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Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete

U >> Ulysses S. Grant >> Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete




On the way from the junction to Grand Gulf, where the road comes into
the one from Vicksburg to the same place six or seven miles out, I
learned that the last of the enemy had retreated past that place on
their way to Vicksburg. I left Logan to make the proper disposition of
his troops for the night, while I rode into the town with an escort of
about twenty cavalry. Admiral Porter had already arrived with his
fleet. The enemy had abandoned his heavy guns and evacuated the place.

When I reached Grand Gulf May 3d I had not been with my baggage since
the 27th of April and consequently had had no change of underclothing,
no meal except such as I could pick up sometimes at other headquarters,
and no tent to cover me. The first thing I did was to get a bath,
borrow some fresh underclothing from one of the naval officers and
get a good meal on the flag-ship. Then I wrote letters to the
general-in-chief informing him of our present position, dispatches to be
telegraphed from Cairo, orders to General Sullivan commanding above
Vicksburg, and gave orders to all my corps commanders. About twelve
o'clock at night I was through my work and started for Hankinson's
ferry, arriving there before daylight. While at Grand Gulf I heard from
Banks, who was on the Red River, and who said that he could not be at
Port Hudson before the 10th of May and then with only 15,000 men. Up to
this time my intention had been to secure Grand Gulf, as a base of
supplies, detach McClernand's corps to Banks and co-operate with him in
the reduction of Port Hudson.

The news from Banks forced upon me a different plan of campaign from the
one intended. To wait for his co-operation would have detained me at
least a month. The reinforcements would not have reached ten thousand
men after deducting casualties and necessary river guards at all high
points close to the river for over three hundred miles. The enemy would
have strengthened his position and been reinforced by more men than
Banks could have brought. I therefore determined to move independently
of Banks, cut loose from my base, destroy the rebel force in rear of
Vicksburg and invest or capture the city.

Grand Gulf was accordingly given up as a base and the authorities at
Washington were notified. I knew well that Halleck's caution would lead
him to disapprove of this course; but it was the only one that gave any
chance of success. The time it would take to communicate with
Washington and get a reply would be so great that I could not be
interfered with until it was demonstrated whether my plan was
practicable. Even Sherman, who afterwards ignored bases of supplies
other than what were afforded by the country while marching through four
States of the Confederacy with an army more than twice as large as mine
at this time, wrote me from Hankinson's ferry, advising me of the
impossibility of supplying our army over a single road. He urged me to
"stop all troops till your army is partially supplied with wagons, and
then act as quick as possible; for this road will be jammed, as sure as
life." To this I replied: "I do not calculate upon the possibility of
supplying the army with full rations from Grand Gulf. I know it will be
impossible without constructing additional roads. What I do expect is
to get up what rations of hard bread, coffee and salt we can, and make
the country furnish the balance." We started from Bruinsburg with an
average of about two days' rations, and received no more from our own
supplies for some days; abundance was found in the mean time. A delay
would give the enemy time to reinforce and fortify.

McClernand's and McPherson's commands were kept substantially as they
were on the night of the 2d, awaiting supplies sufficient to give them
three days' rations in haversacks. Beef, mutton, poultry and forage
were found in abundance. Quite a quantity of bacon and molasses was
also secured from the country, but bread and coffee could not be
obtained in quantity sufficient for all the men. Every plantation,
however, had a run of stone, propelled by mule power, to grind corn for
the owners and their slaves. All these were kept running while we were
stopping, day and night, and when we were marching, during the night, at
all plantations covered by the troops. But the product was taken by the
troops nearest by, so that the majority of the command was destined to
go without bread until a new base was established on the Yazoo above
Vicksburg.

While the troops were awaiting the arrival of rations I ordered
reconnoissances made by McClernand and McPherson, with the view of
leading the enemy to believe that we intended to cross the Big Black and
attack the city at once.

On the 6th Sherman arrived at Grand Gulf and crossed his command that
night and the next day. Three days' rations had been brought up from
Grand Gulf for the advanced troops and were issued. Orders were given
for a forward movement the next day. Sherman was directed to order up
Blair, who had been left behind to guard the road from Milliken's Bend
to Hard Times with two brigades.

The quartermaster at Young's Point was ordered to send two hundred
wagons with Blair, and the commissary was to load them with hard bread,
coffee, sugar, salt and one hundred thousand pounds of salt meat.

On the 3d Hurlbut, who had been left at Memphis, was ordered to send
four regiments from his command to Milliken's Bend to relieve Blair's
division, and on the 5th he was ordered to send Lauman's division in
addition, the latter to join the army in the field. The four regiments
were to be taken from troops near the river so that there would be no
delay.

During the night of the 6th McPherson drew in his troops north of the
Big Black and was off at an early hour on the road to Jackson, via Rocky
Springs, Utica and Raymond. That night he and McClernand were both at
Rocky Springs ten miles from Hankinson's ferry. McPherson remained
there during the 8th, while McClernand moved to Big Sandy and Sherman
marched from Grand Gulf to Hankinson's ferry. The 9th, McPherson moved
to a point within a few miles west of Utica; McClernand and Sherman
remained where they were. On the 10th McPherson moved to Utica, Sherman
to Big Sandy; McClernand was still at Big Sandy. The 11th, McClernand
was at Five Mile Creek; Sherman at Auburn; McPherson five miles advanced
from Utica. May 12th, McClernand was at Fourteen Mile Creek; Sherman at
Fourteen Mile Creek; McPherson at Raymond after a battle.

After McPherson crossed the Big Black at Hankinson's ferry Vicksburg
could have been approached and besieged by the south side. It is not
probable, however, that Pemberton would have permitted a close
besiegement. The broken nature of the ground would have enabled him to
hold a strong defensible line from the river south of the city to the
Big Black, retaining possession of the railroad back to that point. It
was my plan, therefore, to get to the railroad east of Vicksburg, and
approach from that direction. Accordingly, McPherson's troops that had
crossed the Big Black were withdrawn and the movement east to Jackson
commenced.

As has been stated before, the country is very much broken and the roads
generally confined to the tops of the hills. The troops were moved one
(sometimes two) corps at a time to reach designated points out parallel
to the railroad and only from six to ten miles from it. McClernand's
corps was kept with its left flank on the Big Black guarding all the
crossings. Fourteen Mile Creek, a stream substantially parallel with
the railroad, was reached and crossings effected by McClernand and
Sherman with slight loss. McPherson was to the right of Sherman,
extending to Raymond. The cavalry was used in this advance in
reconnoitring to find the roads: to cover our advances and to find the
most practicable routes from one command to another so they could
support each other in case of an attack. In making this move I
estimated Pemberton's movable force at Vicksburg at about eighteen
thousand men, with smaller forces at Haines' Bluff and Jackson. It
would not be possible for Pemberton to attack me with all his troops at
one place, and I determined to throw my army between his and fight him
in detail. This was done with success, but I found afterwards that I
had entirely under-estimated Pemberton's strength.

Up to this point our movements had been made without serious opposition.
My line was now nearly parallel with the Jackson and Vicksburg railroad
and about seven miles south of it. The right was at Raymond eighteen
miles from Jackson, McPherson commanding; Sherman in the centre on
Fourteen Mile Creek, his advance thrown across; McClernand to the left,
also on Fourteen Mile Creek, advance across, and his pickets within two
miles of Edward's station, where the enemy had concentrated a
considerable force and where they undoubtedly expected us to attack.
McClernand's left was on the Big Black. In all our moves, up to this
time, the left had hugged the Big Black closely, and all the ferries had
been guarded to prevent the enemy throwing a force on our rear.

McPherson encountered the enemy, five thousand strong with two batteries
under General Gregg, about two miles out of Raymond. This was about two
P.M. Logan was in advance with one of his brigades. He deployed and
moved up to engage the enemy. McPherson ordered the road in rear to be
cleared of wagons, and the balance of Logan's division, and Crocker's,
which was still farther in rear, to come forward with all dispatch. The
order was obeyed with alacrity. Logan got his division in position for
assault before Crocker could get up, and attacked with vigor, carrying
the enemy's position easily, sending Gregg flying from the field not to
appear against our front again until we met at Jackson.

In this battle McPherson lost 66 killed, 339 wounded, and 37 missing
--nearly or quite all from Logan's division. The enemy's loss was 100
killed, 305 wounded, besides 415 taken prisoners.

I regarded Logan and Crocker as being as competent division commanders
as could be found in or out of the army and both equal to a much higher
command. Crocker, however, was dying of consumption when he
volunteered. His weak condition never put him on the sick report when
there was a battle in prospect, as long as he could keep on his feet.
He died not long after the close of the rebellion.



CHAPTER XXXV.

MOVEMENT AGAINST JACKSON--FALL OF JACKSON--INTERCEPTING THE ENEMY
--BATTLE OF CHAMPION'S HILL.

When the news reached me of McPherson's victory at Raymond about sundown
my position was with Sherman. I decided at once to turn the whole
column towards Jackson and capture that place without delay.

Pemberton was now on my left, with, as I supposed, about 18,000 men; in
fact, as I learned afterwards, with nearly 50,000. A force was also
collecting on my right, at Jackson, the point where all the railroads
communicating with Vicksburg connect. All the enemy's supplies of men
and stores would come by that point. As I hoped in the end to besiege
Vicksburg I must first destroy all possibility of aid. I therefore
determined to move swiftly towards Jackson, destroy or drive any force
in that direction and then turn upon Pemberton. But by moving against
Jackson, I uncovered my own communication. So I finally decided to have
none--to cut loose altogether from my base and move my whole force
eastward. I then had no fears for my communications, and if I moved
quickly enough could turn upon Pemberton before he could attack me in
the rear.

Accordingly, all previous orders given during the day for movements on
the 13th were annulled by new ones. McPherson was ordered at daylight
to move on Clinton, ten miles from Jackson; Sherman was notified of my
determination to capture Jackson and work from there westward. He was
ordered to start at four in the morning and march to Raymond.
McClernand was ordered to march with three divisions by Dillon's to
Raymond. One was left to guard the crossing of the Big Black.

On the 10th I had received a letter from Banks, on the Red River, asking
reinforcements. Porter had gone to his assistance with a part of his
fleet on the 3d, and I now wrote to him describing my position and
declining to send any troops. I looked upon side movements as long as
the enemy held Port Hudson and Vicksburg as a waste of time and
material.

General Joseph E. Johnston arrived at Jackson in the night of the 13th
from Tennessee, and immediately assumed command of all the Confederate
troops in Mississippi. I knew he was expecting reinforcements from the
south and east. On the 6th I had written to General Halleck:
"Information from the other side leaves me to believe the enemy are
bringing forces from Tullahoma."

Up to this time my troops had been kept in supporting distances of each
other, as far as the nature of the country would admit. Reconnoissances
were constantly made from each corps to enable them to acquaint
themselves with the most practicable routes from one to another in case
a union became necessary.

McPherson reached Clinton with the advance early on the 13th and
immediately set to work destroying the railroad. Sherman's advance
reached Raymond before the last of McPherson's command had got out of
the town. McClernand withdrew from the front of the enemy, at Edward's
station, with much skill and without loss, and reached his position for
the night in good order. On the night of the 13th, McPherson was
ordered to march at early dawn upon Jackson, only fifteen miles away.
Sherman was given the same order; but he was to move by the direct road
from Raymond to Jackson, which is south of the road McPherson was on and
does not approach within two miles of it at the point where it crossed
the line of intrenchments which, at that time, defended the city.
McClernand was ordered to move one division of his command to Clinton,
one division a few miles beyond Mississippi Springs following Sherman's
line, and a third to Raymond. He was also directed to send his siege
guns, four in number with the troops going by Mississippi Springs.
McClernand's position was an advantageous one in any event. With one
division at Clinton he was in position to reinforce McPherson, at
Jackson, rapidly if it became necessary; the division beyond Mississippi
Springs was equally available to reinforce Sherman; the one at Raymond
could take either road. He still had two other divisions farther back
now that Blair had come up, available within a day at Jackson. If this
last command should not be wanted at Jackson, they were already one
day's march from there on their way to Vicksburg and on three different
roads leading to the latter city. But the most important consideration
in my mind was to have a force confronting Pemberton if he should come
out to attack my rear. This I expected him to do; as shown further on,
he was directed by Johnston to make this very move.

I notified General Halleck that I should attack the State capital on the
14th. A courier carried the dispatch to Grand Gulf through an
unprotected country.

Sherman and McPherson communicated with each other during the night and
arranged to reach Jackson at about the same hour. It rained in torrents
during the night of the 13th and the fore part of the day of the 14th.
The roads were intolerable, and in some places on Sherman's line, where
the land was low, they were covered more than a foot deep with water.
But the troops never murmured. By nine o'clock Crocker, of McPherson's
corps, who was now in advance, came upon the enemy's pickets and
speedily drove them in upon the main body. They were outside of the
intrenchments in a strong position, and proved to be the troops that had
been driven out of Raymond. Johnston had been reinforced; during the
night by Georgia and South Carolina regiments, so that his force
amounted to eleven thousand men, and he was expecting still more.

Sherman also came upon the rebel pickets some distance out from the
town, but speedily drove them in. He was now on the south and
south-west of Jackson confronting the Confederates behind their
breastworks, while McPherson's right was nearly two miles north,
occupying a line running north and south across the Vicksburg railroad.
Artillery was brought up and reconnoissances made preparatory to an
assault. McPherson brought up Logan's division while he deployed
Crocker's for the assault. Sherman made similar dispositions on the
right. By eleven A.M. both were ready to attack. Crocker moved his
division forward, preceded by a strong skirmish line. These troops at
once encountered the enemy's advance and drove it back on the main body,
when they returned to their proper regiment and the whole division
charged, routing the enemy completely and driving him into this main
line. This stand by the enemy was made more than two miles outside of
his main fortifications. McPherson followed up with his command until
within range of the guns of the enemy from their intrenchments, when he
halted to bring his troops into line and reconnoitre to determine the
next move. It was now about noon.

While this was going on Sherman was confronting a rebel battery which
enfiladed the road on which he was marching--the Mississippi Springs
road--and commanded a bridge spanning a stream over which he had to
pass. By detaching right and left the stream was forced and the enemy
flanked and speedily driven within the main line. This brought our
whole line in front of the enemy's line of works, which was continuous
on the north, west and south sides from the Pearl River north of the
city to the same river south. I was with Sherman. He was confronted by
a force sufficient to hold us back. Appearances did not justify an
assault where we were. I had directed Sherman to send a force to the
right, and to reconnoitre as far as to the Pearl River. This force,
Tuttle's division, not returning I rode to the right with my staff, and
soon found that the enemy had left that part of the line. Tuttle's
movement or McPherson's pressure had no doubt led Johnston to order a
retreat, leaving only the men at the guns to retard us while he was
getting away. Tuttle had seen this and, passing through the lines
without resistance, came up in the rear of the artillerists confronting
Sherman and captured them with ten pieces of artillery. I rode
immediately to the State House, where I was soon followed by Sherman.
About the same time McPherson discovered that the enemy was leaving his
front, and advanced Crocker, who was so close upon the enemy that they
could not move their guns or destroy them. He captured seven guns and,
moving on, hoisted the National flag over the rebel capital of
Mississippi. Stevenson's brigade was sent to cut off the rebel retreat,
but was too late or not expeditious enough.

Our loss in this engagement was: McPherson, 37 killed, 228 wounded;
Sherman, 4 killed and 21 wounded and missing. The enemy lost 845
killed, wounded and captured. Seventeen guns fell into our hands, and
the enemy destroyed by fire their store-houses, containing a large
amount of commissary stores.

On this day Blair reached New Auburn and joined McClernand's 4th
division. He had with him two hundred wagons loaded with rations, the
only commissary supplies received during the entire campaign.

I slept that night in the room that Johnston was said to have occupied
the night before.

About four in the afternoon I sent for the corps commanders and directed
the dispositions to be made of their troops. Sherman was to remain in
Jackson until he destroyed that place as a railroad centre, and
manufacturing city of military supplies. He did the work most
effectually. Sherman and I went together into a manufactory which had
not ceased work on account of the battle nor for the entrance of Yankee
troops. Our presence did not seem to attract the attention of either
the manager or the operatives, most of whom were girls. We looked on
for a while to see the tent cloth which they were making roll out of the
looms, with "C. S. A." woven in each bolt. There was an immense amount
of cotton, in bales, stacked outside. Finally I told Sherman I thought
they had done work enough. The operatives were told they could leave
and take with them what cloth they could carry. In a few minutes cotton
and factory were in a blaze. The proprietor visited Washington while I
was President to get his pay for this property, claiming that it was
private. He asked me to give him a statement of the fact that his
property had been destroyed by National troops, so that he might use it
with Congress where he was pressing, or proposed to press, his claim. I
declined.

On the night of the 13th Johnston sent the following dispatch to
Pemberton at Edward's station: "I have lately arrived, and learn that
Major-General Sherman is between us with four divisions at Clinton. It
is important to establish communication, that you may be reinforced. If
practicable, come up in his rear at once. To beat such a detachment
would be of immense value. All the troops you can quickly assemble
should be brought. Time is all-important." This dispatch was sent in
triplicate, by different messengers. One of the messengers happened to
be a loyal man who had been expelled from Memphis some months before by
Hurlbut for uttering disloyal and threatening sentiments. There was a
good deal of parade about his expulsion, ostensibly as a warning to
those who entertained the sentiments he expressed; but Hurlbut and the
expelled man understood each other. He delivered his copy of Johnston's
dispatch to McPherson who forwarded it to me.

Receiving this dispatch on the 14th I ordered McPherson to move promptly
in the morning back to Bolton, the nearest point where Johnston could
reach the road. Bolton is about twenty miles west of Jackson. I also
informed McClernand of the capture of Jackson and sent him the following
order: "It is evidently the design of the enemy to get north of us and
cross the Big Black, and beat us into Vicksburg. We must not allow them
to do this. Turn all your forces towards Bolton station, and make all
dispatch in getting there. Move troops by the most direct road from
wherever they may be on the receipt of this order."

And to Blair I wrote: "Their design is evidently to cross the Big Black
and pass down the peninsula between the Big Black and Yazoo rivers. We
must beat them. Turn your troops immediately to Bolton; take all the
trains with you. Smith's division, and any other troops now with you,
will go to the same place. If practicable, take parallel roads, so as
to divide your troops and train."

Johnston stopped on the Canton road only six miles north of Jackson, the
night of the 14th. He sent from there to Pemberton dispatches
announcing the loss of Jackson, and the following order:

"As soon as the reinforcements are all up, they must be united to the
rest of the army. I am anxious to see a force assembled that may be
able to inflict a heavy blow upon the enemy. Can Grant supply himself
from the Mississippi? Can you not cut him off from it, and above all,
should he be compelled to fall back for want of supplies, beat him."

The concentration of my troops was easy, considering the character of
the country. McPherson moved along the road parallel with and near the
railroad. McClernand's command was, one division (Hovey's) on the road
McPherson had to take, but with a start of four miles. One (Osterhaus)
was at Raymond, on a converging road that intersected the other near
Champion's Hill; one (Carr's) had to pass over the same road with
Osterhaus, but being back at Mississippi Springs, would not be detained
by it; the fourth (Smith's) with Blair's division, was near Auburn with
a different road to pass over. McClernand faced about and moved
promptly. His cavalry from Raymond seized Bolton by half-past nine in
the morning, driving out the enemy's pickets and capturing several men.

The night of the 15th Hovey was at Bolton; Carr and Osterhaus were about
three miles south, but abreast, facing west; Smith was north of Raymond
with Blair in his rear.

McPherson's command, with Logan in front, had marched at seven o'clock,
and by four reached Hovey and went into camp; Crocker bivouacked just in
Hovey's rear on the Clinton road. Sherman with two divisions, was in
Jackson, completing the destruction of roads, bridges and military
factories. I rode in person out to Clinton. On my arrival I ordered
McClernand to move early in the morning on Edward's station, cautioning
him to watch for the enemy and not bring on an engagement unless he felt
very certain of success.

I naturally expected that Pemberton would endeavor to obey the orders of
his superior, which I have shown were to attack us at Clinton. This,
indeed, I knew he could not do; but I felt sure he would make the
attempt to reach that point. It turned out, however, that he had
decided his superior's plans were impracticable, and consequently
determined to move south from Edward's station and get between me and my
base. I, however, had no base, having abandoned it more than a week
before. On the 15th Pemberton had actually marched south from Edward's
station, but the rains had swollen Baker's Creek, which he had to cross
so much that he could not ford it, and the bridges were washed away.
This brought him back to the Jackson road, on which there was a good
bridge over Baker's Creek. Some of his troops were marching until
midnight to get there. Receiving here early on the 16th a repetition of
his order to join Johnston at Clinton, he concluded to obey, and sent a
dispatch to his chief, informing him of the route by which he might be
expected.

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