Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete

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As a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or to act in support of
it, the 9th army corps, over twenty thousand strong, under General
Burnside, had been rendezvoused at Annapolis, Maryland. This was an
admirable position for such a reinforcement. The corps could be brought
at the last moment as a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or it
could be thrown on the sea-coast, south of Norfolk, in Virginia or North
Carolina, to operate against Richmond from that direction. In fact
Burnside and the War Department both thought the 9th corps was intended
for such an expedition up to the last moment.

My general plan now was to concentrate all the force possible against
the Confederate armies in the field. There were but two such, as we
have seen, east of the Mississippi River and facing north. The Army of
Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee commanding, was on the south
bank of the Rapidan, confronting the Army of the Potomac; the second,
under General Joseph E. Johnston, was at Dalton, Georgia, opposed to
Sherman who was still at Chattanooga. Beside these main armies the
Confederates had to guard the Shenandoah Valley, a great storehouse to
feed their armies from, and their line of communications from Richmond
to Tennessee. Forrest, a brave and intrepid cavalry general, was in the
West with a large force; making a larger command necessary to hold what
we had gained in Middle and West Tennessee. We could not abandon any
territory north of the line held by the enemy because it would lay the
Northern States open to invasion. But as the Army of the Potomac was
the principal garrison for the protection of Washington even while it
was moving on Lee, so all the forces to the west, and the Army of the
James, guarded their special trusts when advancing from them as well as
when remaining at them. Better indeed, for they forced the enemy to
guard his own lines and resources at a greater distance from ours, and
with a greater force. Little expeditions could not so well be sent out
to destroy a bridge or tear up a few miles of railroad track, burn a
storehouse, or inflict other little annoyances. Accordingly I arranged
for a simultaneous movement all along the line. Sherman was to move
from Chattanooga, Johnston's army and Atlanta being his objective
points. (*23) Crook, commanding in West Virginia, was to move from the
mouth of the Gauley River with a cavalry force and some artillery, the
Virginia and Tennessee Railroad to be his objective. Either the enemy
would have to keep a large force to protect their communications, or see
them destroyed and a large amount of forage and provision, which they so
much needed, fall into our hands. Sigel was in command in the Valley of
Virginia. He was to advance up the valley, covering the North from an
invasion through that channel as well while advancing as by remaining
near Harper's Ferry. Every mile he advanced also gave us possession of
stores on which Lee relied. Butler was to advance by the James River,
having Richmond and Petersburg as his objective.

Before the advance commenced I visited Butler at Fort Monroe. This was
the first time I had ever met him. Before giving him any order as to
the part he was to play in the approaching campaign I invited his views.
They were very much such as I intended to direct, and as I did direct
(*24), in writing, before leaving.

General W. F. Smith, who had been promoted to the rank of major-general
shortly after the battle of Chattanooga on my recommendation, had not
yet been confirmed. I found a decided prejudice against his
confirmation by a majority of the Senate, but I insisted that his
services had been such that he should be rewarded. My wishes were now
reluctantly complied with, and I assigned him to the command of one of
the corps under General Butler. I was not long in finding out that the
objections to Smith's promotion were well founded.

In one of my early interviews with the President I expressed my
dissatisfaction with the little that had been accomplished by the
cavalry so far in the war, and the belief that it was capable of
accomplishing much more than it had done if under a thorough leader. I
said I wanted the very best man in the army for that command. Halleck
was present and spoke up, saying: "How would Sheridan do?" I replied:
"The very man I want." The President said I could have anybody I wanted.
Sheridan was telegraphed for that day, and on his arrival was assigned
to the command of the cavalry corps with the Army of the Potomac. This
relieved General Alfred Pleasonton. It was not a reflection on that
officer, however, for I did not know but that he had been as efficient
as any other cavalry commander.

Banks in the Department of the Gulf was ordered to assemble all the
troops he had at New Orleans in time to join in the general move, Mobile
to be his objective.

At this time I was not entirely decided as to whether I should move the
Army of the Potomac by the right flank of the enemy, or by his left.
Each plan presented advantages. (*25) If by his right--my left--the
Potomac, Chesapeake Bay and tributaries would furnish us an easy hauling
distance of every position the army could occupy from the Rapidan to the
James River. But Lee could, if he chose, detach or move his whole army
north on a line rather interior to the one I would have to take in
following. A movement by his left--our right--would obviate this; but
all that was done would have to be done with the supplies and ammunition
we started with. All idea of adopting this latter plan was abandoned
when the limited quantity of supplies possible to take with us was
considered. The country over which we would have to pass was so
exhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carry
everything with us.

While these preparations were going on the enemy was not entirely idle.
In the West Forrest made a raid in West Tennessee up to the northern
border, capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at Union
City, and followed it up by an attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks
of the Ohio. While he was able to enter the city he failed to capture
the forts or any part of the garrison. On the first intelligence of
Forrest's raid I telegraphed Sherman to send all his cavalry against
him, and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself into.
Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before he got
my order.

Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at Fort
Pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of the
Mississippi River. The garrison consisted of a regiment of colored
troops, infantry, and a detachment of Tennessee cavalry. These troops
fought bravely, but were overpowered. I will leave Forrest in his
dispatches to tell what he did with them.

"The river was dyed," he says, "with the blood of the slaughtered for
two hundred yards. The approximate loss was upward of five hundred
killed, but few of the officers escaping. My loss was about twenty
killed. It is hoped that these facts will demonstrate to the Northern
people that negro soldiers cannot cope with Southerners." Subsequently
Forrest made a report in which he left out the part which shocks
humanity to read.

At the East, also, the rebels were busy. I had said to Halleck that
Plymouth and Washington, North Carolina, were unnecessary to hold. It
would be better to have the garrisons engaged there added to Butler's
command. If success attended our arms both places, and others too,
would fall into our hands naturally. These places had been occupied by
Federal troops before I took command of the armies, and I knew that the
Executive would be reluctant to abandon them, and therefore explained my
views; but before my views were carried out the rebels captured the
garrison at Plymouth. I then ordered the abandonment of Washington, but
directed the holding of New Berne at all hazards. This was essential
because New Berne was a port into which blockade runners could enter.

General Banks had gone on an expedition up the Red River long before my
promotion to general command. I had opposed the movement strenuously,
but acquiesced because it was the order of my superior at the time. By
direction of Halleck I had reinforced Banks with a corps of about ten
thousand men from Sherman's command. This reinforcement was wanted back
badly before the forward movement commenced. But Banks had got so far
that it seemed best that he should take Shreveport on the Red River, and
turn over the line of that river to Steele, who commanded in Arkansas,
to hold instead of the line of the Arkansas. Orders were given
accordingly, and with the expectation that the campaign would be ended
in time for Banks to return A. J. Smith's command to where it belonged
and get back to New Orleans himself in time to execute his part in the
general plan. But the expedition was a failure. Banks did not get back
in time to take part in the programme as laid down. Nor was Smith
returned until long after the movements of May, 1864, had been begun.
The services of forty thousand veteran troops, over and above the number
required to hold all that was necessary in the Department of the Gulf,
were thus paralyzed. It is but just to Banks, however, to say that his
expedition was ordered from Washington and he was in no way responsible
except for the conduct of it. I make no criticism on this point. He
opposed the expedition.

By the 27th of April spring had so far advanced as to justify me in
fixing a day for the great move. On that day Burnside left Annapolis to
occupy Meade's position between Bull Run and the Rappahannock. Meade
was notified and directed to bring his troops forward to his advance.
On the following day Butler was notified of my intended advance on the
4th of May, and he was directed to move the night of the same day and
get as far up the James River as possible by daylight, and push on from
there to accomplish the task given him. He was also notified that
reinforcements were being collected in Washington City, which would be
forwarded to him should the enemy fall back into the trenches at
Richmond. The same day Sherman was directed to get his forces up ready
to advance on the 5th. Sigel was in Winchester and was notified to move
in conjunction with the others.

The criticism has been made by writers on the campaign from the Rapidan
to the James River that all the loss of life could have been obviated by
moving the army there on transports. Richmond was fortified and
intrenched so perfectly that one man inside to defend was more than
equal to five outside besieging or assaulting. To get possession of
Lee's army was the first great object. With the capture of his army
Richmond would necessarily follow. It was better to fight him outside
of his stronghold than in it. If the Army of the Potomac had been moved
bodily to the James River by water Lee could have moved a part of his
forces back to Richmond, called Beauregard from the south to reinforce
it, and with the balance moved on to Washington. Then, too, I ordered a
move, simultaneous with that of the Army of the Potomac, up the James
River by a formidable army already collected at the mouth of the river.

While my headquarters were at Culpeper, from the 26th of March to the
4th of May, I generally visited Washington once a week to confer with
the Secretary of War and President. On the last occasion, a few days
before moving, a circumstance occurred which came near postponing my
part in the campaign altogether. Colonel John S. Mosby had for a long
time been commanding a partisan corps, or regiment, which operated in
the rear of the Army of the Potomac. On my return to the field on this
occasion, as the train approached Warrenton Junction, a heavy cloud of
dust was seen to the east of the road as if made by a body of cavalry on
a charge. Arriving at the junction the train was stopped and inquiries
made as to the cause of the dust. There was but one man at the station,
and he informed us that Mosby had crossed a few minutes before at full
speed in pursuit of Federal cavalry. Had he seen our train coming, no
doubt he would have let his prisoners escape to capture the train. I
was on a special train, if I remember correctly, without any guard.

Since the close of the war I have come to know Colonel Mosby personally,
and somewhat intimately. He is a different man entirely from what I had
supposed. He is slender, not tall, wiry, and looks as if he could
endure any amount of physical exercise. He is able, and thoroughly
honest and truthful. There were probably but few men in the South who
could have commanded successfully a separate detachment in the rear of
an opposing army, and so near the border of hostilities, as long as he
did without losing his entire command.

On this same visit to Washington I had my last interview with the
President before reaching the James River. He had of course become
acquainted with the fact that a general movement had been ordered all
along the line, and seemed to think it a new feature in war. I
explained to him that it was necessary to have a great number of troops
to guard and hold the territory we had captured, and to prevent
incursions into the Northern States. These troops could perform this
service just as well by advancing as by remaining still; and by
advancing they would compel the enemy to keep detachments to hold them
back, or else lay his own territory open to invasion. His answer was:
"Oh, yes! I see that. As we say out West, if a man can't skin he must
hold a leg while somebody else does."

There was a certain incident connected with the Wilderness campaign of
which it may not be out of place to speak; and to avoid a digression
further on I will mention it here.

A few days before my departure from Culpeper the Honorable E. B.
Washburne visited me there, and remained with my headquarters for some
distance south, through the battle in the Wilderness and, I think, to
Spottsylvania. He was accompanied by a Mr. Swinton, whom he presented as
a literary gentleman who wished to accompany the army with a view of
writing a history of the war when it was over. He assured me--and I
have no doubt Swinton gave him the assurance--that he was not present as
a correspondent of the press. I expressed an entire willingness to have
him (Swinton) accompany the army, and would have allowed him to do so as
a correspondent, restricted, however, in the character of the
information he could give. We received Richmond papers with about as
much regularity as if there had been no war, and knew that our papers
were received with equal regularity by the Confederates. It was
desirable, therefore, that correspondents should not be privileged spies
of the enemy within our lines.

Probably Mr. Swinton expected to be an invited guest at my headquarters,
and was disappointed that he was not asked to become so. At all events
he was not invited, and soon I found that he was corresponding with some
paper (I have now forgotten which one), thus violating his word either
expressed or implied. He knew of the assurance Washburne had given as
to the character of his mission. I never saw the man from the day of
our introduction to the present that I recollect. He accompanied us,
however, for a time at least.

The second night after crossing the Rapidan (the night of the 5th of
May) Colonel W. R. Rowley, of my staff, was acting as night officer at
my headquarters. A short time before midnight I gave him verbal
instructions for the night. Three days later I read in a Richmond paper
a verbatim report of these instructions.

A few nights still later (after the first, and possibly after the
second, day's fighting in the Wilderness) General Meade came to my tent
for consultation, bringing with him some of his staff officers. Both
his staff and mine retired to the camp-fire some yards in front of the
tent, thinking our conversation should be private. There was a stump a
little to one side, and between the front of the tent and camp-fire.
One of my staff, Colonel T. S. Bowers, saw what he took to be a man
seated on the ground and leaning against the stump, listening to the
conversation between Meade and myself. He called the attention of
Colonel Rowley to it. The latter immediately took the man by the
shoulder and asked him, in language more forcible than polite, what he
was doing there. The man proved to be Swinton, the "historian," and his
replies to the question were evasive and unsatisfactory, and he was
warned against further eaves-dropping.

The next I heard of Mr. Swinton was at Cold Harbor. General Meade came
to my headquarters saying that General Burnside had arrested Swinton,
who at some previous time had given great offence, and had ordered him
to be shot that afternoon. I promptly ordered the prisoner to be
released, but that he must be expelled from the lines of the army not to
return again on pain of punishment.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

COMMENCEMENT OF THE GRAND CAMPAIGN--GENERAL BUTLER'S POSITION
--SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAID.

The armies were now all ready to move for the accomplishment of a single
object. They were acting as a unit so far as such a thing was possible
over such a vast field. Lee, with the capital of the Confederacy, was
the main end to which all were working. Johnston, with Atlanta, was an
important obstacle in the way of our accomplishing the result aimed at,
and was therefore almost an independent objective. It was of less
importance only because the capture of Johnston and his army would not
produce so immediate and decisive a result in closing the rebellion as
would the possession of Richmond, Lee and his army. All other troops
were employed exclusively in support of these two movements. This was
the plan; and I will now endeavor to give, as concisely as I can, the
method of its execution, outlining first the operations of minor
detached but co-operative columns.

As stated before, Banks failed to accomplish what he had been sent to do
on the Red River, and eliminated the use of forty thousand veterans
whose cooperation in the grand campaign had been expected--ten thousand
with Sherman and thirty thousand against Mobile.

Sigel's record is almost equally brief. He moved out, it is true,
according to programme; but just when I was hoping to hear of good work
being done in the valley I received instead the following announcement
from Halleck: "Sigel is in full retreat on Strasburg. He will do
nothing but run; never did anything else." The enemy had intercepted
him about New Market and handled him roughly, leaving him short six
guns, and some nine hundred men out of his six thousand.

The plan had been for an advance of Sigel's forces in two columns.
Though the one under his immediate command failed ingloriously the other
proved more fortunate. Under Crook and Averell his western column
advanced from the Gauley in West Virginia at the appointed time, and
with more happy results. They reached the Virginia and Tennessee
Railroad at Dublin and destroyed a depot of supplies, besides tearing up
several miles of road and burning the bridge over New River. Having
accomplished this they recrossed the Alleghanies to Meadow Bluffs and
there awaited further orders.

Butler embarked at Fort Monroe with all his command, except the cavalry
and some artillery which moved up the south bank of the James River.
His steamers moved first up Chesapeake Bay and York River as if
threatening the rear of Lee's army. At midnight they turned back, and
Butler by daylight was far up the James River. He seized City Point and
Bermuda Hundred early in the day, without loss and, no doubt, very much
to the surprise of the enemy.

This was the accomplishment of the first step contemplated in my
instructions to Butler. He was to act from here, looking to Richmond as
his objective point. I had given him to understand that I should aim to
fight Lee between the Rapidan and Richmond if he would stand; but should
Lee fall back into Richmond I would follow up and make a junction of the
armies of the Potomac and the James on the James River. He was directed
to secure a footing as far up the south side of the river as he could at
as early a date as possible.

Butler was in position by the 6th of May and had begun intrenching, and
on the 7th he sent out his cavalry from Suffolk to cut the Weldon
Railroad. He also sent out detachments to destroy the railroad between
Petersburg and Richmond, but no great success attended these latter
efforts. He made no great effort to establish himself on that road and
neglected to attack Petersburg, which was almost defenceless. About the
11th he advanced slowly until he reached the works at Drury's Bluff,
about half way between Bermuda Hundred and Richmond. In the mean time
Beauregard had been gathering reinforcements. On the 16th he attacked
Butler with great vigor, and with such success as to limit very
materially the further usefulness of the Army of the James as a distinct
factor in the campaign. I afterward ordered a portion of it to join the
Army of the Potomac, leaving a sufficient force with Butler to man his
works, hold securely the footing he had already gained and maintain a
threatening front toward the rear of the Confederate capital.

The position which General Butler had chosen between the two rivers, the
James and Appomattox, was one of great natural strength, one where a
large area of ground might be thoroughly inclosed by means of a single
intrenched line, and that a very short one in comparison with the extent
of territory which it thoroughly protected. His right was protected by
the James River, his left by the Appomattox, and his rear by their
junction--the two streams uniting near by. The bends of the two streams
shortened the line that had been chosen for intrenchments, while it
increased the area which the line inclosed.

Previous to ordering any troops from Butler I sent my chief engineer,
General Barnard, from the Army of the Potomac to that of the James to
inspect Butler's position and ascertain whether I could again safely
make an order for General Butler's movement in co-operation with mine,
now that I was getting so near Richmond; or, if I could not, whether his
position was strong enough to justify me in withdrawing some of his
troops and having them brought round by water to White House to join me
and reinforce the Army of the Potomac. General Barnard reported the
position very strong for defensive purposes, and that I could do the
latter with great security; but that General Butler could not move from
where he was, in co-operation, to produce any effect. He said that the
general occupied a place between the James and Appomattox rivers which
was of great strength, and where with an inferior force he could hold it
for an indefinite length of time against a superior; but that he could
do nothing offensively. I then asked him why Butler could not move out
from his lines and push across the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad to
the rear and on the south side of Richmond. He replied that it was
impracticable, because the enemy had substantially the same line across
the neck of land that General Butler had. He then took out his pencil
and drew a sketch of the locality, remarking that the position was like
a bottle and that Butler's line of intrenchments across the neck
represented the cork; that the enemy had built an equally strong line
immediately in front of him across the neck; and it was therefore as if
Butler was in a bottle. He was perfectly safe against an attack; but,
as Barnard expressed it, the enemy had corked the bottle and with a
small force could hold the cork in its place. This struck me as being
very expressive of his position, particularly when I saw the hasty
sketch which General Barnard had drawn; and in making my subsequent
report I used that expression without adding quotation marks, never
thinking that anything had been said that would attract attention--as
this did, very much to the annoyance, no doubt, of General Butler and, I
know, very much to my own. I found afterwards that this was mentioned
in the notes of General Badeau's book, which, when they were shown to
me, I asked to have stricken out; yet it was retained there, though
against my wishes.

I make this statement here because, although I have often made it
before, it has never been in my power until now to place it where it
will correct history; and I desire to rectify all injustice that I may
have done to individuals, particularly to officers who were gallantly
serving their country during the trying period of the war for the
preservation of the Union. General Butler certainly gave his very
earnest support to the war; and he gave his own best efforts personally
to the suppression of the rebellion.

The further operations of the Army of the James can best be treated of
in connection with those of the Army of the Potomac, the two being so
intimately associated and connected as to be substantially one body in
which the individuality of the supporting wing is merged.