The Campaign of Chancellorsville

T >> Theodore A. Dodge >> The Campaign of Chancellorsville

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17

In the field he was patient, hard-working, careless of self, and full of
forethought for his men; though no one could call for and get from
troops such excessive work, on the march or in action. No one could ask
them to forego rations, rest, often the barest necessaries of life,
and yet cheerfully yield him their utmost efforts, as could "Old Jack."

He habitually rode an old sorrel horse, leaning forward in a most
unmilitary seat, and wore a sun-browned cap, dingy gray uniform, and a
stock, into which he would settle his chin in a queer way, as he moved
along with abstracted look. He paid little heed to camp comforts,
and slept on the march, or by snatches under trees, as he might find
occasion; often begging a cup of bean-coffee and a bit of hard bread
from his men, as he passed them in their bivouacs, He was too uncertain
in his movements, and careless of self, for any of his military family
to be able to look after his physical welfare. In fact, a cold
occasioned by lending his cloak to one of his staff, a night or two
before Chancellorsville, was the primary cause of the pneumonia, which,
setting in upon his exhausting wounds, terminated his life.

Jackson was himself a bad disciplinarian. Nor had he even average
powers of organization. He was in the field quite careless of the
minutiae of drill. But he had a singularly happy faculty for choosing
men to do his work for him. He was a very close calculator of all his
movements. He worked out his manoeuvres to the barest mathematical
chances, and insisted upon the unerring execution of what he prescribed;
and above all be believed in mystery. Of his entire command, he alone
knew what work he had cut out for his corps to do. And this was carried
so far that it is said the men were often forbidden to ask the names of
the places through which they marched. "Mystery," said Jackson,
"mystery is the secret of success in war, as in all transactions of
human life."

Jackson was a professing member of the Presbyterian Church, and what is
known as a praying man. By this is meant, that, while he never
intentionally paraded or obtruded upon his associates his belief in the
practical and immediate effect of prayer, he made no effort to hide his
faith or practice from the eyes of the world. In action, while the
whole man was wrought up to the culminating pitch of enthusiasm, and
while every fibre of his mind and heart was strained towards the
achievement of his purpose, his hand would often be instinctively raised
upwards; and those who knew him best, believed this to be a sign that
his trust in the help of a Higher Power was ever present.

Jackson was remarkable as a fighter. In this he stands with but one or
two peers. Few men in the world's history have ever got so great
results from armed men as he was able to do. But to judge rightly of
his actual military strength is not so easy as to award this praise.
Unless a general has commanded large armies, it is difficult to judge of
how far he may be found wanting if tried in that balance. In the
detached commands which he enjoyed, in the Valley and elsewhere, his
strategic ability was marked: but these commands were always more or
less limited; and, unlike Lee or Johnston, Jackson did not live long
enough to rise to the command of a large army upon an extended and
independent field of operations.

In Gen. Lee, Jackson reposed an implicit faith. "He is the only man I
would follow blindfold," said Jackson. And Lee's confidence in his
lieutenant's ability to carry out any scheme he set his hand to, was
equally pronounced. Honestly, though with too much modesty, did Lee
say: "Could I have directed events, I should have chosen, for the good
of the country, to have been disabled in your stead."

But, illy as Lee could spare Jackson, less still could the Army of
Northern Virginia spare Robert E. Lee, the greatest in adversity of the
soldiers of our civil war. Still, after Jackson's death, it is certain
that Lee found no one who could attempt the bold manoeuvres on the field
of battle, or the hazardous strategic marches, which have illumined the
name of Jackson to all posterity.

It is not improbable that had Jackson lived, and risen to larger
commands, he would have been found equal to the full exigencies of the
situation. Whatever he was called upon to do, under limited but
independent scope, seems to testify to the fact that he was far from
having reached his limit. Whatever he did was thoroughly done; and he
never appears to have been taxed to the term of his powers, in any
operation which he undertook.

Honesty, singleness of purpose, true courage, rare ability, suffice to
account for Jackson's military success. But those alone who have served
under his eye know to what depths that rarer, stranger power of his has
sounded them: they only can testify to the full measure of the strength
of Stonewall Jackson.

XXI.

THE POSITION AT FAIRVIEW.

Gen. Hooker's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War
comprises almost every thing which has been officially put forth by him
with reference to this campaign. It therefore stands in lieu of a
report of operations, and it may be profitable to continue to quote from
it to some extent. His alleged intention of withdrawing from
Chancellorsville is thus explained. After setting forth that on the
demolition of the Eleventh Corps, the previous evening, he threw Berry
into the gap to arrest Jackson, "and if possible to seize, and at all
hazards hold, the high ground abandoned by that corps," he says:--

"Gen. Berry, after going perhaps three-quarters of a mile, reported that
the enemy was already in possession of the ground commanding my position,
and that he had been compelled to establish his line in the valley on
the Chancellorsville side of that high ground. As soon as this was
communicated to me, I directed Gens. Warren and Comstock to trace out a
new line which I pointed out to them on the map, and to do it that night,
as I would not be able to hold the one I then occupied after the enemy
should renew the attack the next morning."

"The position" at Dowdall's "was the most commanding one in the
vicinity. In the possession of the enemy it would enable him with his
artillery to enfilade the lines held by the Twelfth and Second Corps."
"To wrest this position from the enemy after his batteries were
established upon it, would have required slender columns of infantry,
which he could destroy as fast as they were thrown upon it." Slender
columns of infantry were at this time among Hooker's pet ideas.

"Every disposition was made of our forces to hold our line as long as
practicable, for the purpose of being in readiness to co-operate with
the movement which had been ordered to be made on our left."

"The attack was renewed by the enemy about seven o'clock in the morning,
and was bravely resisted by the limited number of troops I could bring
into action until eleven o'clock, when orders were given for the army to
establish itself on the new line. This it did in good order. The
position I abandoned was one that I had held at a disadvantage; and I
kept the troops on it as long as I did, only for the purpose of enabling
me to hear of the approach of the force under Gen. Sedgwick." Thus much
Hooker.

The position of both armies shortly after daybreak was substantially
that to which the operation of Saturday had led.

The crest at Fairview was crowned by eight batteries of the Third and
Twelfth Corps, supported by Whipple's Second brigade (Bowman's), in
front to the left, forming, as it were, a third line of infantry.

In advance of the artillery some five hundred yards, (a good half-mile
from the Chancellor House,) lay the Federal line of battle, on a crest
less high than Fairview, but still commanding the tangled woods in its
front to a limited distance, and with lower ground in its rear,
deepening to a ravine on the south of the plank road. Berry's division
held this line north of the plank road, occupying the ground it had
fought over since dusk of the evening before. Supporting it somewhat
later was Whipple's First brigade (Franklin's). Berdan's sharpshooters
formed a movable skirmish-line; while another, and heavier, was thrown
out by Berry from his own troops.

A section of Dimick's battery was trained down the road.

Williams's division of the Twelfth Corps was to the south of the plank
road, both he and Berry substantially in one line, and perpendicular to
it; while Mott's brigade was massed in rear of Williams's right.

Near Williams's left flank, but almost at right angles to it, came
Geary's division, in the same intrenched line he had defended the day
before; and on his left again, the Second Corps, which had not
materially changed its position since Friday.

The angle thus formed by Geary and Williams, looked out towards cleared
fields, and rising ground, surmounted by some farm-buildings on a high
crest, about six hundred yards from Fairview.

At this farm, called Hazel Grove, during the night, and until just
before daybreak, holding a position which could have been utilized as an
almost impregnable point d'appui, and which, so long as it was held,
practically prevented, in the approaching battle, a junction of Lee's
severed wings, had lain Birney's and Whipple's divisions. This point
they had occupied, (as already described,) late the evening before,
after Sickles and Pleasonton had finished their brush with Jackson's
right brigades. But Hooker was blind to the fact that the possession of
this height would enable either himself or his enemy to enfilade the
other's lines; and before daybreak the entire force was ordered to move
back to Chancellorsville. In order to do this, the intervening swamp
had to be bridged, and the troops handled with extreme care. When all
but Graham had been withdrawn, a smart attack was made upon his brigade
by Archer of Hill's command, who charged up and captured the Hazel Grove
height; but it was with no serious Federal loss, except a gun and
caisson stalled in the swamp. Sickles drew in his line by the right,
and was directed to place his two divisions so as to strengthen the new
line at Fairview.

Reynolds's corps had arrived the evening before, and, after somewhat
blind instructions, had been placed along the east of Hunting Run,
from the Rapidan to the junction of Ely's and United-States Ford roads,
in a location where the least advantage could be gained from his fresh
and eager troops, and where, in fact, the corps was not called into
action at all, restless however Reynolds may have been under his
enforced inactivity.

The Eleventh Corps had gone to the extreme left, where it had relieved
Meade; Sykes was already formed on Reynolds's left, (having rapidly
moved to the cross roads at dusk on Saturday;) while Meade with the rest
of his corps, so soon as Howard had relieved him, went into position to
support this entire line on the extreme right of the Army of the
Potomac. Thus three strong army corps henceforth disappear from
effective usefulness in the campaign.

The Confederate position opposite Fairview had been entirely rectified
during the night to prepare for the expected contest. The division of
A. P. Hill was now in the front line, perpendicular to the road, Archer
on the extreme right, and McGowan, Lane, Pender, and Thomas, extending
towards the left; the two latter on the north of the road. Heth was in
reserve, behind Lane and Pender. Archer and McGowan were half refused
from the general line at daylight, so as to face, and if possible drive
Sickles from Hazel Grove. Archer was taking measures with a view to
forcing a connection with Anderson; while the latter sent Perry by the
Catharpen road, and Posey direct, towards the Furnace, with like purpose.

Colston was drawn up in second line with Trimble's division; while Rodes,
who had led the van in the attack on Howard of last evening, now made
the third. The artillery of the corps was disposed mainly on the right
of the line, occupying, shortly after daylight, the Hazel-Grove crest,
and at Melzi Chancellor's, in the clearing, where the Eleventh Corps had
met its disaster.

There was thus opposed to the Federal right centre, (Berry's, Whipple's,
and Birney's divisions of the Third Corps, and Williams's of the
Twelfth,) consisting of about twenty-two thousand men, the whole of
Jackson's corps, now reduced to about the same effective; while Anderson,
on the left of the plank road, feeling out towards the Furnace, and
McLaws on the right, with seventeen thousand men between them,
confronted our left centre, consisting of Geary of the Twelfth, and
Hancock of the Second Corps, numbering not much above twelve thousand
for duty.

Owing to Hooker's ill-fitting dispositions, and lack of ability to
concentrate, the fight of Sunday morning was thus narrowed to a contest
in which the Federals were outnumbered, with the prestige of Confederate
success to offset our intrenchments.

The right and left wings proper of the Union army comprised the bulk and
freshest part of the forces, having opposite to them no enemy whatever,
unless a couple of cavalry regiments scouting on the Mine and River
roads.

Gen. Warren, who was much in Hooker's confidence, thus explains his
understanding of the situation Saturday night: "The position of the
Third Corps and our cavalry on the right flank of Jackson's cavalry"
(? corps), "cut off, it seemed, all direct communication with Gen. Lee's
right. No thought of retreating during the night was entertained on our
side; and, unless the enemy did, the next day promised a decisive
battle. By our leaving sufficient force in front of the right wing of
the enemy to hold our breastworks, the whole of the rest of our force
was to be thrown upon his left at dawn of day, with every prospect of
annihilating it. To render this success more complete, Gen. Sedgwick,
with the Sixth Corps, (about twenty thousand strong,) was to leave his
position in front of the enemy's lines at Fredericksburg, and fall upon
Gen. Lee's rear at daylight."

This summarizes an excellent plan, weak only in the fact that it was
impracticable to expect Sedgwick to gain Lee's rear by daylight.
The balance was well enough, and, vigorously carried out, could, even if
unassisted by Sedgwick, scarcely fail of success.

To examine into its manner of execution.

XXII.

THE FIGHT AT FAIRVIEW.

At the earliest dawn, while Rodes was issuing rations to his men,
who had been many hours without food, the indefatigable Stuart gave
orders for a slight advance of his right, to reduce the angle of refusal
or Archer and McGowan; for at this moment it was ascertained that
Sickles was being withdrawn from Hazel Grove. By some error, Stuart's
order was interpreted as a command for the anticipated general attack,
and the advancing columns soon provoked the fire of the expectant
Federals.

Seeing that the men were ready for their work, rations or no rations,
Stuart wisely refrained from recalling them; and Berry and Williams
betimes felt the shock of the strong line of A. P. Hill, which Alexander
seconded by opening with his artillery in full action. The Confederates
forged ahead with the watchword, "Charge, and remember Jackson!"
And this appeal was one to nerve all hearts to the desperate task before
them.

Hotchkiss thus describes the field of operations of this morning: "The
first line of works occupied by the Federal troops had been thrown up in
the night, and was very formidable. The engineer division of the Union
Army consisted of near four thousand men, and these had been
unremittingly engaged in its construction. A vast number of trees had
been felled, and formed into a heavy rampart, all approach to which was
rendered extremely difficult by an abattis of limbs and brushwood.
On the south side of the road this line is situated upon a ridge,
on the Chancellorsville side of Lewis Creek, one of the numerous
head-waters of the Mattapony. It is intersected by the smaller branches
of this creek, and the ravines in which they run. These ravines
extended behind the Federal lines, almost to the plank road, and
afforded excellent positions for successive stands. In the morning,
Sickles extended to the west of the creek, and held the elevated plateau
at Hazel Grove. This is the most commanding point, except Fairview,
in the vicinity. On the north of the plank road, the ground is more
level. The line thus crossed several small branches, the origin of some
small tributaries of the Rappahannock, but the ravines on that side are
not considerable. From the ridge occupied by the first line, the ground
falls away to the east, until the valley of another branch of Lewis
Creek is reached. The depression here is considerable, and gives an
abrupt slope to the Fairview hill, which rises directly from it on the
eastern side. From the first line of the creek, extends on both sides
of the road a dense forest. From the latter point to Fairview heights,
and to Chancellorsville, on the south side of the road, the country is
cleared. This clearing is bounded on the south by a drain, which runs
from near Chancellorsville, between Fairview and the works occupied by
Slocum. It extends some distance on the north of the road.

"Behind the front line of works, there were some defences in the valley
near the creek, not constituting a connecting line, however; and these
in turn were succeeded by the second main line of works, which covered
the Fairview heights, and were more strongly constructed even than the
first."

It was at just the time of Rodes's assault, that Birney had received
orders to withdraw from his cardinal position at the angle made by Geary
and Williams, and to form as a second and third line near the plank road,
a duty there was an abundance of troops to fill. He retired, and ployed
into brigade columns by regiments, immediately beyond the crest of
Fairview hill. Here, placing batteries in position, he shelled the
field from which he had just withdrawn. This crest, however, Archer
speedily occupied; and on its summit Stuart, with better foresight than
Hooker, posted some thirty guns under Walker, which enfiladed our lines
with murderous effect during the remainder of the combat of Sunday,
and contributed largely to our defeat.

The attack of the Confederates was made, "as Jackson usually did,
in heavy columns" (Sickles), and was vigorous and effective. According
to their own accounts, the onset was met with equal cheerful gallantry.
While Archer occupied Hazel Grove, McGowan and Lane assaulted the works
held by Williams, carried them with an impetuous rush, and pushed our
troops well back. This rapid success was largely owing to a serious
breach made in the Union line by the decampment of the Third Maryland
Volunteers, a full regiment of Knipe's brigade, which held the right of
Williams's division on the plank road. The regiment was composed of new
men, no match for Jackson's veterans. They stood as well as raw troops
can, in the face of such an onslaught; but after a loss of about a
hundred men, they yielded ground, and were too green to rally. Into the
gap thus made, quickly poured a stream of Lane's men, thus taking both
Berry's and Williams's lines in reverse. The Second Brigade was
compelled to change front to meet this new attack: Mott was instantly
thrown forward to fill the interval; and after a desperate hand-to-hand
struggle he regained the lost ground, and captured eight stands of
colors and about a thousand prisoners. This separated Archer from the
main line, and took in their turn McGowan and Lane in reverse,
precipitately driving them back, and enabling our columns to regain the
ground lost by the fierceness of the Confederate inroad. This sally in
reverse likewise carried back Lane and Heth, the entire corps having
suffered severely from the excellent service of the Federal guns.
But the effect on Williams's division of this alternating gain and loss,
had been to cause it to waver; while having for an instant captured our
works, was encouragement to our foes.

On the north of the road, Pender and Thomas had at first won equal
fortune against Berry's works, but their success had been equally
short-lived. For the falling-back of Jackson's right, and the cheering
of the Union line as its fire advanced in hot pursuit, gave at the same
moment notice to the Confederate left that it was compromised, and to
our own brave boys the news of their comrades' fortune. Pender and
Thomas were slowly but surely forced back, under a withering fire,
beyond the breastworks they had won. A second time did these veterans
rally for the charge, and a second time did they penetrate a part of our
defences; only, however, to be taken in flank again by Berry's right
brigade, and tumbled back to their starting-point. But their onset had
shown so great determination, that Ward was despatched to sustain
Berry's right, lest he should be eventually over-matched.

The Federal line on the north of the plank road had thus doggedly
resisted the most determined attacks of Jackson's men, and had lost no
ground. And so hard pressed indeed was Pender by gallant Berry's
legions, that Colquitt's brigade was sent to his relief. Pender's men
had early expended all their ammunition, word whereof was sent to Stuart,
but merely to evoke renewal of that stubborn officer's orders to hold
their ground with the bayonet, and at all hazards. And such orders as
these were wont to be obeyed by these hardened warriors.

The three Confederate lines of attack had soon, as on yesternight,
become one, as each pushed forward to sustain the other. The enemy
"pressed forward in crowds rather than in any regular formation"
(Sickles); but the momentum of these splendid troops was well-nigh
irresistible. Nichols's brigade of Trimble's division, and Iverson's
and Rodes's of Rodes's division, pressed forward to sustain the first
line on the north of the road, and repel the flank attack, constantly
renewed by Berry. Another advance of the entire line was ordered.
Rodes led his old brigade in person. The Confederates seemed determined,
for Jackson's sake, to carry and hold the works which they had twice
gained, and out of which they had been twice driven; for, with "Old Jack"
at their head, they had never shown a sterner front.

Now came the most grievous loss of this morning's conflict. Gallant
Berry, the life of his division, always in the hottest of the fire,
reckless of safety, had fallen mortally wounded, before Ward's brigade
could reach his line. Gen. Revere assumed command, and, almost before
the renewal of the Confederate attack, "heedless of their murmurs,"
says Sickles's report, "shamefully led to the rear the whole of the
Second Brigade, and portions of two others, thus subjecting these proud
soldiers, for the first time, to the humiliation of being marched to the
rear while their comrades were under fire. Gen. Revere was promptly
recalled with his troops, and at once relieved of command." Revere
certainly gives no satisfactory explanation of his conduct; but he
appears to have marched over to the vicinity of French of the Second
Corps, upon the White House clearing, and reported to him with a large
portion of his troops. Revere was subsequently courtmartialled for this
misbehavior, and was sentenced to dismissal; but the sentence was
revoked by the President, and he was allowed to resign.

Col. Stevens was speedily put in command in Revere's stead; but he, too,
soon fell, leaving the gallant division without a leader, nearly half of
its number off the field, and the remainder decimated by the bloody
contest of the past four hours. Moreover, Gen. Hays, whose brigade of
French's division had been detached in support of Berry, where it had
done most gallant work, was at the same time wounded and captured by the
enemy.

It was near eight o'clock. The artillery was quite out of ammunition,
except canister, which could not be used with safety over the heads of
our troops. Our outer lines of breastworks had been captured, and were
held by the enemy. So much as was left of Berry's division was in
absolute need of re-forming. Its supports were in equally bad plight.
The death of Berry, and the present location of our lines in the low
ground back of the crest just lost, where the undergrowth was so tangled
and the bottom so marshy, that Ward, when he marched to Berry's relief,
had failed to find him, obliged the Federals to fall back to the
Fairview heights, and form a new line at the western edge of the
Chancellor clearing, where the artillery had been so ably sustaining the
struggle now steadily in progress since daylight. Sickles himself
supervised the withdrawal of the line, and its being deployed on its new
position.

The receding of the right of the line also necessitated the falling-back
of Williams. The latter officer had, moreover, been for some time quite
short of ammunition; and though Graham had filled the place of a part of
his line, and had held it for nearly two hours, repeatedly using the
bayonet, Williams was obliged to give way before Stuart's last assault.
But Graham was not the man readily to accept defeat; and, as Williams's
line melted away, he found himself isolated, and in great danger of
being surrounded. Gen. Birney fortunately became aware of the danger
before it was too late; and, hastily gathering a portion of Hayman's
brigade, he gallantly led them to the charge in person; and, under cover
of this opportune diversion, Graham contrived to withdraw in good order,
holding McGowan severely in check.

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17