ammunition
further than what he carried with him.

But the move had to be made, and I relied upon Lee's not seeing my
danger as I saw it. Besides we had armies on both sides of the James
River and not far from the Confederate capital. I knew that its safety
would be a matter of the first consideration with the executive,
legislative and judicial branches of the so-called Confederate
government, if it was not with the military commanders. But I took all
the precaution I knew of to guard against all dangers.

Sheridan was sent with two divisions, to communicate with Hunter and to
break up the Virginia Central Railroad and the James River Canal, on the
7th of June, taking instructions to Hunter to come back with him (*35).
Hunter was also informed by way of Washington and the Valley that
Sheridan was on the way to meet him. The canal and Central Road, and
the regions penetrated by them, were of vast importance to the enemy,
furnishing and carrying a large per cent. of all the supplies for the
Army of Northern Virginia and the people of Richmond. Before Sheridan
got off on the 7th news was received from Hunter reporting his advance
to Staunton and successful engagement with the enemy near that place on
the 5th, in which the Confederate commander, W. S. Jones, was killed.
On the 4th of June the enemy having withdrawn his left corps, Burnside
on our right was moved up between Warren and Smith. On the 5th Birney
returned to Hancock, which extended his left now to the Chickahominy,
and Warren was withdrawn to Cold Harbor. Wright was directed to send
two divisions to the left to extend down the banks of that stream to
Bottom's Bridge. The cavalry extended still farther east to Jones's
Bridge.

On the 7th Abercrombie--who was in command at White House, and who had
been in command at our base of supplies in all the changes made from the
start--was ordered to take up the iron from the York River Railroad and
put it on boats, and to be in readiness to move by water to City Point.

On the 8th Meade was directed to fortify a line down the bank
overlooking the Chickahominy, under cover of which the army could move.

On the 9th Abercrombie was directed to send all organized troops
arriving at White House, without debarking from their transports, to
report to Butler. Halleck was at this time instructed to send all
reinforcements to City Point.

On the 11th I wrote:

COLD HARBOR, VA., June 11, 1864.

MAJOR-GEN. B. F. BUTLER, Commanding Department of Va. and N. C.

The movement to transfer this army to the south side of the James River
will commence after dark to-morrow night. Col. Comstock, of my staff,
was sent specially to ascertain what was necessary to make your position
secure in the interval during which the enemy might use most of his
force against you, and also, to ascertain what point on the river we
should reach to effect a crossing if it should not be practicable to
reach this side of the river at Bermuda Hundred. Colonel Comstock has
not yet returned, so that I cannot make instructions as definite as I
would wish, but the time between this and Sunday night being so short in
which to get word to you, I must do the best I can. Colonel Dent goes
to the Chickahominy to take to you the 18th corps. The corps will leave
its position in the trenches as early in the evening, tomorrow, as
possible, and make a forced march to Cole's Landing or Ferry, where it
should reach by ten A.M. the following morning. This corps numbers now
15,300 men. They take with them neither wagons nor artillery; these
latter marching with the balance of the army to the James River. The
remainder of the army will cross the Chickahominy at Long Bridge and at
Jones's, and strike the river at the most practicable crossing below
City Point.

I directed several days ago that all reinforcements for the army should
be sent to you. I am not advised of the number that may have gone, but
suppose you have received from six to ten thousand. General Smith will
also reach you as soon as the enemy could, going by the way of Richmond.

The balance of the force will not be more than one day behind, unless
detained by the whole of Lee's army, in which case you will be strong
enough.

I wish you would direct the proper staff officers, your chief-engineer
and your chief-quartermaster, to commence at once the collection of all
the means in their reach for crossing the army on its arrival. If there
is a point below City Point where a pontoon bridge can be thrown, have
it laid.

Expecting the arrival of the 18th corps by Monday night, if you deem it
practicable from the force you have to seize and hold Petersburg, you
may prepare to start, on the arrival of troops to hold your present
lines. I do not want Petersburg visited, however, unless it is held,
nor an attempt to take it, unless you feel a reasonable degree of
confidence of success. If you should go there, I think troops should
take nothing with them except what they can carry, depending upon
supplies being sent after the place is secured. If Colonel Dent should
not succeed in securing the requisite amount of transportation for the
18th corps before reaching you, please have the balance supplied.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

P. S.--On reflection I will send the 18th corps by way of White House.
The distance which they will have to march will be enough shorter to
enable them to reach you about the same time, and the uncertainty of
navigation on the Chickahominy will be avoided.

U. S. GRANT.

COLD HARBOR, VA., June 11,1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL G. G. MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Colonel Comstock, who visited the James River for the purpose of
ascertaining the best point below Bermuda Hundred to which to march the
army has not yet returned. It is now getting so late, however, that all
preparations may be made for the move to-morrow night without waiting
longer.

The movement will be made as heretofore agreed upon, that is, the 18th
corps make a rapid march with the infantry alone, their wagons and
artillery accompanying the balance of the army to Cole's Landing or
Ferry, and there embark for City Point, losing no time for rest until
they reach the latter point.

The 5th corps will seize Long Bridge and move out on the Long Bridge
Road to its junction with Quaker Road, or until stopped by the enemy.

The other three corps will follow in such order as you may direct, one
of them crossing at Long Bridge, and two at Jones's Bridge. After the
crossing is effected, the most practicable roads will be taken to reach
about Fort Powhattan. Of course, this is supposing the enemy makes no
opposition to our advance. The 5th corps, after securing the passage of
the balance of the army, will join or follow in rear of the corps which
crosses the same bridge with themselves. The wagon trains should be
kept well east of the troops, and if a crossing can be found, or made
lower down than Jones's they should take it.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

P. S.--In view of the long march to reach Cole's Landing, and the
uncertainty of being able to embark a large number of men there, the
direction of the 18th corps may be changed to White House. They should
be directed to load up transports, and start them as fast as loaded
without waiting for the whole corps or even whole divisions to go
together.

U. S. GRANT.

About this time word was received (through the Richmond papers of the
11th) that Crook and Averell had united and were moving east. This,
with the news of Hunter's successful engagement near Staunton, was no
doubt known to Lee before it was to me. Then Sheridan leaving with two
divisions of cavalry, looked indeed threatening, both to Lee's
communications and supplies. Much of his cavalry was sent after
Sheridan, and Early with Ewell's entire corps was sent to the Valley.
Supplies were growing scarce in Richmond, and the sources from which to
draw them were in our hands. People from outside began to pour into
Richmond to help eat up the little on hand. Consternation reigned
there.

On the 12th Smith was ordered to move at night to White House, not to
stop until he reached there, and to take boats at once for City Point,
leaving his trains and artillery to move by land.

Soon after dark some of the cavalry at Long Bridge effected a crossing
by wading and floundering through the water and mud, leaving their
horses behind, and drove away the cavalry pickets. A pontoon bridge was
speedily thrown across, over which the remainder of the army soon passed
and pushed out for a mile or two to watch and detain any advance that
might be made from the other side. Warren followed the cavalry, and by
the morning of the 13th had his whole corps over. Hancock followed
Warren. Burnside took the road to Jones's Bridge, followed by Wright.
Ferrero's division, with the wagon train, moved farther east, by Window
Shades and Cole's Ferry, our rear being covered by cavalry.

It was known that the enemy had some gunboats at Richmond. These might
run down at night and inflict great damage upon us before they could be
sunk or captured by our navy. General Butler had, in advance, loaded
some vessels with stone ready to be sunk so as to obstruct the channel
in an emergency. On the 13th I sent orders to have these sunk as high
up the river as we could guard them, and prevent their removal by the
enemy.

As soon as Warren's corps was over the Chickahominy it marched out and
joined the cavalry in holding the roads from Richmond while the army
passed. No attempt was made by the enemy to impede our march, however,
but Warren and Wilson reported the enemy strongly fortified in their
front. By the evening of the 13th Hancock's corps was at Charles City
Court House on the James River. Burnside's and Wright's corps were on
the Chickahominy, and crossed during the night, Warren's corps and the
cavalry still covering the army. The material for a pontoon bridge was
already at hand and the work of laying it was commenced immediately,
under the superintendence of Brigadier-General Benham, commanding the
engineer brigade. On the evening of the 14th the crossing commenced,
Hancock in advance, using both the bridge and boats.

When the Wilderness campaign commenced the Army of the Potomac,
including Burnside's--which was a separate command until the 24th of May
when it was incorporated with the main army--numbered about 116,000 men.
During the progress of the campaign about 40,000 reinforcements were
received. At the crossing of the James River June 14th-15th the army
numbered about 115,000. Besides the ordinary losses incident to a
campaign of six weeks' nearly constant fighting or skirmishing, about
one-half of the artillery was sent back to Washington, and many men were
discharged by reason of the expiration of their term of service.* In
estimating our strength every enlisted man and every commissioned
officer present is included, no matter how employed; in bands, sick in
field hospitals, hospital attendants, company cooks and all. Operating
in an enemy's country, and being supplied always from a distant base,
large detachments had at all times to be sent from the front, not only
to guard the base of supplies and the roads to it, but all the roads
leading to our flanks and rear. We were also operating in a country
unknown to us, and without competent guides or maps showing the roads
accurately.

The manner of estimating numbers in the two armies differs materially.
In the Confederate army often only bayonets are taken into account,
never, I believe, do they estimate more than are handling the guns of
the artillery and armed with muskets (*36) or carbines. Generally the
latter are far enough away to be excluded from the count in any one
field. Officers and details of enlisted men are not included. In the
Northern armies the estimate is most liberal, taking in all connected
with the army and drawing pay.

Estimated in the same manner as ours, Lee had not less than 80,000 men
at the start. His reinforcements were about equal to ours during the
campaign, deducting the discharged men and those sent back. He was on
the defensive, and in a country in which every stream, every road, every
obstacle to the movement of troops and every natural defence was
familiar to him and his army. The citizens were all friendly to him and
his cause, and could and did furnish him with accurate reports of our
every move. Rear guards were not necessary for him, and having always a
railroad at his back, large wagon trains were not required. All
circumstances considered we did not have any advantage in numbers.

General Lee, who had led the Army of Northern Virginia in all these
contests, was a very highly estimated man in the Confederate army and
States, and filled also a very high place in the estimation of the
people and press of the Northern States. His praise was sounded
throughout the entire North after every action he was engaged in: the
number of his forces was always lowered and that of the National forces
exaggerated. He was a large, austere man, and I judge difficult of
approach to his subordinates. To be extolled by the entire press of the
South after every engagement, and by a portion of the press North with
equal vehemence, was calculated to give him the entire confidence of his
troops and to make him feared by his antagonists. It was not an
uncommon thing for my staff-officers to hear from Eastern officers,
"Well, Grant has never met Bobby Lee yet." There were good and true
officers who believe now that the Army of Northern Virginia was superior
to the Army of the Potomac man to man. I do not believe so, except as
the advantages spoken of above made them so. Before the end I believe
the difference was the other way. The Army of Northern Virginia became
despondent and saw the end. It did not please them. The National army
saw the same thing, and were encouraged by it.

The advance of the Army of the Potomac reached the James on the 14th of
June. Preparations were at once commenced for laying the pontoon
bridges and crossing the river. As already stated, I had previously
ordered General Butler to have two vessels loaded with stone and carried
up the river to a point above that occupied by our gunboats, where the
channel was narrow, and sunk there so as to obstruct the passage and
prevent Confederate gunboats from coming down the river. Butler had had
these boats filled and put in position, but had not had them sunk before
my arrival. I ordered this done, and also directed that he should turn
over all material and boats not then in use in the river to be used in
ferrying the troops across.