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Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete

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When the landing was completed I returned with the transports to Paducah
to hasten up the balance of the troops. I got back on the 5th with the
advance the remainder following as rapidly as the steamers could carry
them. At ten o'clock at night, on the 5th, the whole command was not
yet up. Being anxious to commence operations as soon as possible before
the enemy could reinforce heavily, I issued my orders for an advance at
11 A.M. on the 6th. I felt sure that all the troops would be up by that
time.

Fort Henry occupies a bend in the river which gave the guns in the water
battery a direct fire down the stream. The camp outside the fort was
intrenched, with rifle pits and outworks two miles back on the road to
Donelson and Dover. The garrison of the fort and camp was about 2,800,
with strong reinforcements from Donelson halted some miles out. There
were seventeen heavy guns in the fort. The river was very high, the
banks being overflowed except where the bluffs come to the water's edge.
A portion of the ground on which Fort Henry stood was two feet deep in
water. Below, the water extended into the woods several hundred yards
back from the bank on the east side. On the west bank Fort Heiman stood
on high ground, completely commanding Fort Henry. The distance from
Fort Henry to Donelson is but eleven miles. The two positions were so
important to the enemy, AS HE SAW HIS INTEREST, that it was natural to
suppose that reinforcements would come from every quarter from which
they could be got. Prompt action on our part was imperative.

The plan was for the troops and gunboats to start at the same moment.
The troops were to invest the garrison and the gunboats to attack the
fort at close quarters. General Smith was to land a brigade of his
division on the west bank during the night of the 5th and get it in rear
of Heiman.

At the hour designated the troops and gunboats started. General Smith
found Fort Heiman had been evacuated before his men arrived. The
gunboats soon engaged the water batteries at very close quarters, but
the troops which were to invest Fort Henry were delayed for want of
roads, as well as by the dense forest and the high water in what would
in dry weather have been unimportant beds of streams. This delay made
no difference in the result. On our first appearance Tilghman had sent
his entire command, with the exception of about one hundred men left to
man the guns in the fort, to the outworks on the road to Dover and
Donelson, so as to have them out of range of the guns of our navy; and
before any attack on the 6th he had ordered them to retreat on Donelson.
He stated in his subsequent report that the defence was intended solely
to give his troops time to make their escape.

Tilghman was captured with his staff and ninety men, as well as the
armament of the fort, the ammunition and whatever stores were there.
Our cavalry pursued the retreating column towards Donelson and picked up
two guns and a few stragglers; but the enemy had so much the start, that
the pursuing force did not get in sight of any except the stragglers.

All the gunboats engaged were hit many times. The damage, however,
beyond what could be repaired by a small expenditure of money, was
slight, except to the Essex. A shell penetrated the boiler of that
vessel and exploded it, killing and wounding forty-eight men, nineteen
of whom were soldiers who had been detailed to act with the navy. On
several occasions during the war such details were made when the
complement of men with the navy was insufficient for the duty before
them. After the fall of Fort Henry Captain Phelps, commanding the
iron-clad Carondelet, at my request ascended the Tennessee River and
thoroughly destroyed the bridge of the Memphis and Ohio Railroad.



CHAPTER XXII.

INVESTMENT OF FORT DONELSON--THE NAVAL OPERATIONS--ATTACK OF THE ENEMY
--ASSAULTING THE WORKS--SURRENDER OF THE FORT.

I informed the department commander of our success at Fort Henry and
that on the 8th I would take Fort Donelson. But the rain continued to
fall so heavily that the roads became impassable for artillery and wagon
trains. Then, too, it would not have been prudent to proceed without
the gunboats. At least it would have been leaving behind a valuable
part of our available force.

On the 7th, the day after the fall of Fort Henry, I took my staff and
the cavalry--a part of one regiment--and made a reconnoissance to within
about a mile of the outer line of works at Donelson. I had known
General Pillow in Mexico, and judged that with any force, no matter how
small, I could march up to within gunshot of any intrenchments he was
given to hold. I said this to the officers of my staff at the time. I
knew that Floyd was in command, but he was no soldier, and I judged that
he would yield to Pillow's pretensions. I met, as I expected, no
opposition in making the reconnoissance and, besides learning the
topography of the country on the way and around Fort Donelson, found
that there were two roads available for marching; one leading to the
village of Dover, the other to Donelson.

Fort Donelson is two miles north, or down the river, from Dover. The
fort, as it stood in 1861, embraced about one hundred acres of land. On
the east it fronted the Cumberland; to the north it faced Hickman's
creek, a small stream which at that time was deep and wide because of
the back-water from the river; on the south was another small stream, or
rather a ravine, opening into the Cumberland. This also was filled with
back-water from the river. The fort stood on high ground, some of it as
much as a hundred feet above the Cumberland. Strong protection to the
heavy guns in the water batteries had been obtained by cutting away
places for them in the bluff. To the west there was a line of rifle
pits some two miles back from the river at the farthest point. This
line ran generally along the crest of high ground, but in one place
crossed a ravine which opens into the river between the village and the
fort. The ground inside and outside of this intrenched line was very
broken and generally wooded. The trees outside of the rifle-pits had
been cut down for a considerable way out, and had been felled so that
their tops lay outwards from the intrenchments. The limbs had been
trimmed and pointed, and thus formed an abatis in front of the greater
part of the line. Outside of this intrenched line, and extending about
half the entire length of it, is a ravine running north and south and
opening into Hickman creek at a point north of the fort. The entire
side of this ravine next to the works was one long abatis.

General Halleck commenced his efforts in all quarters to get
reinforcements to forward to me immediately on my departure from Cairo.
General Hunter sent men freely from Kansas, and a large division under
General Nelson, from Buell's army, was also dispatched. Orders went out
from the War Department to consolidate fragments of companies that were
being recruited in the Western States so as to make full companies, and
to consolidate companies into regiments. General Halleck did not
approve or disapprove of my going to Fort Donelson. He said nothing
whatever to me on the subject. He informed Buell on the 7th that I
would march against Fort Donelson the next day; but on the 10th he
directed me to fortify Fort Henry strongly, particularly to the land
side, saying that he forwarded me intrenching tools for that purpose. I
received this dispatch in front of Fort Donelson.

I was very impatient to get to Fort Donelson because I knew the
importance of the place to the enemy and supposed he would reinforce it
rapidly. I felt that 15,000 men on the 8th would be more effective than
50,000 a month later. I asked Flag-officer Foote, therefore, to order
his gunboats still about Cairo to proceed up the Cumberland River and
not to wait for those gone to Eastport and Florence; but the others got
back in time and we started on the 12th. I had moved McClernand out a
few miles the night before so as to leave the road as free as possible.

Just as we were about to start the first reinforcement reached me on
transports. It was a brigade composed of six full regiments commanded
by Colonel Thayer, of Nebraska. As the gunboats were going around to
Donelson by the Tennessee, Ohio and Cumberland rivers, I directed Thayer
to turn about and go under their convoy.

I started from Fort Henry with 15,000 men, including eight batteries and
part of a regiment of cavalry, and, meeting with no obstruction to
detain us, the advance arrived in front of the enemy by noon. That
afternoon and the next day were spent in taking up ground to make the
investment as complete as possible. General Smith had been directed to
leave a portion of his division behind to guard forts Henry and Heiman.
He left General Lew. Wallace with 2,500 men. With the remainder of his
division he occupied our left, extending to Hickman creek. McClernand
was on the right and covered the roads running south and south-west from
Dover. His right extended to the back-water up the ravine opening into
the Cumberland south of the village. The troops were not intrenched, but
the nature of the ground was such that they were just as well protected
from the fire of the enemy as if rifle-pits had been thrown up. Our
line was generally along the crest of ridges. The artillery was
protected by being sunk in the ground. The men who were not serving the
guns were perfectly covered from fire on taking position a little back
from the crest. The greatest suffering was from want of shelter. It
was midwinter and during the siege we had rain and snow, thawing and
freezing alternately. It would not do to allow camp-fires except far
down the hill out of sight of the enemy, and it would not do to allow
many of the troops to remain there at the same time. In the march over
from Fort Henry numbers of the men had thrown away their blankets and
overcoats. There was therefore much discomfort and absolute suffering.

During the 12th and 13th, and until the arrival of Wallace and Thayer on
the 14th, the National forces, composed of but 15,000 men, without
intrenchments, confronted an intrenched army of 21,000, without conflict
further than what was brought on by ourselves. Only one gunboat had
arrived. There was a little skirmishing each day, brought on by the
movement of our troops in securing commanding positions; but there was
no actual fighting during this time except once, on the 13th, in front
of McClernand's command. That general had undertaken to capture a
battery of the enemy which was annoying his men. Without orders or
authority he sent three regiments to make the assault. The battery was
in the main line of the enemy, which was defended by his whole army
present. Of course the assault was a failure, and of course the loss on
our side was great for the number of men engaged. In this assault
Colonel William Morrison fell badly wounded. Up to this time the
surgeons with the army had no difficulty in finding room in the houses
near our line for all the sick and wounded; but now hospitals were
overcrowded. Owing, however, to the energy and skill of the surgeons the
suffering was not so great as it might have been. The hospital
arrangements at Fort Donelson were as complete as it was possible to
make them, considering the inclemency of the weather and the lack of
tents, in a sparsely settled country where the houses were generally of
but one or two rooms.

On the return of Captain Walke to Fort Henry on the 10th, I had
requested him to take the vessels that had accompanied him on his
expedition up the Tennessee, and get possession of the Cumberland as far
up towards Donelson as possible. He started without delay, taking,
however, only his own gunboat, the Carondelet, towed by the steamer
Alps. Captain Walke arrived a few miles below Donelson on the 12th, a
little after noon. About the time the advance of troops reached a point
within gunshot of the fort on the land side, he engaged the water
batteries at long range. On the 13th I informed him of my arrival the
day before and of the establishment of most of our batteries, requesting
him at the same time to attack again that day so that I might take
advantage of any diversion. The attack was made and many shots fell
within the fort, creating some consternation, as we now know. The
investment on the land side was made as complete as the number of troops
engaged would admit of.

During the night of the 13th Flag-officer Foote arrived with the
iron-clads St. Louis, Louisville and Pittsburg and the wooden gunboats
Tyler and Conestoga, convoying Thayer's brigade. On the morning of the
14th Thayer was landed. Wallace, whom I had ordered over from Fort
Henry, also arrived about the same time. Up to this time he had been
commanding a brigade belonging to the division of General C. F. Smith.
These troops were now restored to the division they belonged to, and
General Lew. Wallace was assigned to the command of a division composed
of the brigade of Colonel Thayer and other reinforcements that arrived
the same day. This new division was assigned to the centre, giving the
two flanking divisions an opportunity to close up and form a stronger
line.

The plan was for the troops to hold the enemy within his lines, while
the gunboats should attack the water batteries at close quarters and
silence his guns if possible. Some of the gunboats were to run the
batteries, get above the fort and above the village of Dover. I had
ordered a reconnoissance made with the view of getting troops to the
river above Dover in case they should be needed there. That position
attained by the gunboats it would have been but a question of time--and
a very short time, too--when the garrison would have been compelled to
surrender.

By three in the afternoon of the 14th Flag-officer Foote was ready, and
advanced upon the water batteries with his entire fleet. After coming
in range of the batteries of the enemy the advance was slow, but a
constant fire was delivered from every gun that could be brought to bear
upon the fort. I occupied a position on shore from which I could see
the advancing navy. The leading boat got within a very short distance of
the water battery, not further off I think than two hundred yards, and I
soon saw one and then another of them dropping down the river, visibly
disabled. Then the whole fleet followed and the engagement closed for
the day. The gunboat which Flag-officer Foote was on, besides having
been hit about sixty times, several of the shots passing through near
the waterline, had a shot enter the pilot-house which killed the pilot,
carried away the wheel and wounded the flag-officer himself. The
tiller-ropes of another vessel were carried away and she, too, dropped
helplessly back. Two others had their pilot-houses so injured that they
scarcely formed a protection to the men at the wheel.

The enemy had evidently been much demoralized by the assault, but they
were jubilant when they saw the disabled vessels dropping down the river
entirely out of the control of the men on board. Of course I only
witnessed the falling back of our gunboats and felt sad enough at the
time over the repulse. Subsequent reports, now published, show that the
enemy telegraphed a great victory to Richmond. The sun went down on the
night of the 14th of February, 1862, leaving the army confronting Fort
Donelson anything but comforted over the prospects. The weather had
turned intensely cold; the men were without tents and could not keep up
fires where most of them had to stay, and, as previously stated, many
had thrown away their overcoats and blankets. Two of the strongest of
our gunboats had been disabled, presumably beyond the possibility of
rendering any present assistance. I retired this night not knowing but
that I would have to intrench my position, and bring up tents for the
men or build huts under the cover of the hills.

On the morning of the 15th, before it was yet broad day, a messenger
from Flag-officer Foote handed me a note, expressing a desire to see me
on the flag-ship and saying that he had been injured the day before so
much that he could not come himself to me. I at once made my
preparations for starting. I directed my adjutant-general to notify
each of the division commanders of my absence and instruct them to do
nothing to bring on an engagement until they received further orders,
but to hold their positions. From the heavy rains that had fallen for
days and weeks preceding and from the constant use of the roads between
the troops and the landing four to seven miles below, these roads had
become cut up so as to be hardly passable. The intense cold of the
night of the 14th-15th had frozen the ground solid. This made travel on
horseback even slower than through the mud; but I went as fast as the
roads would allow.

When I reached the fleet I found the flag-ship was anchored out in the
stream. A small boat, however, awaited my arrival and I was soon on
board with the flag-officer. He explained to me in short the condition
in which he was left by the engagement of the evening before, and
suggested that I should intrench while he returned to Mound City with
his disabled boats, expressing at the time the belief that he could have
the necessary repairs made and be back in ten days. I saw the absolute
necessity of his gunboats going into hospital and did not know but I
should be forced to the alternative of going through a siege. But the
enemy relieved me from this necessity.

When I left the National line to visit Flag-officer Foote I had no idea
that there would be any engagement on land unless I brought it on
myself. The conditions for battle were much more favorable to us than
they had been for the first two days of the investment. From the 12th
to the 14th we had but 15,000 men of all arms and no gunboats. Now we
had been reinforced by a fleet of six naval vessels, a large division of
troops under General L. Wallace and 2,500 men brought over from Fort
Henry belonging to the division of C. F. Smith. The enemy, however, had
taken the initiative. Just as I landed I met Captain Hillyer of my
staff, white with fear, not for his personal safety, but for the safety
of the National troops. He said the enemy had come out of his lines in
full force and attacked and scattered McClernand's division, which was
in full retreat. The roads, as I have said, were unfit for making fast
time, but I got to my command as soon as possible. The attack had been
made on the National right. I was some four or five miles north of our
left. The line was about three miles long. In reaching the point where
the disaster had occurred I had to pass the divisions of Smith and
Wallace. I saw no sign of excitement on the portion of the line held by
Smith; Wallace was nearer the scene of conflict and had taken part in
it. He had, at an opportune time, sent Thayer's brigade to the support
of McClernand and thereby contributed to hold the enemy within his
lines.

I saw everything favorable for us along the line of our left and centre.
When I came to the right appearances were different. The enemy had come
out in full force to cut his way out and make his escape. McClernand's
division had to bear the brunt of the attack from this combined force.
His men had stood up gallantly until the ammunition in their
cartridge-boxes gave out. There was abundance of ammunition near by
lying on the ground in boxes, but at that stage of the war it was not
all of our commanders of regiments, brigades, or even divisions, who had
been educated up to the point of seeing that their men were constantly
supplied with ammunition during an engagement. When the men found
themselves without ammunition they could not stand up against troops who
seemed to have plenty of it. The division broke and a portion fled, but
most of the men, as they were not pursued, only fell back out of range
of the fire of the enemy. It must have been about this time that Thayer
pushed his brigade in between the enemy and those of our troops that
were without ammunition. At all events the enemy fell back within his
intrenchments and was there when I got on the field.

I saw the men standing in knots talking in the most excited manner. No
officer seemed to be giving any directions. The soldiers had their
muskets, but no ammunition, while there were tons of it close at hand.
I heard some of the men say that the enemy had come out with knapsacks,
and haversacks filled with rations. They seemed to think this indicated
a determination on his part to stay out and fight just as long as the
provisions held out. I turned to Colonel J. D. Webster, of my staff,
who was with me, and said: "Some of our men are pretty badly
demoralized, but the enemy must be more so, for he has attempted to
force his way out, but has fallen back: the one who attacks first now
will be victorious and the enemy will have to be in a hurry if he gets
ahead of me." I determined to make the assault at once on our left. It
was clear to my mind that the enemy had started to march out with his
entire force, except a few pickets, and if our attack could be made on
the left before the enemy could redistribute his forces along the line,
we would find but little opposition except from the intervening abatis.
I directed Colonel Webster to ride with me and call out to the men as we
passed: "Fill your cartridge-boxes, quick, and get into line; the enemy
is trying to escape and he must not be permitted to do so." This acted
like a charm. The men only wanted some one to give them a command. We
rode rapidly to Smith's quarters, when I explained the situation to him
and directed him to charge the enemy's works in his front with his whole
division, saying at the same time that he would find nothing but a very
thin line to contend with. The general was off in an incredibly short
time, going in advance himself to keep his men from firing while they
were working their way through the abatis intervening between them and
the enemy. The outer line of rifle-pits was passed, and the night of
the 15th General Smith, with much of his division, bivouacked within the
lines of the enemy. There was now no doubt but that the Confederates
must surrender or be captured the next day.

There seems from subsequent accounts to have been much consternation,
particularly among the officers of high rank, in Dover during the night
of the 15th. General Floyd, the commanding officer, who was a man of
talent enough for any civil position, was no soldier and, possibly, did
not possess the elements of one. He was further unfitted for command,
for the reason that his conscience must have troubled him and made him
afraid. As Secretary of War he had taken a solemn oath to maintain the
Constitution of the United States and to uphold the same against all its
enemies. He had betrayed that trust. As Secretary of War he was
reported through the northern press to have scattered the little army
the country had so that the most of it could be picked up in detail when
secession occurred. About a year before leaving the Cabinet he had
removed arms from northern to southern arsenals. He continued in the
Cabinet of President Buchanan until about the 1st of January, 1861,
while he was working vigilantly for the establishment of a confederacy
made out of United States territory. Well may he have been afraid to
fall into the hands of National troops. He would no doubt have been
tried for misappropriating public property, if not for treason, had he
been captured. General Pillow, next in command, was conceited, and
prided himself much on his services in the Mexican war. He telegraphed
to General Johnston, at Nashville, after our men were within the rebel
rifle-pits, and almost on the eve of his making his escape, that the
Southern troops had had great success all day. Johnston forwarded the
dispatch to Richmond. While the authorities at the capital were reading
it Floyd and Pillow were fugitives.

A council of war was held by the enemy at which all agreed that it would
be impossible to hold out longer. General Buckner, who was third in
rank in the garrison but much the most capable soldier, seems to have
regarded it a duty to hold the fort until the general commanding the
department, A. S. Johnston, should get back to his headquarters at
Nashville. Buckner's report shows, however, that he considered Donelson
lost and that any attempt to hold the place longer would be at the
sacrifice of the command. Being assured that Johnston was already in
Nashville, Buckner too agreed that surrender was the proper thing.
Floyd turned over the command to Pillow, who declined it. It then
devolved upon Buckner, who accepted the responsibility of the position.
Floyd and Pillow took possession of all the river transports at Dover
and before morning both were on their way to Nashville, with the brigade
formerly commanded by Floyd and some other troops, in all about 3,000.
Some marched up the east bank of the Cumberland; others went on the
steamers. During the night Forrest also, with his cavalry and some
other troops about a thousand in all, made their way out, passing
between our right and the river. They had to ford or swim over the
back-water in the little creek just south of Dover.

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