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Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete

U >> Ulysses S. Grant >> Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete




Longstreet was an entirely different man. He was brave, honest,
intelligent, a very capable soldier, subordinate to his superiors, just
and kind to his subordinates, but jealous of his own rights, which he
had the courage to maintain. He was never on the lookout to detect a
slight, but saw one as soon as anybody when intentionally given.

It may be that Longstreet was not sent to Knoxville for the reason
stated, but because Mr. Davis had an exalted opinion of his own military
genius, and thought he saw a chance of "killing two birds with one
stone." On several occasions during the war he came to the relief of
the Union army by means of his SUPERIOR MILITARY GENIUS.

I speak advisedly when I saw Mr. Davis prided himself on his military
capacity. He says so himself, virtually, in his answer to the notice of
his nomination to the Confederate presidency. Some of his generals have
said so in their writings since the downfall of the Confederacy.

My recollection is that my first orders for the battle of Chattanooga
were as fought. Sherman was to get on Missionary Ridge, as he did;
Hooker to cross the north end of Lookout Mountain, as he did, sweep
across Chattanooga Valley and get across the south end of the ridge near
Rossville. When Hooker had secured that position the Army of the
Cumberland was to assault in the centre. Before Sherman arrived,
however, the order was so changed as that Hooker was directed to come to
Chattanooga by the north bank of the Tennessee River. The waters in the
river, owing to heavy rains, rose so fast that the bridge at Brown's
Ferry could not be maintained in a condition to be used in crossing
troops upon it. For this reason Hooker's orders were changed by
telegraph back to what they were originally.------

NOTE.--From this point on this volume was written (with the exception of
the campaign in the Wilderness, which had been previously written) by
General Grant, after his great illness in April, and the present
arrangement of the subject-matter was made by him between the 10th and
18th of July, 1885.



CHAPTER XLV.

THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE--HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO NASHVILLE--VISITING
KNOXVILLE-CIPHER CIPHER DISPATCHES--WITHHOLDING ORDERS.

Chattanooga now being secure to the National troops beyond any doubt, I
immediately turned my attention to relieving Knoxville, about the
situation of which the President, in particular, was very anxious.
Prior to the battles, I had made preparations for sending troops to the
relief of Burnside at the very earliest moment after securing
Chattanooga. We had there two little steamers which had been built and
fitted up from the remains of old boats and put in condition to run.
General Thomas was directed to have one of these boats loaded with
rations and ammunition and move up the Tennessee River to the mouth of
the Holston, keeping the boat all the time abreast of the troops.
General Granger, with the 4th corps reinforced to make twenty thousand
men, was to start the moment Missionary Ridge was carried, and under no
circumstances were the troops to return to their old camps. With the
provisions carried, and the little that could be got in the country, it
was supposed he could hold out until Longstreet was driven away, after
which event East Tennessee would furnish abundance of food for
Burnside's army and his own also.

While following the enemy on the 26th, and again on the morning of the
27th, part of the time by the road to Ringgold, I directed Thomas,
verbally, not to start Granger until he received further orders from me;
advising him that I was going to the front to more fully see the
situation. I was not right sure but that Bragg's troops might be over
their stampede by the time they reached Dalton. In that case Bragg
might think it well to take the road back to Cleveland, move thence
towards Knoxville, and, uniting with Longstreet, make a sudden dash upon
Burnside.

When I arrived at Ringgold, however, on the 27th, I saw that the retreat
was most earnest. The enemy had been throwing away guns, caissons and
small-arms, abandoning provisions, and, altogether, seemed to be moving
like a disorganized mob, with the exception of Cleburne's division,
which was acting as rear-guard to cover the retreat.

When Hooker moved from Rossville toward Ringgold Palmer's division took
the road to Graysville, and Sherman moved by the way of Chickamauga
Station toward the same point. As soon as I saw the situation at
Ringgold I sent a staff officer back to Chattanooga to advise Thomas of
the condition of affairs, and direct him by my orders to start Granger
at once. Feeling now that the troops were already on the march for the
relief of Burnside I was in no hurry to get back, but stayed at Ringgold
through the day to prepare for the return of our troops.

Ringgold is in a valley in the mountains, situated between East
Chickamauga Creek and Taylor's Ridge, and about twenty miles south-east
from Chattanooga. I arrived just as the artillery that Hooker had left
behind at Chattanooga Creek got up. His men were attacking Cleburne's
division, which had taken a strong position in the adjacent hills so as
to cover the retreat of the Confederate army through a narrow gorge
which presents itself at that point. Just beyond the gorge the valley
is narrow, and the creek so tortuous that it has to be crossed a great
many times in the course of the first mile. This attack was
unfortunate, and cost us some men unnecessarily. Hooker captured,
however, 3 pieces of artillery and 230 prisoners, and 130 rebel dead
were left upon the field.

I directed General Hooker to collect the flour and wheat in the
neighboring mills for the use of the troops, and then to destroy the
mills and all other property that could be of use to the enemy, but not
to make any wanton destruction.

At this point Sherman came up, having reached Graysville with his
troops, where he found Palmer had preceded him. Palmer had picked up
many prisoners and much abandoned property on the route. I went back in
the evening to Graysville with Sherman, remained there over night and
did not return to Chattanooga until the following night, the 29th. I
then found that Thomas had not yet started Granger, thus having lost a
full day which I deemed of so much importance in determining the fate of
Knoxville. Thomas and Granger were aware that on the 23d of the month
Burnside had telegraphed that his supplies would last for ten or twelve
days and during that time he could hold out against Longstreet, but if
not relieved within the time indicated he would be obliged to surrender
or attempt to retreat. To effect a retreat would have been an
impossibility. He was already very low in ammunition, and with an army
pursuing he would not have been able to gather supplies.

Finding that Granger had not only not started but was very reluctant to
go, he having decided for himself that it was a very bad move to make, I
sent word to General Sherman of the situation and directed him to march
to the relief of Knoxville. I also gave him the problem that we had to
solve--that Burnside had now but four to six days supplies left, and
that he must be relieved within that time.

Sherman, fortunately, had not started on his return from Graysville,
having sent out detachments on the railroad which runs from Dalton to
Cleveland and Knoxville to thoroughly destroy that road, and these
troops had not yet returned to camp. I was very loath to send Sherman,
because his men needed rest after their long march from Memphis and hard
fighting at Chattanooga. But I had become satisfied that Burnside would
not be rescued if his relief depended upon General Granger's movements.

Sherman had left his camp on the north side of the Tennessee River, near
Chattanooga, on the night of the 23d, the men having two days' cooked
rations in their haversacks. Expecting to be back in their tents by
that time and to be engaged in battle while out, they took with them
neither overcoats nor blankets. The weather was already cold, and at
night they must have suffered more or less. The two days' rations had
already lasted them five days; and they were now to go through a country
which had been run over so much by Confederate troops that there was but
little probability of finding much food. They did, however, succeed in
capturing some flour. They also found a good deal of bran in some of
the mills, which the men made up into bread; and in this and other ways
they eked out an existence until they could reach Knoxville.

I was so very anxious that Burnside should get news of the steps being
taken for his relief, and thus induce him to hold out a little longer if
it became necessary, that I determined to send a message to him. I
therefore sent a member of my staff, Colonel J. H. Wilson, to get into
Knoxville if he could report to Burnside the situation fully, and give
him all the encouragement possible. Mr. Charles A. Dana was at
Chattanooga during the battle, and had been there even before I assumed
command. Mr. Dana volunteered to accompany Colonel Wilson, and did
accompany him. I put the information of what was being done for the
relief of Knoxville into writing, and directed that in some way or other
it must be secretly managed so as to have a copy of this fall into the
hands of General Longstreet. They made the trip safely; General
Longstreet did learn of Sherman's coming in advance of his reaching
there, and Burnside was prepared to hold out even for a longer time if
it had been necessary.

Burnside had stretched a boom across the Holston River to catch scows
and flats as they floated down. On these, by previous arrangements with
the loyal people of East Tennessee, were placed flour and corn, with
forage and provisions generally, and were thus secured for the use of
the Union troops. They also drove cattle into Knoxville by the east
side, which was not covered by the enemy; so that when relief arrived
Burnside had more provisions on hand than when he had last reported.

Our total loss (not including Burnside's) in all these engagements
amounted to 757 killed, 4,529 wounded and 330 missing. We captured
6,142 prisoners--about 50 per cent. more than the enemy reported for
their total loss--40 pieces of artillery, 69 artillery carriages and
caissons and over 7,000 stands of small-arms. The enemy's loss in arms
was probably much greater than here reported, because we picked up a
great many that were found abandoned.

I had at Chattanooga, in round numbers, about 60,000 men. Bragg had
about half this number, but his position was supposed to be impregnable.
It was his own fault that he did not have more men present. He had sent
Longstreet away with his corps swelled by reinforcements up to over
twenty thousand men, thus reducing his own force more than one-third and
depriving himself of the presence of the ablest general of his command.
He did this, too, after our troops had opened a line of communication by
way of Brown's and Kelly's ferries with Bridgeport, thus securing full
rations and supplies of every kind; and also when he knew reinforcements
were coming to me. Knoxville was of no earthly use to him while
Chattanooga was in our hands. If he should capture Chattanooga,
Knoxville with its garrison would have fallen into his hands without a
struggle. I have never been able to see the wisdom of this move.

Then, too, after Sherman had arrived, and when Bragg knew that he was on
the north side of the Tennessee River, he sent Buckner's division to
reinforce Longstreet. He also started another division a day later, but
our attack having commenced before it reached Knoxville Bragg ordered it
back. It had got so far, however, that it could not return to
Chattanooga in time to be of service there. It is possible this latter
blunder may have been made by Bragg having become confused as to what
was going on on our side. Sherman had, as already stated, crossed to
the north side of the Tennessee River at Brown's Ferry, in full view of
Bragg's troops from Lookout Mountain, a few days before the attack.
They then disappeared behind foot hills, and did not come to the view of
the troops on Missionary Ridge until they met their assault. Bragg knew
it was Sherman's troops that had crossed, and, they being so long out of
view, may have supposed that they had gone up the north bank of the
Tennessee River to the relief of Knoxville and that Longstreet was
therefore in danger. But the first great blunder, detaching Longstreet,
cannot be accounted for in any way I know of. If he had captured
Chattanooga, East Tennessee would have fallen without a struggle. It
would have been a victory for us to have got our army away from
Chattanooga safely. It was a manifold greater victory to drive away the
besieging army; a still greater one to defeat that army in his chosen
ground and nearly annihilate it.

The probabilities are that our loss in killed was the heavier, as we
were the attacking party. The enemy reported his loss in killed at 361:
but as he reported his missing at 4,146, while we held over 6,000 of
them as prisoners, and there must have been hundreds if not thousands
who deserted, but little reliance can be placed on this report. There
was certainly great dissatisfaction with Bragg on the part of the
soldiers for his harsh treatment of them, and a disposition to get away
if they could. Then, too, Chattanooga, following in the same half year
with Gettysburg in the East and Vicksburg in the West, there was much
the same feeling in the South at this time that there had been in the
North the fall and winter before. If the same license had been allowed
the people and press in the South that was allowed in the North,
Chattanooga would probably have been the last battle fought for the
preservation of the Union.

General William F. Smith's services in these battles had been such that
I thought him eminently entitled to promotion. I was aware that he had
previously been named by the President for promotion to the grade of
major-general, but that the Senate had rejected the nomination. I was
not aware of the reasons for this course, and therefore strongly
recommended him for a major-generalcy. My recommendation was heeded and
the appointment made.

Upon the raising of the siege of Knoxville I, of course, informed the
authorities at Washington--the President and Secretary of War--of the
fact, which caused great rejoicing there. The President especially was
rejoiced that Knoxville had been relieved (*18) without further
bloodshed. The safety of Burnside's army and the loyal people of East
Tennessee had been the subject of much anxiety to the President for
several months, during which time he was doing all he could to relieve
the situation; sending a new commander (*19) with a few thousand troops
by the way of Cumberland Gap, and telegraphing me daily, almost hourly,
to "remember Burnside," "do something for Burnside," and other appeals
of like tenor. He saw no escape for East Tennessee until after our
victory at Chattanooga. Even then he was afraid that Burnside might be
out of ammunition, in a starving condition, or overpowered: and his
anxiety was still intense until he heard that Longstreet had been driven
from the field.

Burnside followed Longstreet only to Strawberry Plains, some twenty
miles or more east, and then stopped, believing that Longstreet would
leave the State. The latter did not do so, however, but stopped only a
short distance farther on and subsisted his army for the entire winter
off East Tennessee. Foster now relieved Burnside. Sherman made
disposition of his troops along the Tennessee River in accordance with
instructions. I left Thomas in command at Chattanooga, and, about the
20th of December, moved my headquarters to Nashville, Tennessee.

Nashville was the most central point from which to communicate with my
entire military division, and also with the authorities at Washington.
While remaining at Chattanooga I was liable to have my telegraphic
communications cut so as to throw me out of communication with both my
command and Washington.

Nothing occurred at Nashville worthy of mention during the winter, (*20)
so I set myself to the task of having troops in positions from which
they could move to advantage, and in collecting all necessary supplies
so as to be ready to claim a due share of the enemy's attention upon the
appearance of the first good weather in the spring. I expected to
retain the command I then had, and prepared myself for the campaign
against Atlanta. I also had great hopes of having a campaign made
against Mobile from the Gulf. I expected after Atlanta fell to occupy
that place permanently, and to cut off Lee's army from the West by way
of the road running through Augusta to Atlanta and thence south-west. I
was preparing to hold Atlanta with a small garrison, and it was my
expectation to push through to Mobile if that city was in our
possession: if not, to Savannah; and in this manner to get possession
of the only east and west railroad that would then be left to the enemy.
But the spring campaign against Mobile was not made.

The Army of the Ohio had been getting supplies over Cumberland Gap until
their animals had nearly all starved. I now determined to go myself to
see if there was any possible chance of using that route in the spring,
and if not to abandon it. Accordingly I left Nashville in the latter
part of December by rail for Chattanooga. From Chattanooga I took one of
the little steamers previously spoken of as having been built there,
and, putting my horses aboard, went up to the junction of the Clinch
with the Tennessee. From that point the railroad had been repaired up
to Knoxville and out east to Strawberry Plains. I went by rail
therefore to Knoxville, where I remained for several days. General John
G. Foster was then commanding the Department of the Ohio. It was an
intensely cold winter, the thermometer being down as low as zero every
morning for more than a week while I was at Knoxville and on my way from
there on horseback to Lexington, Kentucky, the first point where I could
reach rail to carry me back to my headquarters at Nashville.

The road over Cumberland Gap, and back of it, was strewn with debris of
broken wagons and dead animals, much as I had found it on my first trip
to Chattanooga over Waldron's Ridge. The road had been cut up to as
great a depth as clay could be by mules and wagons, and in that
condition frozen; so that the ride of six days from Strawberry Plains to
Lexington over these holes and knobs in the road was a very cheerless
one, and very disagreeable.

I found a great many people at home along that route, both in Tennessee
and Kentucky, and, almost universally, intensely loyal. They would
collect in little places where we would stop of evenings, to see me,
generally hearing of my approach before we arrived. The people
naturally expected to see the commanding general the oldest person in
the party. I was then forty-one years of age, while my medical director
was gray-haired and probably twelve or more years my senior. The crowds
would generally swarm around him, and thus give me an opportunity of
quietly dismounting and getting into the house. It also gave me an
opportunity of hearing passing remarks from one spectator to another
about their general. Those remarks were apt to be more complimentary to
the cause than to the appearance of the supposed general, owing to his
being muffled up, and also owing to the travel-worn condition we were
all in after a hard day's ride. I was back in Nashville by the 13th of
January, 1864.

When I started on this trip it was necessary for me to have some person
along who could turn dispatches into cipher, and who could also read the
cipher dispatches which I was liable to receive daily and almost hourly.
Under the rules of the War Department at that time, Mr. Stanton had
taken entire control of the matter of regulating the telegraph and
determining how it should be used, and of saying who, and who alone,
should have the ciphers. The operators possessed of the ciphers, as
well as the ciphers used, were practically independent of the commanders
whom they were serving immediately under, and had to report to the War
Department through General Stager all the dispatches which they received
or forwarded.

I was obliged to leave the telegraphic operator back at Nashville,
because that was the point at which all dispatches to me would come, to
be forwarded from there. As I have said, it was necessary for me also
to have an operator during this inspection who had possession of this
cipher to enable me to telegraph to my division and to the War
Department without my dispatches being read by all the operators along
the line of wires over which they were transmitted. Accordingly I
ordered the cipher operator to turn over the key to Captain Cyrus B.
Comstock, of the Corps of Engineers, whom I had selected as a wise and
discreet man who certainly could be trusted with the cipher if the
operator at my headquarters could.

The operator refused point blank to turn over the key to Captain
Comstock as directed by me, stating that his orders from the War
Department were not to give it to anybody--the commanding general or any
one else. I told him I would see whether he would or not. He said that
if he did he would be punished. I told him if he did not he most
certainly would be punished. Finally, seeing that punishment was certain
if he refused longer to obey my order, and being somewhat remote (even
if he was not protected altogether from the consequences of his
disobedience to his orders) from the War Department, he yielded. When I
returned from Knoxville I found quite a commotion. The operator had
been reprimanded very severely and ordered to be relieved. I informed
the Secretary of War, or his assistant secretary in charge of the
telegraph, Stager, that the man could not be relieved, for he had only
obeyed my orders. It was absolutely necessary for me to have the
cipher, and the man would most certainly have been punished if he had
not delivered it; that they would have to punish me if they punished
anybody, or words to that effect.

This was about the only thing approaching a disagreeable difference
between the Secretary of War and myself that occurred until the war was
over, when we had another little spat. Owing to his natural disposition
to assume all power and control in all matters that he had anything
whatever to do with, he boldly took command of the armies, and, while
issuing no orders on the subject, prohibited any order from me going out
of the adjutant-general's office until he had approved it. This was
done by directing the adjutant-general to hold any orders that came from
me to be issued from the adjutant-general's office until he had examined
them and given his approval. He never disturbed himself, either, in
examining my orders until it was entirely convenient for him; so that
orders which I had prepared would often lie there three or four days
before he would sanction them. I remonstrated against this in writing,
and the Secretary apologetically restored me to my rightful position of
General-in-Chief of the Army. But he soon lapsed again and took control
much as before.

After the relief of Knoxville Sherman had proposed to Burnside that he
should go with him to drive Longstreet out of Tennessee; but Burnside
assured him that with the troops which had been brought by Granger, and
which were to be left, he would be amply prepared to dispose of
Longstreet without availing himself of this offer. As before stated
Sherman's command had left their camps north of the Tennessee, near
Chattanooga, with two days' rations in their haversacks, without coats
or blankets, and without many wagons, expecting to return to their camps
by the end of that time. The weather was now cold and they were
suffering, but still they were ready to make the further sacrifice, had
it been required, for the good of the cause which had brought them into
service. Sherman, having accomplished the object for which he was sent,
marched back leisurely to his old camp on the Tennessee River.



CHAPTER XLVI.

OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI--LONGSTREET IN EAST TENNESSEE--COMMISSIONED
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL--COMMANDING THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES--FIRST
INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT LINCOLN.

Soon after his return from Knoxville I ordered Sherman to distribute his
forces from Stevenson to Decatur and thence north to Nashville; Sherman
suggested that he be permitted to go back to Mississippi, to the limits
of his own department and where most of his army still remained, for the
purpose of clearing out what Confederates might still be left on the
east bank of the Mississippi River to impede its navigation by our
boats. He expected also to have the co-operation of Banks to do the
same thing on the west shore. Of course I approved heartily.

About the 10th of January Sherman was back in Memphis, where Hurlbut
commanded, and got together his Memphis men, or ordered them collected
and sent to Vicksburg. He then went to Vicksburg and out to where
McPherson was in command, and had him organize his surplus troops so as
to give him about 20,000 men in all.

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