Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete

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At two o'clock in the morning, November 24th, Giles A. Smith pushed out
from the North Chickamauga with his one hundred and sixteen boats, each
loaded with thirty brave and well-armed men. The boats with their
precious freight dropped down quietly with the current to avoid
attracting the attention of any one who could convey information to the
enemy, until arriving near the mouth of South Chickamauga. Here a few
boats were landed, the troops debarked, and a rush was made upon the
picket guard known to be at that point. The guard were surprised, and
twenty of their number captured. The remainder of the troops effected a
landing at the point where the bridge was to start, with equally good
results. The work of ferrying over Sherman's command from the north
side of the Tennessee was at once commenced, using the pontoons for the
purpose. A steamer was also brought up from the town to assist. The
rest of M. L. Smith's division came first, then the division of John E.
Smith. The troops as they landed were put to work intrenching their
position. By daylight the two entire divisions were over, and well
covered by the works they had built.

The work of laying the bridge, on which to cross the artillery and
cavalry, was now begun. The ferrying over the infantry was continued
with the steamer and the pontoons, taking the pontoons, however, as fast
as they were wanted to put in their place in the bridge. By a little
past noon the bridge was completed, as well as one over the South
Chickamauga connecting the troops left on that side with their comrades
below, and all the infantry and artillery were on the south bank of the
Tennessee.

Sherman at once formed his troops for assault on Missionary Ridge. By
one o'clock he started with M. L. Smith on his left, keeping nearly the
course of Chickamauga River; J. E. Smith next to the right and a little
to the rear; and Ewing still farther to the right and also a little to
the rear of J. E. Smith's command, in column, ready to deploy to the
right if an enemy should come from that direction. A good skirmish line
preceded each of these columns. Soon the foot of the hill was reached;
the skirmishers pushed directly up, followed closely by their supports.
By half-past three Sherman was in possession of the height without
having sustained much loss. A brigade from each division was now
brought up, and artillery was dragged to the top of the hill by hand.
The enemy did not seem to be aware of this movement until the top of the
hill was gained. There had been a drizzling rain during the day, and
the clouds were so low that Lookout Mountain and the top of Missionary
Ridge were obscured from the view of persons in the valley. But now the
enemy opened fire upon their assailants, and made several attempts with
their skirmishers to drive them away, but without avail. Later in the
day a more determined attack was made, but this, too, failed, and
Sherman was left to fortify what he had gained.

Sherman's cavalry took up its line of march soon after the bridge was
completed, and by half-past three the whole of it was over both bridges
and on its way to strike the enemy's communications at Chickamauga
Station. All of Sherman's command was now south of the Tennessee.
During the afternoon General Giles A. Smith was severely wounded and
carried from the field.

Thomas having done on the 23d what was expected of him on the 24th,
there was nothing for him to do this day except to strengthen his
position. Howard, however, effected a crossing of Citico Creek and a
junction with Sherman, and was directed to report to him. With two or
three regiments of his command he moved in the morning along the banks
of the Tennessee, and reached the point where the bridge was being laid.
He went out on the bridge as far as it was completed from the south end,
and saw Sherman superintending the work from the north side and moving
himself south as fast as an additional boat was put in and the roadway
put upon it. Howard reported to his new chief across the chasm between
them, which was now narrow and in a few minutes closed.

While these operations were going on to the east of Chattanooga, Hooker
was engaged on the west. He had three divisions: Osterhaus's, of the
15th corps, Army of the Tennessee; Geary's, 12th corps, Army of the
Potomac; and Cruft's, 14th corps, Army of the Cumberland. Geary was on
the right at Wauhatchie, Cruft at the centre, and Osterhaus near Brown's
Ferry. These troops were all west of Lookout Creek. The enemy had the
east bank of the creek strongly picketed and intrenched, and three
brigades of troops in the rear to reinforce them if attacked. These
brigades occupied the summit of the mountain. General Carter L.
Stevenson was in command of the whole. Why any troops, except artillery
with a small infantry guard, were kept on the mountain-top, I do not
see. A hundred men could have held the summit--which is a palisade for
more than thirty feet down--against the assault of any number of men
from the position Hooker occupied.

The side of Lookout Mountain confronting Hooker's command was rugged,
heavily timbered, and full of chasms, making it difficult to advance
with troops, even in the absence of an opposing force. Farther up, the
ground becomes more even and level, and was in cultivation. On the east
side the slope is much more gradual, and a good wagon road, zigzagging
up it, connects the town of Chattanooga with the summit.

Early on the morning of the 24th Hooker moved Geary's division,
supported by a brigade of Cruft's, up Lookout Creek, to effect a
crossing. The remainder of Cruft's division was to seize the bridge
over the creek, near the crossing of the railroad. Osterhaus was to move
up to the bridge and cross it. The bridge was seized by Gross's brigade
after a slight skirmish with the pickets guarding it. This attracted
the enemy so that Geary's movement farther up was not observed. A heavy
mist obscured him from the view of the troops on the top of the
mountain. He crossed the creek almost unobserved, and captured the
picket of over forty men on guard near by. He then commenced ascending
the mountain directly in his front. By this time the enemy was seen
coming down from their camps on the mountain slope, and filing into
their rifle-pits to contest the crossing of the bridge. By eleven
o'clock the bridge was complete. Osterhaus was up, and after some sharp
skirmishing the enemy was driven away with considerable loss in killed
and captured.

While the operations at the bridge were progressing, Geary was pushing
up the hill over great obstacles, resisted by the enemy directly in his
front, and in face of the guns on top of the mountain. The enemy,
seeing their left flank and rear menaced, gave way, and were followed by
Cruft and Osterhaus. Soon these were up abreast of Geary, and the whole
command pushed up the hill, driving the enemy in advance. By noon Geary
had gained the open ground on the north slope of the mountain, with his
right close up to the base of the upper palisade, but there were strong
fortifications in his front. The rest of the command coming up, a line
was formed from the base of the upper palisade to the mouth of
Chattanooga Creek.

Thomas and I were on the top of Orchard Knob. Hooker's advance now made
our line a continuous one. It was in full view, extending from the
Tennessee River, where Sherman had crossed, up Chickamauga River to the
base of Mission Ridge, over the top of the north end of the ridge to
Chattanooga Valley, then along parallel to the ridge a mile or more,
across the valley to the mouth of Chattanooga Creek, thence up the slope
of Lookout Mountain to the foot of the upper palisade. The day was
hazy, so that Hooker's operations were not visible to us except at
moments when the clouds would rise. But the sound of his artillery and
musketry was heard incessantly. The enemy on his front was partially
fortified, but was soon driven out of his works. During the afternoon
the clouds, which had so obscured the top of Lookout all day as to hide
whatever was going on from the view of those below, settled down and
made it so dark where Hooker was as to stop operations for the time. At
four o'clock Hooker reported his position as impregnable. By a little
after five direct communication was established, and a brigade of troops
was sent from Chattanooga to reinforce him. These troops had to cross
Chattanooga Creek and met with some opposition, but soon overcame it,
and by night the commander, General Carlin, reported to Hooker and was
assigned to his left. I now telegraphed to Washington: "The fight
to-day progressed favorably. Sherman carried the end of Missionary
Ridge, and his right is now at the tunnel, and his left at Chickamauga
Creek. Troops from Lookout Valley carried the point of the mountain, and
now hold the eastern slope and a point high up. Hooker reports two
thousand prisoners taken, besides which a small number have fallen into
our hands from Missionary Ridge." The next day the President replied:
"Your dispatches as to fighting on Monday and Tuesday are here. Well
done. Many thanks to all. Remember Burnside." And Halleck also
telegraphed: "I congratulate you on the success thus far of your plans.
I fear that Burnside is hard pushed, and that any further delay may
prove fatal. I know you will do all in your power to relieve him."

The division of Jefferson C. Davis, Army of the Cumberland, had been
sent to the North Chickamauga to guard the pontoons as they were
deposited in the river, and to prevent all ingress or egress of
citizens. On the night of the 24th his division, having crossed with
Sherman, occupied our extreme left from the upper bridge over the plain
to the north base of Missionary Ridge. Firing continued to a late hour
in the night, but it was not connected with an assault at any point.

CHAPTER XLIV.

BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA--A GALLANT CHARGE--COMPLETE ROUT OF THE ENEMY
--PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES--GENERAL BRAGG--REMARKS ON CHATTANOOGA.

At twelve o'clock at night, when all was quiet, I began to give orders
for the next day, and sent a dispatch to Willcox to encourage Burnside.
Sherman was directed to attack at daylight. Hooker was ordered to move
at the same hour, and endeavor to intercept the enemy's retreat if he
still remained; if he had gone, then to move directly to Rossville and
operate against the left and rear of the force on Missionary Ridge.
Thomas was not to move until Hooker had reached Missionary Ridge. As I
was with him on Orchard Knob, he would not move without further orders
from me.

The morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and the whole field was
in full view from the top of Orchard Knob. It remained so all day.
Bragg's headquarters were in full view, and officers--presumably staff
officers--could be seen coming and going constantly.

The point of ground which Sherman had carried on the 24th was almost
disconnected from the main ridge occupied by the enemy. A low pass, over
which there is a wagon road crossing the hill, and near which there is a
railroad tunnel, intervenes between the two hills. The problem now was
to get to the main ridge. The enemy was fortified on the point; and back
farther, where the ground was still higher, was a second fortification
commanding the first. Sherman was out as soon as it was light enough to
see, and by sunrise his command was in motion. Three brigades held the
hill already gained. Morgan L. Smith moved along the east base of
Missionary Ridge; Loomis along the west base, supported by two brigades
of John E. Smith's division; and Corse with his brigade was between the
two, moving directly towards the hill to be captured. The ridge is
steep and heavily wooded on the east side, where M. L. Smith's troops
were advancing, but cleared and with a more gentle slope on the west
side. The troops advanced rapidly and carried the extreme end of the
rebel works. Morgan L. Smith advanced to a point which cut the enemy
off from the railroad bridge and the means of bringing up supplies by
rail from Chickamauga Station, where the main depot was located. The
enemy made brave and strenuous efforts to drive our troops from the
position we had gained, but without success. The contest lasted for two
hours. Corse, a brave and efficient commander, was badly wounded in
this assault. Sherman now threatened both Bragg's flank and his stores,
and made it necessary for him to weaken other points of his line to
strengthen his right. From the position I occupied I could see column
after column of Bragg's forces moving against Sherman. Every
Confederate gun that could be brought to bear upon the Union forces was
concentrated upon him. J. E. Smith, with two brigades, charged up the
west side of the ridge to the support of Corse's command, over open
ground and in the face of a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry,
and reached the very parapet of the enemy. He lay here for a time, but
the enemy coming with a heavy force upon his right flank, he was
compelled to fall back, followed by the foe. A few hundred yards
brought Smith's troops into a wood, where they were speedily reformed,
when they charged and drove the attacking party back to his
intrenchments.

Seeing the advance, repulse, and second advance of J. E. Smith from the
position I occupied, I directed Thomas to send a division to reinforce
him. Baird's division was accordingly sent from the right of Orchard
Knob. It had to march a considerable distance directly under the eye of
the enemy to reach its position. Bragg at once commenced massing in the
same direction. This was what I wanted. But it had now got to be late
in the afternoon, and I had expected before this to see Hooker crossing
the ridge in the neighborhood of Rossville and compelling Bragg to mass
in that direction also.

The enemy had evacuated Lookout Mountain during the night, as I expected
he would. In crossing the valley he burned the bridge over Chattanooga
Creek, and did all he could to obstruct the roads behind him. Hooker
was off bright and early, with no obstructions in his front but distance
and the destruction above named. He was detained four hours crossing
Chattanooga Creek, and thus was lost the immediate advantage I expected
from his forces. His reaching Bragg's flank and extending across it was
to be the signal for Thomas's assault of the ridge. But Sherman's
condition was getting so critical that the assault for his relief could
not be delayed any longer.

Sheridan's and Wood's divisions had been lying under arms from early
morning, ready to move the instant the signal was given. I now directed
Thomas to order the charge at once (*16). I watched eagerly to see the
effect, and became impatient at last that there was no indication of any
charge being made. The centre of the line which was to make the charge
was near where Thomas and I stood, but concealed from view by an
intervening forest. Turning to Thomas to inquire what caused the delay,
I was surprised to see Thomas J. Wood, one of the division commanders
who was to make the charge, standing talking to him. I spoke to General
Wood, asking him why he did not charge as ordered an hour before. He
replied very promptly that this was the first he had heard of it, but
that he had been ready all day to move at a moment's notice. I told him
to make the charge at once. He was off in a moment, and in an
incredibly short time loud cheering was heard, and he and Sheridan were
driving the enemy's advance before them towards Missionary Ridge. The
Confederates were strongly intrenched on the crest of the ridge in front
of us, and had a second line half-way down and another at the base. Our
men drove the troops in front of the lower line of rifle-pits so
rapidly, and followed them so closely, that rebel and Union troops went
over the first line of works almost at the same time. Many rebels were
captured and sent to the rear under the fire of their own friends higher
up the hill. Those that were not captured retreated, and were pursued.
The retreating hordes being between friends and pursuers caused the
enemy to fire high to avoid killing their own men. In fact, on that
occasion the Union soldier nearest the enemy was in the safest position.
Without awaiting further orders or stopping to reform, on our troops
went to the second line of works; over that and on for the crest--thus
effectually carrying out my orders of the 18th for the battle and of the
24th (*17) for this charge.

I watched their progress with intense interest. The fire along the
rebel line was terrific. Cannon and musket balls filled the air: but
the damage done was in small proportion to the ammunition expended. The
pursuit continued until the crest was reached, and soon our men were
seen climbing over the Confederate barriers at different points in front
of both Sheridan's and Wood's divisions. The retreat of the enemy along
most of his line was precipitate and the panic so great that Bragg and
his officers lost all control over their men. Many were captured, and
thousands threw away their arms in their flight.

Sheridan pushed forward until he reached the Chickamauga River at a
point above where the enemy crossed. He met some resistance from troops
occupying a second hill in rear of Missionary Ridge, probably to cover
the retreat of the main body and of the artillery and trains. It was
now getting dark, but Sheridan, without halting on that account pushed
his men forward up this second hill slowly and without attracting the
attention of the men placed to defend it, while he detached to the right
and left to surround the position. The enemy discovered the movement
before these dispositions were complete, and beat a hasty retreat,
leaving artillery, wagon trains, and many prisoners in our hands. To
Sheridan's prompt movement the Army of the Cumberland, and the nation,
are indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery, and
small-arms that day. Except for his prompt pursuit, so much in this way
would not have been accomplished.

While the advance up Mission Ridge was going forward, General Thomas
with staff, General Gordon Granger, commander of the corps making the
assault, and myself and staff occupied Orchard Knob, from which the
entire field could be observed. The moment the troops were seen going
over the last line of rebel defences, I ordered Granger to join his
command, and mounting my horse I rode to the front. General Thomas left
about the same time. Sheridan on the extreme right was already in
pursuit of the enemy east of the ridge. Wood, who commanded the
division to the left of Sheridan, accompanied his men on horseback in
the charge, but did not join Sheridan in the pursuit. To the left, in
Baird's front where Bragg's troops had massed against Sherman, the
resistance was more stubborn and the contest lasted longer. I ordered
Granger to follow the enemy with Wood's division, but he was so much
excited, and kept up such a roar of musketry in the direction the enemy
had taken, that by the time I could stop the firing the enemy had got
well out of the way. The enemy confronting Sherman, now seeing
everything to their left giving way, fled also. Sherman, however, was
not aware of the extent of our success until after nightfall, when he
received orders to pursue at daylight in the morning.

As soon as Sherman discovered that the enemy had left his front he
directed his reserves, Davis's division of the Army of the Cumberland,
to push over the pontoon-bridge at the mouth of the Chickamauga, and to
move forward to Chickamauga Station. He ordered Howard to move up the
stream some two miles to where there was an old bridge, repair it during
the night, and follow Davis at four o'clock in the morning. Morgan L.
Smith was ordered to reconnoitre the tunnel to see if that was still
held. Nothing was found there but dead bodies of men of both armies.
The rest of Sherman's command was directed to follow Howard at daylight
in the morning to get on to the railroad towards Graysville.

Hooker, as stated, was detained at Chattanooga Creek by the destruction
of the bridge at that point. He got his troops over, with the exception
of the artillery, by fording the stream at a little after three o'clock.
Leaving his artillery to follow when the bridge should be reconstructed,
he pushed on with the remainder of his command. At Rossville he came
upon the flank of a division of the enemy, which soon commenced a
retreat along the ridge. This threw them on Palmer. They could make
but little resistance in the position they were caught in, and as many
of them as could do so escaped. Many, however, were captured. Hooker's
position during the night of the 25th was near Rossville, extending east
of the ridge. Palmer was on his left, on the road to Graysville.

During the night I telegraphed to Willcox that Bragg had been defeated,
and that immediate relief would be sent to Burnside if he could hold
out; to Halleck I sent an announcement of our victory, and informed him
that forces would be sent up the valley to relieve Burnside.

Before the battle of Chattanooga opened I had taken measures for the
relief of Burnside the moment the way should be clear. Thomas was
directed to have the little steamer that had been built at Chattanooga
loaded to its capacity with rations and ammunition. Granger's corps was
to move by the south bank of the Tennessee River to the mouth of the
Holston, and up that to Knoxville accompanied by the boat. In addition
to the supplies transported by boat, the men were to carry forty rounds
of ammunition in their cartridge-boxes, and four days' rations in
haversacks.

In the battle of Chattanooga, troops from the Army of the Potomac, from
the Army of the Tennessee, and from the Army of the Cumberland
participated. In fact, the accidents growing out of the heavy rains and
the sudden rise in the Tennessee River so mingled the troops that the
organizations were not kept together, under their respective commanders,
during the battle. Hooker, on the right, had Geary's division of the
12th corps, Army of the Potomac; Osterhaus's division of the 15th corps,
Army of the Tennessee; and Cruft's division of the Army of the
Cumberland. Sherman had three divisions of his own army, Howard's corps
from the Army of the Potomac, and Jefferson C. Davis's division of the
Army of the Cumberland. There was no jealousy--hardly rivalry. Indeed,
I doubt whether officers or men took any note at the time of the fact of
this intermingling of commands. All saw a defiant foe surrounding them,
and took it for granted that every move was intended to dislodge him,
and it made no difference where the troops came from so that the end was
accomplished.

The victory at Chattanooga was won against great odds, considering the
advantage the enemy had of position, and was accomplished more easily
than was expected by reason of Bragg's making several grave mistakes:
first, in sending away his ablest corps commander with over twenty
thousand troops; second, in sending away a division of troops on the eve
of battle; third, in placing so much of a force on the plain in front of
his impregnable position.

It was known that Mr. Jefferson Davis had visited Bragg on Missionary
Ridge a short time before my reaching Chattanooga. It was reported and
believed that he had come out to reconcile a serious difference between
Bragg and Longstreet, and finding this difficult to do, planned the
campaign against Knoxville, to be conducted by the latter general. I
had known both Bragg and Longstreet before the war, the latter very
well. We had been three years at West Point together, and, after my
graduation, for a time in the same regiment. Then we served together in
the Mexican War. I had known Bragg in Mexico, and met him occasionally
subsequently. I could well understand how there might be an
irreconcilable difference between them.

Bragg was a remarkably intelligent and well-informed man, professionally
and otherwise. He was also thoroughly upright. But he was possessed of
an irascible temper, and was naturally disputatious. A man of the
highest moral character and the most correct habits, yet in the old army
he was in frequent trouble. As a subordinate he was always on the
lookout to catch his commanding officer infringing his prerogatives; as
a post commander he was equally vigilant to detect the slightest
neglect, even of the most trivial order.

I have heard in the old army an anecdote very characteristic of Bragg.
On one occasion, when stationed at a post of several companies commanded
by a field officer, he was himself commanding one of the companies and
at the same time acting as post quartermaster and commissary. He was
first lieutenant at the time, but his captain was detached on other
duty. As commander of the company he made a requisition upon the
quartermaster--himself--for something he wanted. As quartermaster he
declined to fill the requisition, and endorsed on the back of it his
reasons for so doing. As company commander he responded to this, urging
that his requisition called for nothing but what he was entitled to, and
that it was the duty of the quartermaster to fill it. As quartermaster
he still persisted that he was right. In this condition of affairs
Bragg referred the whole matter to the commanding officer of the post.
The latter, when he saw the nature of the matter referred, exclaimed:
"My God, Mr. Bragg, you have quarrelled with every officer in the army,
and now you are quarrelling with yourself!"