Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete

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Burnside on the left had got up to within a few hundred yards of
Spottsylvania Court House, completely turning Lee's right. He was not
aware of the importance of the advantage he had gained, and I, being
with the troops where the heavy fighting was, did not know of it at the
time. He had gained his position with but little fighting, and almost
without loss. Burnside's position now separated him widely from
Wright's corps, the corps nearest to him. At night he was ordered to
join on to this. This brought him back about a mile, and lost to us an
important advantage. I attach no blame to Burnside for this, but I do
to myself for not having had a staff officer with him to report to me
his position.

The enemy had not dared to come out of his line at any point to follow
up his advantage, except in the single instance of his attack on Barlow.
Then he was twice repulsed with heavy loss, though he had an entire
corps against two brigades. Barlow took up his bridges in the presence
of this force.

On the 11th there was no battle and but little firing; none except by
Mott who made a reconnoissance to ascertain if there was a weak point in
the enemy's line.

I wrote the following letter to General Halleck:

NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., May 11, 1864--8.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D. C.

We have now ended the 6th day of very hard fighting. The result up to
this time is much in our favor. But our losses have been heavy as well
as those of the enemy. We have lost to this time eleven general
officers killed, wounded and missing, and probably twenty thousand men.
I think the loss of the enemy must be greater--we having taken over four
thousand prisoners in battle, whilst he has taken from us but few except
a few stragglers. I am now sending back to Belle Plain all my wagons
for a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, and purpose to fight it
out on this line if it takes all summer.

The arrival of reinforcements here will be very encouraging to the men,
and I hope they will be sent as fast as possible, and in as great
numbers. My object in having them sent to Belle Plain was to use them
as an escort to our supply trains. If it is more convenient to send
them out by train to march from the railroad to Belle Plain or
Fredericksburg, send them so.

I am satisfied the enemy are very shaky, and are only kept up to the
mark by the greatest exertions on the part of their officers, and by
keeping them intrenched in every position they take.

Up to this time there is no indication of any portion of Lee's army
being detached for the defence of Richmond.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

And also, I received information, through the War Department, from
General Butler that his cavalry under Kautz had cut the railroad south
of Petersburg, separating Beauregard from Richmond, and had whipped
Hill, killing, wounding and capturing many. Also that he was
intrenched, and could maintain himself. On this same day came news from
Sheridan to the effect that he had destroyed ten miles of the railroad
and telegraph between Lee and Richmond, one and a half million rations,
and most of the medical stores for his army.

On the 8th I had directed Sheridan verbally to cut loose from the Army
of the Potomac and pass around the left of Lee's army and attack his
cavalry and communications, which was successfully executed in the
manner I have already described.

CHAPTER LIII.

HANCOCK'S ASSAULT-LOSSES OF THE CONFEDERATES--PROMOTIONS RECOMMENDED
--DISCOMFITURE OF THE ENEMY--EWELL'S ATTACK-REDUCING THE ARTILLERY.

In the reconnoissance made by Mott on the 11th, a salient was discovered
at the right centre. I determined that an assault should be made at that
point. (*28) Accordingly in the afternoon Hancock was ordered to move
his command by the rear of Warren and Wright, under cover of night, to
Wright's left, and there form it for an assault at four o'clock the next
morning. The night was dark, it rained heavily, and the road was
difficult, so that it was midnight when he reached the point where he
was to halt. It took most of the night to get the men in position for
their advance in the morning. The men got but little rest. Burnside
was ordered to attack (*29) on the left of the salient at the same hour.
I sent two of my staff officers to impress upon him the importance of
pushing forward vigorously. Hancock was notified of this. Warren and
Wright were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to join in the
assault if circumstances made it advisable. I occupied a central
position most convenient for receiving information from all points.
Hancock put Barlow on his left, in double column, and Birney to his
right. Mott followed Birney, and Gibbon was held in reserve.

The morning of the 12th opened foggy, delaying the start more than half
an hour.

The ground over which Hancock had to pass to reach the enemy, was
ascending and heavily wooded to within two or three hundred yards of the
enemy's intrenchments. In front of Birney there was also a marsh to
cross. But, notwithstanding all these difficulties, the troops pushed
on in quick time without firing a gun, and when within four or five
hundred yards of the enemy's line broke out in loud cheers, and with a
rush went up to and over the breastworks. Barlow and Birney entered
almost simultaneously. Here a desperate hand-to-hand conflict took
place. The men of the two sides were too close together to fire, but
used their guns as clubs. The hand conflict was soon over. Hancock's
corps captured some four thousand prisoners among them a division and a
brigade commander twenty or more guns with their horses, caissons, and
ammunition, several thousand stand of arms, and many colors. Hancock,
as soon as the hand-to-hand conflict was over, turned the guns of the
enemy against him and advanced inside the rebel lines. About six
o'clock I ordered Warren's corps to the support of Hancock's. Burnside,
on the left, had advanced up east of the salient to the very parapet of
the enemy. Potter, commanding one of his divisions, got over but was
not able to remain there. However, he inflicted a heavy loss upon the
enemy; but not without loss in return.

This victory was important, and one that Lee could not afford to leave
us in full possession of. He made the most strenuous efforts to regain
the position he had lost. Troops were brought up from his left and
attacked Hancock furiously. Hancock was forced to fall back: but he
did so slowly, with his face to the enemy, inflicting on him heavy loss,
until behind the breastworks he had captured. These he turned, facing
them the other way, and continued to hold. Wright was ordered up to
reinforce Hancock, and arrived by six o'clock. He was wounded soon
after coming up but did not relinquish the command of his corps,
although the fighting lasted until one o'clock the next morning. At
eight o'clock Warren was ordered up again, but was so slow in making his
dispositions that his orders were frequently repeated, and with
emphasis. At eleven o'clock I gave Meade written orders to relieve
Warren from his command if he failed to move promptly. Hancock placed
batteries on high ground in his rear, which he used against the enemy,
firing over the heads of his own troops.

Burnside accomplished but little on our left of a positive nature, but
negatively a great deal. He kept Lee from reinforcing his centre from
that quarter. If the 5th corps, or rather if Warren, had been as prompt
as Wright was with the 6th corps, better results might have been
obtained.

Lee massed heavily from his left flank on the broken point of his line.
Five times during the day he assaulted furiously, but without dislodging
our troops from their new position. His losses must have been fearful.
Sometimes the belligerents would be separated by but a few feet. In one
place a tree, eighteen inches in diameter, was cut entirely down by
musket balls. All the trees between the lines were very much cut to
pieces by artillery and musketry. It was three o'clock next morning
before the fighting ceased. Some of our troops had then been twenty
hours under fire. In this engagement we did not lose a single
organization, not even a company. The enemy lost one division with its
commander, one brigade and one regiment, with heavy losses
elsewhere.(*30) Our losses were heavy, but, as stated, no whole company
was captured. At night Lee took a position in rear of his former one,
and by the following morning he was strongly intrenched in it.

Warren's corps was now temporarily broken up, Cutler's division sent to
Wright, and Griffin's to Hancock. Meade ordered his chief of staff,
General Humphreys, to remain with Warren and the remaining division, and
authorized him to give it orders in his name.

During the day I was passing along the line from wing to wing
continuously. About the centre stood a house which proved to be
occupied by an old lady and her daughter. She showed such unmistakable
signs of being strongly Union that I stopped. She said she had not seen
a Union flag for so long a time that it did her heart good to look upon
it again. She said her husband and son, being, Union men, had had to
leave early in the war, and were now somewhere in the Union army, if
alive. She was without food or nearly so, so I ordered rations issued
to her, and promised to find out if I could where the husband and son
were.

There was no fighting on the 13th, further than a little skirmishing
between Mott's division and the enemy. I was afraid that Lee might be
moving out, and I did not want him to go without my knowing it. The
indications were that he was moving, but it was found that he was only
taking his new position back from the salient that had been captured.
Our dead were buried this day. Mott's division was reduced to a
brigade, and assigned to Birney's division.

During this day I wrote to Washington recommending Sherman and Meade
(*31) for promotion to the grade of Major-General in the regular army;
Hancock for Brigadier-General; Wright, Gibbon and Humphreys to be
Major-Generals of Volunteers; and Upton and Carroll to be Brigadiers.
Upton had already been named as such, but the appointment had to be
confirmed by the Senate on the nomination of the President.

The night of the 13th Warren and Wright were moved by the rear to the
left of Burnside. The night was very dark and it rained heavily, the
roads were so bad that the troops had to cut trees and corduroy the road
a part of the way, to get through. It was midnight before they got to
the point where they were to halt, and daylight before the troops could
be organized to advance to their position in line. They gained their
position in line, however, without any fighting, except a little in
Wright's front. Here Upton had to contend for an elevation which we
wanted and which the enemy was not disposed to yield. Upton first drove
the enemy, and was then repulsed in turn. Ayres coming to his support
with his brigade (of Griffin's division, Warren's corps), the position
was secured and fortified. There was no more battle during the 14th.
This brought our line east of the Court House and running north and
south and facing west.

During the night of the 14th-15th Lee moved to cover this new front.
This left Hancock without an enemy confronting him. He was brought to
the rear of our new centre, ready to be moved in any direction he might
be wanted.

On the 15th news came from Butler and Averill. The former reported the
capture of the outer works at Drury's Bluff, on the James River, and
that his cavalry had cut the railroad and telegraph south of Richmond on
the Danville road: and the latter, the destruction of a depot of
supplies at Dublin, West Virginia, and the breaking of New River Bridge
on the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. The next day news came from
Sherman and Sheridan. Sherman had forced Johnston out of Dalton,
Georgia, and was following him south. The report from Sheridan embraced
his operations up to his passing the outer defences of Richmond. The
prospect must now have been dismal in Richmond. The road and telegraph
were cut between the capital and Lee. The roads and wires were cut in
every direction from the rebel capital. Temporarily that city was cut
off from all communication with the outside except by courier. This
condition of affairs, however, was of but short duration.

I wrote Halleck:

NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., May 16, 1864, 8 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Washington, D. C.:

We have had five days almost constant rain without any prospect yet of
it clearing up. The roads have now become so impassable that ambulances
with wounded men can no longer run between here and Fredericksburg. All
offensive operations necessarily cease until we can have twenty-four
hours of dry weather. The army is in the best of spirits, and feel the
greatest confidence of ultimate success. * * * *
* * You can assure the President and Secretary of War that the
elements alone have suspended hostilities, and that it is in no manner
due to weakness or exhaustion on our part.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

The condition of the roads was such that nothing was done on the 17th.
But that night Hancock and Wright were to make a night march back to
their old positions, and to make an assault at four o'clock in the
morning. Lee got troops back in time to protect his old line, so the
assault was unsuccessful. On this day (18th) the news was almost as
discouraging to us as it had been two days before in the rebel capital.
As stated above, Hancock's and Wright's corps had made an unsuccessful
assault. News came that Sigel had been defeated at New Market, badly,
and was retreating down the valley. Not two hours before, I had sent
the inquiry to Halleck whether Sigel could not get to Staunton to stop
supplies coming from there to Lee. I asked at once that Sigel might be
relieved, and some one else put in his place. Hunter's name was
suggested, and I heartily approved. Further news from Butler reported
him driven from Drury's Bluff, but still in possession of the Petersburg
road. Banks had been defeated in Louisiana, relieved, and Canby put in
his place. This change of commander was not on my suggestion. All this
news was very discouraging. All of it must have been known by the enemy
before it was by me. In fact, the good news (for the enemy) must have
been known to him at the moment I thought he was in despair, and his
anguish had been already relieved when we were enjoying his supposed
discomfiture, But this was no time for repining. I immediately gave
orders for a movement by the left flank, on towards Richmond, to
commence on the night of the 19th. I also asked Halleck to secure the
cooperation of the navy in changing our base of supplies from
Fredericksburg to Port Royal, on the Rappahannock.

Up to this time I had received no reinforcements, except six thousand
raw troops under Brigadier General Robert O. Tyler, just arrived. They
had not yet joined their command, Hancock's corps, but were on our
right. This corps had been brought to the rear of the centre, ready to
move in any direction. Lee, probably suspecting some move on my part,
and seeing our right entirely abandoned, moved Ewell's corps about five
o'clock in the afternoon, with Early's as a reserve, to attack us in
that quarter. Tyler had come up from Fredericksburg, and had been
halted on the road to the right of our line, near Kitching's brigade of
Warren's corps. Tyler received the attack with his raw troops, and they
maintained their position, until reinforced, in a manner worthy of
veterans.

Hancock was in a position to reinforce speedily, and was the soldier to
do it without waiting to make dispositions. Birney was thrown to
Tyler's right and Crawford to his left, with Gibbon as a reserve; and
Ewell was whirled back speedily and with heavy loss.

Warren had been ordered to get on Ewell's flank and in his rear, to cut
him off from his intrenchments. But his efforts were so feeble that
under the cover of night Ewell got back with only the loss of a few
hundred prisoners, besides his killed and wounded. The army being
engaged until after dark, I rescinded the order for the march by our
left flank that night.

As soon as it was discovered that the enemy were coming out to attack, I
naturally supposed they would detach a force to destroy our trains. The
withdrawal of Hancock from the right uncovered one road from
Spottsylvania to Fredericksburg over which trains drew our supplies.
This was guarded by a division of colored troops, commanded by General
Ferrero, belonging to Burnside's corps. Ferrero was therefore promptly
notified, and ordered to throw his cavalry pickets out to the south and
be prepared to meet the enemy if he should come; if he had to retreat to
do so towards Fredericksburg. The enemy did detach as expected, and
captured twenty-five or thirty wagons which, however, were soon retaken.

In consequence of the disasters that had befallen us in the past few
days, Lee could be reinforced largely, and I had no doubt he would be.
Beauregard had come up from the south with troops to guard the
Confederate capital when it was in danger. Butler being driven back,
most of the troops could be sent to Lee. Hoke was no longer needed in
North Carolina; and Sigel's troops having gone back to Cedar Creek,
whipped, many troops could be spared from the valley.

The Wilderness and Spottsylvania battles convinced me that we had more
artillery than could ever be brought into action at any one time. It
occupied much of the road in marching, and taxed the trains in bringing
up forage. Artillery is very useful when it can be brought into action,
but it is a very burdensome luxury where it cannot be used. Before
leaving Spottsylvania, therefore, I sent back to the defences of
Washington over one hundred pieces of artillery, with the horses and
caissons. This relieved the roads over which we were to march of more
than two hundred six-horse teams, and still left us more artillery than
could be advantageously used. In fact, before reaching the James River
I again reduced the artillery with the army largely.

I believed that, if one corps of the army was exposed on the road to
Richmond, and at a distance from the main army, Lee would endeavor to
attack the exposed corps before reinforcements could come up; in which
case the main army could follow Lee up and attack him before he had time
to intrench. So I issued the following orders:

NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., VA., May 18, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Before daylight to-morrow morning I propose to draw Hancock and Burnside
from the position they now hold, and put Burnside to the left of Wright.
Wright and Burnside should then force their way up as close to the enemy
as they can get without a general engagement, or with a general
engagement if the enemy will come out of their works to fight, and
intrench. Hancock should march and take up a position as if in support
of the two left corps. To-morrow night, at twelve or one o'clock, he
will be moved south-east with all his force and as much cavalry as can
be given to him, to get as far towards Richmond on the line of the
Fredericksburg Railroad as he can make, fighting the enemy in whatever
force he can find him. If the enemy make a general move to meet this,
they will be followed by the other three corps of the army, and
attacked, if possible, before time is given to intrench.

Suitable directions will at once be given for all trains and surplus
artillery to conform to this movement.

U. S. GRANT.

On the 20th, Lee showing no signs of coming out of his lines, orders
were renewed for a left-flank movement, to commence after night.

CHAPTER LIV.

MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK--BATTLE OF NORTH ANNA--AN INCIDENT OF THE
MARCH--MOVING ON RICHMOND--SOUTH OF THE PAMUNKEY--POSITION OF THE
NATIONAL ARMY.

We were now to operate in a different country from any we had before
seen in Virginia. The roads were wide and good, and the country well
cultivated. No men were seen except those bearing arms, even the black
man having been sent away. The country, however, was new to us, and we
had neither guides nor maps to tell us where the roads were, or where
they led to. Engineer and staff officers were put to the dangerous duty
of supplying the place of both maps and guides. By reconnoitring they
were enabled to locate the roads in the vicinity of each army corps.
Our course was south, and we took all roads leading in that direction
which would not separate the army too widely.

Hancock who had the lead had marched easterly to Guiney's Station, on
the Fredericksburg Railroad, thence southerly to Bowling Green and
Milford. He was at Milford by the night of the 21st. Here he met a
detachment of Pickett's division coming from Richmond to reinforce Lee.
They were speedily driven away, and several hundred captured. Warren
followed on the morning of the 21st, and reached Guiney's Station that
night without molestation. Burnside and Wright were retained at
Spottsylvania to keep up the appearance of an intended assault, and to
hold Lee, if possible, while Hancock and Warren should get start enough
to interpose between him and Richmond.

Lee had now a superb opportunity to take the initiative either by
attacking Wright and Burnside alone, or by following by the Telegraph
Road and striking Hancock's and Warren's corps, or even Hancock's alone,
before reinforcements could come up. But he did not avail himself of
either opportunity. He seemed really to be misled as to my designs; but
moved by his interior line--the Telegraph Road--to make sure of keeping
between his capital and the Army of the Potomac. He never again had
such an opportunity of dealing a heavy blow.

The evening of the 21st Burnside, 9th corps, moved out followed by
Wright, 6th corps. Burnside was to take the Telegraph Road; but finding
Stanard's Ford, over the Po, fortified and guarded, he turned east to
the road taken by Hancock and Warren without an attempt to dislodge the
enemy. The night of the 21st I had my headquarters near the 6th corps,
at Guiney's Station, and the enemy's cavalry was between us and Hancock.
There was a slight attack on Burnside's and Wright's corps as they moved
out of their lines; but it was easily repulsed. The object probably was
only to make sure that we were not leaving a force to follow upon the
rear of the Confederates.

By the morning of the 22d Burnside and Wright were at Guiney's Station.
Hancock's corps had now been marching and fighting continuously for
several days, not having had rest even at night much of the time. They
were, therefore, permitted to rest during the 22d. But Warren was
pushed to Harris's Store, directly west of Milford, and connected with
it by a good road, and Burnside was sent to New Bethel Church. Wright's
corps was still back at Guiney's Station.

I issued the following order for the movement of the troops the next
day:

NEW BETHEL, VA., May 22, 1864

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Direct corps commanders to hold their troops in readiness to march at
five A.M. to-morrow. At that hour each command will send out cavalry
and infantry on all roads to their front leading south, and ascertain,
if possible, where the enemy is. If beyond the South Anna, the 5th and
6th corps will march to the forks of the road, where one branch leads to
Beaver Dam Station, the other to Jericho Bridge, then south by roads
reaching the Anna, as near to and east of Hawkins Creek as they can be
found.

The 2d corps will move to Chesterfield Ford. The 9th corps will be
directed to move at the same time to Jericho Bridge. The map only shows
two roads for the four corps to march upon, but, no doubt, by the use of
plantation roads, and pressing in guides, others can be found, to give
one for each corps.

The troops will follow their respective reconnoitring parties. The
trains will be moved at the same time to Milford Station.

Headquarters will follow the 9th corps.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

Warren's corps was moved from Harris's Store to Jericho Ford, Wright's
following. Warren arrived at the ford early in the afternoon, and by
five o'clock effected a crossing under the protection of sharpshooters.
The men had to wade in water up to their waists. As soon as enough
troops were over to guard the ford, pontoons were laid and the artillery
and the rest of the troops crossed. The line formed was almost
perpendicular to the course of the river--Crawford on the left, next to
the river, Griffin in the centre, and Cutler on the right. Lee was
found intrenched along the front of their line. The whole of Hill's
corps was sent against Warren's right before it had got in position. A
brigade of Cutler's division was driven back, the enemy following, but
assistance coming up the enemy was in turn driven back into his trenches
with heavy loss in killed and wounded, with about five hundred prisoners
left in our hands. By night Wright's corps was up ready to reinforce
Warren.