Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete

U >> Ulysses S. Grant >> Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 37 | 38 | 39 | 40 | 41 | 42 | 43 | 44 | 45 | 46 | 47 | 48 | 49 | 50 | 51 | 52 | 53 | 54 | 55 | 56 | 57 | 58 | 59 | 60 | 61 | 62 | 63 | 64

About five o'clock in the morning (16th) two men, who had been employed
on the Jackson and Vicksburg railroad, were brought to me. They
reported that they had passed through Pemberton's army in the night, and
that it was still marching east. They reported him to have eighty
regiments of infantry and ten batteries; in all, about twenty-five
thousand men.

I had expected to leave Sherman at Jackson another day in order to
complete his work; but getting the above information I sent him orders
to move with all dispatch to Bolton, and to put one division with an
ammunition train on the road at once, with directions to its commander
to march with all possible speed until he came up to our rear. Within
an hour after receiving this order Steele's division was on the road.
At the same time I dispatched to Blair, who was near Auburn, to move
with all speed to Edward's station. McClernand was directed to embrace
Blair in his command for the present. Blair's division was a part of
the 15th army corps (Sherman's); but as it was on its way to join its
corps, it naturally struck our left first, now that we had faced about
and were moving west. The 15th corps, when it got up, would be on our
extreme right. McPherson was directed to get his trains out of the way
of the troops, and to follow Hovey's division as closely as possible.
McClernand had two roads about three miles apart, converging at Edward's
station, over which to march his troops. Hovey's division of his corps
had the advance on a third road (the Clinton) still farther north.
McClernand was directed to move Blair's and A. J. Smith's divisions by
the southernmost of these roads, and Osterhaus and Carr by the middle
road. Orders were to move cautiously with skirmishers to the front to
feel for the enemy.

Smith's division on the most southern road was the first to encounter
the enemy's pickets, who were speedily driven in. Osterhaus, on the
middle road, hearing the firing, pushed his skirmishers forward, found
the enemy's pickets and forced them back to the main line. About the
same time Hovey encountered the enemy on the northern or direct wagon
road from Jackson to Vicksburg. McPherson was hastening up to join
Hovey, but was embarrassed by Hovey's trains occupying the roads. I was
still back at Clinton. McPherson sent me word of the situation, and
expressed the wish that I was up. By half-past seven I was on the road
and proceeded rapidly to the front, ordering all trains that were in
front of troops off the road. When I arrived Hovey's skirmishing
amounted almost to a battle.

McClernand was in person on the middle road and had a shorter distance
to march to reach the enemy's position than McPherson. I sent him word
by a staff officer to push forward and attack. These orders were
repeated several times without apparently expediting McClernand's
advance.

Champion's Hill, where Pemberton had chosen his position to receive us,
whether taken by accident or design, was well selected. It is one of
the highest points in that section, and commanded all the ground in
range. On the east side of the ridge, which is quite precipitous, is a
ravine running first north, then westerly, terminating at Baker's Creek.
It was grown up thickly with large trees and undergrowth, making it
difficult to penetrate with troops, even when not defended. The ridge
occupied by the enemy terminated abruptly where the ravine turns
westerly. The left of the enemy occupied the north end of this ridge.
The Bolton and Edward's station wagon-road turns almost due south at
this point and ascends the ridge, which it follows for about a mile;
then turning west, descends by a gentle declivity to Baker's Creek,
nearly a mile away. On the west side the slope of the ridge is gradual
and is cultivated from near the summit to the creek. There was, when we
were there, a narrow belt of timber near the summit west of the road.

From Raymond there is a direct road to Edward's station, some three
miles west of Champion's Hill. There is one also to Bolton. From this
latter road there is still another, leaving it about three and a half
miles before reaching Bolton and leads direct to the same station. It
was along these two roads that three divisions of McClernand's corps,
and Blair of Sherman's, temporarily under McClernand, were moving.
Hovey of McClernand's command was with McPherson, farther north on the
road from Bolton direct to Edward's station. The middle road comes into
the northern road at the point where the latter turns to the west and
descends to Baker's Creek; the southern road is still several miles
south and does not intersect the others until it reaches Edward's
station. Pemberton's lines covered all these roads, and faced east.
Hovey's line, when it first drove in the enemy's pickets, was formed
parallel to that of the enemy and confronted his left.

By eleven o'clock the skirmishing had grown into a hard-contested
battle. Hovey alone, before other troops could be got to assist him,
had captured a battery of the enemy. But he was not able to hold his
position and had to abandon the artillery. McPherson brought up his
troops as fast as possible, Logan in front, and posted them on the right
of Hovey and across the flank of the enemy. Logan reinforced Hovey with
one brigade from his division; with his other two he moved farther west
to make room for Crocker, who was coming up as rapidly as the roads
would admit. Hovey was still being heavily pressed, and was calling on
me for more reinforcements. I ordered Crocker, who was now coming up,
to send one brigade from his division. McPherson ordered two batteries
to be stationed where they nearly enfiladed the enemy's line, and they
did good execution.

From Logan's position now a direct forward movement carried him over
open fields, in rear of the enemy and in a line parallel with them. He
did make exactly this move, attacking, however, the enemy through the
belt of woods covering the west slope of the hill for a short distance.
Up to this time I had kept my position near Hovey where we were the most
heavily pressed; but about noon I moved with a part of my staff by our
right around, until I came up with Logan himself. I found him near the
road leading down to Baker's Creek. He was actually in command of the
only road over which the enemy could retreat; Hovey, reinforced by two
brigades from McPherson's command, confronted the enemy's left; Crocker,
with two brigades, covered their left flank; McClernand two hours
before, had been within two miles and a half of their centre with two
divisions, and the two divisions, Blair's and A. J. Smith's, were
confronting the rebel right; Ransom, with a brigade of McArthur's
division of the 17th corps (McPherson's), had crossed the river at Grand
Gulf a few days before, and was coming up on their right flank. Neither
Logan nor I knew that we had cut off the retreat of the enemy. Just at
this juncture a messenger came from Hovey, asking for more
reinforcements. There were none to spare. I then gave an order to move
McPherson's command by the left flank around to Hovey. This uncovered
the rebel line of retreat, which was soon taken advantage of by the
enemy.

During all this time, Hovey, reinforced as he was by a brigade from
Logan and another from Crocker, and by Crocker gallantly coming up with
two other brigades on his right, had made several assaults, the last one
about the time the road was opened to the rear. The enemy fled
precipitately. This was between three and four o'clock. I rode
forward, or rather back, to where the middle road intersects the north
road, and found the skirmishers of Carr's division just coming in.
Osterhaus was farther south and soon after came up with skirmishers
advanced in like manner. Hovey's division, and McPherson's two
divisions with him, had marched and fought from early dawn, and were not
in the best condition to follow the retreating foe. I sent orders to
Osterhaus to pursue the enemy, and to Carr, whom I saw personally, I
explained the situation and directed him to pursue vigorously as far as
the Big Black, and to cross it if he could; Osterhaus to follow him.
The pursuit was continued until after dark.

The battle of Champion's Hill lasted about four hours, hard fighting,
preceded by two or three hours of skirmishing, some of which almost rose
to the dignity of battle. Every man of Hovey's division and of
McPherson's two divisions was engaged during the battle. No other part
of my command was engaged at all, except that as described before.
Osterhaus's and A. J. Smith's divisions had encountered the rebel
advanced pickets as early as half-past seven. Their positions were
admirable for advancing upon the enemy's line. McClernand, with two
divisions, was within a few miles of the battle-field long before noon
and in easy hearing. I sent him repeated orders by staff officers fully
competent to explain to him the situation. These traversed the wood
separating us, without escort, and directed him to push forward; but he
did not come. It is true, in front of McClernand there was a small
force of the enemy and posted in a good position behind a ravine
obstructing his advance; but if he had moved to the right by the road my
staff officers had followed the enemy must either have fallen back or
been cut off. Instead of this he sent orders to Hovey, who belonged to
his corps, to join on to his right flank. Hovey was bearing the brunt
of the battle at the time. To obey the order he would have had to pull
out from the front of the enemy and march back as far as McClernand had
to advance to get into battle and substantially over the same ground.
Of course I did not permit Hovey to obey the order of his intermediate
superior.

We had in this battle about 15,000 men absolutely engaged. This
excludes those that did not get up, all of McClernand's command except
Hovey. Our loss was 410 killed, 1,844 wounded and 187 missing. Hovey
alone lost 1,200 killed, wounded and missing--more than one-third of his
division.

Had McClernand come up with reasonable promptness, or had I known the
ground as I did afterwards, I cannot see how Pemberton could have
escaped with any organized force. As it was he lost over three thousand
killed and wounded and about three thousand captured in battle and in
pursuit. Loring's division, which was the right of Pemberton's line,
was cut off from the retreating army and never got back into Vicksburg.
Pemberton himself fell back that night to the Big Black River. His
troops did not stop before midnight and many of them left before the
general retreat commenced, and no doubt a good part of them returned to
their homes. Logan alone captured 1,300 prisoners and eleven guns.
Hovey captured 300 under fire and about 700 in all, exclusive of 500
sick and wounded whom he paroled, thus making 1,200.

McPherson joined in the advance as soon as his men could fill their
cartridge-boxes, leaving one brigade to guard our wounded. The pursuit
was continued as long as it was light enough to see the road. The night
of the 16th of May found McPherson's command bivouacked from two to six
miles west of the battlefield, along the line of the road to Vicksburg.
Carr and Osterhaus were at Edward's station, and Blair was about three
miles south-east; Hovey remained on the field where his troops had
fought so bravely and bled so freely. Much war material abandoned by
the enemy was picked up on the battle-field, among it thirty pieces of
artillery. I pushed through the advancing column with my staff and kept
in advance until after night. Finding ourselves alone we stopped and
took possession of a vacant house. As no troops came up we moved back a
mile or more until we met the head of the column just going into bivouac
on the road. We had no tents, so we occupied the porch of a house which
had been taken for a rebel hospital and which was filled with wounded
and dying who had been brought from the battle-field we had just left.

While a battle is raging one can see his enemy mowed down by the
thousand, or the ten thousand, with great composure; but after the
battle these scenes are distressing, and one is naturally disposed to do
as much to alleviate the suffering of an enemy as a friend.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

BATTLE OF BLACK RIVER BRIDGE--CROSSING THE BIG BLACK--INVESTMENT OF
VICKSBURG--ASSAULTING THE WORKS.

We were now assured of our position between Johnston and Pemberton,
without a possibility of a junction of their forces. Pemberton might
have made a night march to the Big Black, crossed the bridge there and,
by moving north on the west side, have eluded us and finally returned to
Johnston. But this would have given us Vicksburg. It would have been
his proper move, however, and the one Johnston would have made had he
been in Pemberton's place. In fact it would have been in conformity
with Johnston's orders to Pemberton.

Sherman left Jackson with the last of his troops about noon on the 16th
and reached Bolton, twenty miles west, before halting. His rear guard
did not get in until two A.M. the 17th, but renewed their march by
daylight. He paroled his prisoners at Jackson, and was forced to leave
his own wounded in care of surgeons and attendants. At Bolton he was
informed of our victory. He was directed to commence the march early
next day, and to diverge from the road he was on to Bridgeport on the
Big Black River, some eleven miles above the point where we expected to
find the enemy. Blair was ordered to join him there with the pontoon
train as early as possible.

This movement brought Sherman's corps together, and at a point where I
hoped a crossing of the Big Black might be effected and Sherman's corps
used to flank the enemy out of his position in our front, thus opening a
crossing for the remainder of the army. I informed him that I would
endeavor to hold the enemy in my front while he crossed the river.

The advance division, Carr's (McClernand's corps), resumed the pursuit
at half-past three A.M. on the 17th, followed closely by Osterhaus,
McPherson bringing up the rear with his corps. As I expected, the enemy
was found in position on the Big Black. The point was only six miles
from that where my advance had rested for the night, and was reached at
an early hour. Here the river makes a turn to the west, and has washed
close up to the high land; the east side is a low bottom, sometimes
overflowed at very high water, but was cleared and in cultivation. A
bayou runs irregularly across this low land, the bottom of which,
however, is above the surface of the Big Black at ordinary stages. When
the river is full water runs through it, converting the point of land
into an island. The bayou was grown up with timber, which the enemy had
felled into the ditch. At this time there was a foot or two of water in
it. The rebels had constructed a parapet along the inner bank of this
bayou by using cotton bales from the plantation close by and throwing
dirt over them. The whole was thoroughly commanded from the height west
of the river. At the upper end of the bayou there was a strip of
uncleared land which afforded a cover for a portion of our men. Carr's
division was deployed on our right, Lawler's brigade forming his extreme
right and reaching through these woods to the river above. Osterhaus'
division was deployed to the left of Carr and covered the enemy's entire
front. McPherson was in column on the road, the head close by, ready to
come in wherever he could be of assistance.

While the troops were standing as here described an officer from Banks'
staff came up and presented me with a letter from General Halleck, dated
the 11th of May. It had been sent by the way of New Orleans to Banks to
be forwarded to me. It ordered me to return to Grand Gulf and to
co-operate from there with Banks against Port Hudson, and then to return
with our combined forces to besiege Vicksburg. I told the officer that
the order came too late, and that Halleck would not give it now if he
knew our position. The bearer of the dispatch insisted that I ought to
obey the order, and was giving arguments to support his position when I
heard great cheering to the right of our line and, looking in that
direction, saw Lawler in his shirt sleeves leading a charge upon the
enemy. I immediately mounted my horse and rode in the direction of the
charge, and saw no more of the officer who delivered the dispatch; I
think not even to this day.

The assault was successful. But little resistance was made. The enemy
fled from the west bank of the river, burning the bridge behind him and
leaving the men and guns on the east side to fall into our hands. Many
tried to escape by swimming the river. Some succeeded and some were
drowned in the attempt. Eighteen guns were captured and 1,751 prisoners.
Our loss was 39 killed, 237 wounded and 3 missing. The enemy probably
lost but few men except those captured and drowned. But for the
successful and complete destruction of the bridge, I have but little
doubt that we should have followed the enemy so closely as to prevent
his occupying his defences around Vicksburg.

As the bridge was destroyed and the river was high, new bridges had to
be built. It was but little after nine o'clock A.M. when the capture
took place. As soon as work could be commenced, orders were given for
the construction of three bridges. One was taken charge of by
Lieutenant Hains, of the Engineer Corps, one by General McPherson
himself and one by General Ransom, a most gallant and intelligent
volunteer officer. My recollection is that Hains built a raft bridge;
McPherson a pontoon, using cotton bales in large numbers, for pontoons;
and that Ransom felled trees on opposite banks of the river, cutting
only on one side of the tree, so that they would fall with their tops
interlacing in the river, without the trees being entirely severed from
their stumps. A bridge was then made with these trees to support the
roadway. Lumber was taken from buildings, cotton gins and wherever
found, for this purpose. By eight o'clock in the morning of the 18th
all three bridges were complete and the troops were crossing.

Sherman reached Bridgeport about noon of the 17th and found Blair with
the pontoon train already there. A few of the enemy were intrenched on
the west bank, but they made little resistance and soon surrendered.
Two divisions were crossed that night and the third the following
morning.

On the 18th I moved along the Vicksburg road in advance of the troops
and as soon as possible joined Sherman. My first anxiety was to secure
a base of supplies on the Yazoo River above Vicksburg. Sherman's line
of march led him to the very point on Walnut Hills occupied by the enemy
the December before when he was repulsed. Sherman was equally anxious
with myself. Our impatience led us to move in advance of the column and
well up with the advanced skirmishers. There were some detached works
along the crest of the hill. These were still occupied by the enemy, or
else the garrison from Haines' Bluff had not all got past on their way
to Vicksburg. At all events the bullets of the enemy whistled by thick
and fast for a short time. In a few minutes Sherman had the pleasure of
looking down from the spot coveted so much by him the December before on
the ground where his command had lain so helpless for offensive action.
He turned to me, saying that up to this minute he had felt no positive
assurance of success. This, however, he said was the end of one of the
greatest campaigns in history and I ought to make a report of it at
once. Vicksburg was not yet captured, and there was no telling what
might happen before it was taken; but whether captured or not, this was
a complete and successful campaign. I do not claim to quote Sherman's
language; but the substance only. My reason for mentioning this
incident will appear further on.

McPherson, after crossing the Big Black, came into the Jackson and
Vicksburg road which Sherman was on, but to his rear. He arrived at
night near the lines of the enemy, and went into camp. McClernand moved
by the direct road near the railroad to Mount Albans, and then turned to
the left and put his troops on the road from Baldwin's ferry to
Vicksburg. This brought him south of McPherson. I now had my three
corps up the works built for the defence of Vicksburg, on three roads
--one to the north, one to the east and one to the south-east of the city.
By the morning of the 19th the investment was as complete as my limited
number of troops would allow. Sherman was on the right, and covered the
high ground from where it overlooked the Yazoo as far south-east as his
troops would extend. McPherson joined on to his left, and occupied
ground on both sides of the Jackson road. McClernand took up the ground
to his left and extended as far towards Warrenton as he could, keeping a
continuous line.

On the 19th there was constant skirmishing with the enemy while we were
getting into better position. The enemy had been much demoralized by
his defeats at Champion's Hill and the Big Black, and I believed he
would not make much effort to hold Vicksburg. Accordingly, at two
o'clock I ordered an assault. It resulted in securing more advanced
positions for all our troops where they were fully covered from the fire
of the enemy.

The 20th and 21st were spent in strengthening our position and in making
roads in rear of the army, from Yazoo River or Chickasaw Bayou. Most of
the army had now been for three weeks with only five days' rations
issued by the commissary. They had an abundance of food, however, but
began to feel the want of bread. I remember that in passing around to
the left of the line on the 21st, a soldier, recognizing me, said in
rather a low voice, but yet so that I heard him, "Hard tack." In a
moment the cry was taken up all along the line, "Hard tack! Hard tack!"
I told the men nearest to me that we had been engaged ever since the
arrival of the troops in building a road over which to supply them with
everything they needed. The cry was instantly changed to cheers. By
the night of the 21st all the troops had full rations issued to them.
The bread and coffee were highly appreciated.

I now determined on a second assault. Johnston was in my rear, only
fifty miles away, with an army not much inferior in numbers to the one I
had with me, and I knew he was being reinforced. There was danger of his
coming to the assistance of Pemberton, and after all he might defeat my
anticipations of capturing the garrison if, indeed, he did not prevent
the capture of the city. The immediate capture of Vicksburg would save
sending me the reinforcements which were so much wanted elsewhere, and
would set free the army under me to drive Johnston from the State. But
the first consideration of all was--the troops believed they could carry
the works in their front, and would not have worked so patiently in the
trenches if they had not been allowed to try.

The attack was ordered to commence on all parts of the line at ten
o'clock A.M. on the 22d with a furious cannonade from every battery in
position. All the corps commanders set their time by mine so that all
might open the engagement at the same minute. The attack was gallant,
and portions of each of the three corps succeeded in getting up to the
very parapets of the enemy and in planting their battle flags upon them;
but at no place were we able to enter. General McClernand reported that
he had gained the enemy's intrenchments at several points, and wanted
reinforcements. I occupied a position from which I believed I could see
as well as he what took place in his front, and I did not see the
success he reported. But his request for reinforcements being repeated
I could not ignore it, and sent him Quinby's division of the 17th corps.
Sherman and McPherson were both ordered to renew their assaults as a
diversion in favor of McClernand. This last attack only served to
increase our casualties without giving any benefit whatever. As soon as
it was dark our troops that had reached the enemy's line and been
obliged to remain there for security all day, were withdrawn; and thus
ended the last assault upon Vicksburg.

CHAPTER XXXVII

SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.

I now determined upon a regular siege--to "out-camp the enemy," as it
were, and to incur no more losses. The experience of the 22d convinced
officers and men that this was best, and they went to work on the
defences and approaches with a will. With the navy holding the river,
the investment of Vicksburg was complete. As long as we could hold our
position the enemy was limited in supplies of food, men and munitions of
war to what they had on hand. These could not last always.

The crossing of troops at Bruinsburg commenced April 30th. On the 18th
of May the army was in rear of Vicksburg. On the 19th, just twenty days
after the crossing, the city was completely invested and an assault had
been made: five distinct battles (besides continuous skirmishing) had
been fought and won by the Union forces; the capital of the State had
fallen and its arsenals, military manufactories and everything useful
for military purposes had been destroyed; an average of about one
hundred and eighty miles had been marched by the troops engaged; but
five days' rations had been issued, and no forage; over six thousand
prisoners had been captured, and as many more of the enemy had been
killed or wounded; twenty-seven heavy cannon and sixty-one field-pieces
had fallen into our hands; and four hundred miles of the river, from
Vicksburg to Port Hudson, had become ours. The Union force that had
crossed the Mississippi River up to this time was less than forty-three
thousand men. One division of these, Blair's, only arrived in time to
take part in the battle of Champion's Hill, but was not engaged there;
and one brigade, Ransom's of McPherson's corps, reached the field after
the battle. The enemy had at Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, Jackson, and on the
roads between these places, over sixty thousand men. They were in their
own country, where no rear guards were necessary. The country is
admirable for defence, but difficult for the conduct of an offensive
campaign. All their troops had to be met. We were fortunate, to say
the least, in meeting them in detail: at Port Gibson seven or eight
thousand; at Raymond, five thousand; at Jackson, from eight to eleven
thousand; at Champion's Hill, twenty-five thousand; at the Big Black,
four thousand. A part of those met at Jackson were all that was left of
those encountered at Raymond. They were beaten in detail by a force
smaller than their own, upon their own ground. Our loss up to this time
was: