The Belgian Curtain
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8 (c) 2002 Copyright Lidija Rangelovska.
The Belgian Curtain
Europe after Communism
1st EDITION
Sam Vaknin, Ph.D.
Editing and Design:
Lidija Rangelovska
Lidija Rangelovska
A Narcissus Publications Imprint, Skopje 2003
First published by United Press International - UPI
Not for Sale! Non-commercial edition.
(c) 2002 Copyright Lidija Rangelovska.
All rights reserved. This book, or any part thereof, may not be used or
reproduced in any manner without written permission from:
Lidija Rangelovska - write to:
palma@unet.com.mk or to
vaknin@link.com.mk
Visit the Author Archive of Dr. Sam Vaknin in "Central Europe Review":
http://www.ce-review.org/authorarchives/vaknin_archive/vaknin_main.html
Visit Sam Vaknin's United Press International (UPI) Article Archive
http://samvak.tripod.com/guide.html
http://samvak.tripod.com/briefs.html
http://ceeandbalkan.tripod.com
http://samvak.tripod.com/after.html
Created by: LIDIJA RANGELOVSKA
REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
C O N T E N T S
I. European Union and NATO - The Competing Alliances
II. The War in Iraq
III. How the West Lost the East
IV. Left and Right in a Divided Europe
V. Forward to the Past - Capitalism in Post-Communist Europe
VI. Transition in Context
VII. Eastern Advantages
VIII. Europe's Four Speeds
IX. Switching Empires
X. Europe's Agricultural Revolution
XI. Winning the European CAP
XII. History of Previous Currency Unions
XIII. The Concert of Europe, Interrupted
XIV. The Eastern Question Revisited
XV. Europe's New Jews
XVI. The Author
XVII. About "After the Rain"
EU and NATO - The Competing Alliances
By: Dr. Sam Vaknin
Also published by United Press International (UPI)
Saturday's vote in Ireland was the second time in 18 months that its
increasingly disillusioned citizenry had to decide the fate of the
European Union by endorsing or rejecting the crucial Treaty of Nice.
The treaty seeks to revamp the union's administration and the hitherto
sacred balance between small and big states prior to the accession of
10 central and east European countries. Enlargement has been the
centerpiece of European thinking ever since the meltdown of the eastern
bloc.
Shifting geopolitical and geo-strategic realities in the wake of the
September 11 atrocities have rendered this project all the more urgent.
NATO - an erstwhile anti-Soviet military alliance is search of purpose
- is gradually acquiring more political hues. Its remit has swelled to
take in peacekeeping, regime change, and nation-building.
Led by the USA, it has expanded aggressively into central and northern
Europe. It has institutionalized its relationships with the countries
of the Balkan through the "Partnership for Peace" and with Russia
through a recently established joint council. The Czech Republic,
Poland, and Hungary - the eternal EU candidates - have full scale
members of NATO for 3 years now.
The EU responded by feebly attempting to counter this worrisome
imbalance of influence with a Common Foreign and Security Policy and a
rapid deployment force. Still, NATO's chances of replacing the EU as
the main continental political alliance are much higher than the EU's
chances of substituting for NATO as the pre-eminent European military
pact. the EU is hobbled by minuscule and decreasing defense spending by
its mostly pacifistic members and by the backwardness of their armed
forces.
That NATO, under America's thumb, and the vaguely anti-American EU are
at cross-purposes emerged during the recent spat over the International
Criminal Court. Countries, such as Romania, were asked to choose
between NATO's position - immunity for American soldiers on
international peacekeeping missions - and the EU's (no such thing).
Finally - and typically - the EU backed down. But it was a close call
and it cast in sharp relief the tensions inside the Atlantic
partnership.
As far as the sole superpower is concerned, the strategic importance of
western Europe has waned together with the threat posed by a
dilapidated Russia. Both south Europe and its northern regions are
emerging as pivotal. Airbases in Bulgaria are more useful in the fight
against Iraq than airbases in Germany.
The affairs of Bosnia - with its al-Qaida's presence - are more
pressing than those of France. Turkey and its borders with central Asia
and the middle east is of far more concern to the USA than
disintegrating Belgium. Russia, a potentially newfound ally, is more
mission-critical than grumpy Germany.
Thus, enlargement would serve to enhance the dwindling strategic
relevance of the EU and heal some of the multiple rifts with the USA -
on trade, international affairs (e.g., Israel), defense policy, and
international law. But this is not the only benefit the EU would derive
from its embrace of the former lands of communism.
Faced with an inexorably ageing populace and an unsustainable system of
social welfare and retirement benefits, the EU is in dire need of young
immigrants. According to the United Nations Population Division, the EU
would need to import 1.6 million migrant workers annually to maintain
its current level of working age population. But it would need to
absorb almost 14 million new, working age, immigrants per year just to
preserve a stable ratio of workers to pensioners.
Eastern Europe - and especially central Europe - is the EU's natural
reservoir of migrant labor. It is ironic that xenophobic and
anti-immigration parties hold the balance of power in a continent so
dependent on immigration for the survival of its way of life and
institutions.
The internal, common, market of the EU has matured. Its growth rate has
leveled off and it has developed a mild case of deflation. In previous
centuries, Europe exported its excess labor and surplus capacity to its
colonies - an economic system known as "mercantilism".
The markets of central, southern, and eastern Europe - West Europe's
hinterland - are replete with abundant raw materials and dirt-cheap,
though well-educated, labor. As indigenous purchasing power increases,
the demand for consumer goods and services will expand.
Thus, the enlargement candidates can act both as a sink for Europe's
production and the root of its competitive advantage.
Moreover, the sheer weight of their agricultural sectors and the
backwardness of their infrastructure can force a reluctant EU to reform
its inanely bloated farm and regional aid subsidies, notably the Common
Agricultural Policy. That the EU cannot afford to treat the candidates
to dollops of subventioary largesse as it does the likes of France,
Spain, Portugal, and Greece is indisputable. But even a much-debated
phase-in period of 10 years would burden the EU's budget - and the
patience of its member states and denizens - to an acrimonious breaking
point.
The countries of central and eastern Europe are new consumption and
investment markets. With a total of 300 million people (Russia
counted), they equal the EU's population - though not its much larger
purchasing clout. They are likely to while the next few decades on a
steep growth curve, catching up with the West. Their proximity to the
EU makes them ideal customers for its goods and services. They could
provide the impetus for a renewed golden age of European economic
expansion.
Central and eastern Europe also provide a natural land nexus between
west Europe and Asia and the Middle East. As China and India grow in
economic and geopolitical importance, an enlarged Europe will find
itself in the profitable role of an intermediary between east and west.
The wide-ranging benefits to the EU of enlargement are clear,
therefore. What do the candidate states stand to gain from their
accession? The answer is: surprisingly little.
All of them already enjoy, to varying degrees, unfettered, largely
duty-free, access to the EU. To belong, a few - like Estonia - would
have to dismantle a much admired edifice of economic liberalism.
Most of them would have to erect barriers to trade and the free
movement of labor and capital where none existed. All of them would be
forced to encumber their fragile economies with tens of thousands of
pages of prohibitively costly labor, intellectual property rights,
financial, and environmental regulation. None stands to enjoy the same
benefits as do the more veteran members - notably in agricultural and
regional development funds.
Joining the EU would deliver rude economic and political shocks to the
candidate countries. A brutal and rather sudden introduction of
competition in hitherto much-sheltered sectors of the economy, giving
up recently hard-won sovereignty, shouldering the debilitating cost of
the implementation of reams of guideline, statutes, laws, decrees, and
directives, and being largely powerless to influence policy outcomes.
Faced with such a predicament, some countries may even reconsider.
THE WAR IN IRAQ
The Euro-Atlantic Divide
By: Dr. Sam Vaknin
Also published by United Press International (UPI)
The countries of central and east Europe - especially those slated to
join the European Union (EU) in May next year - are between the
American rock and the European hard place. The Czech republic, Hungary
and Poland, already NATO members, have joined Spain, Britain and other
EU veterans in signing the "letter of eight" in support of US policy in
the Gulf. NATO and EU aspirants - including most of the nations of the
Balkans - followed suit in a joint statement of the Vilnius Group.
The denizens of the region wonder what is meant by "democracy" when
their own governments so blithely ignore public opinion, resolutely set
against the looming conflict. The heads of these newly independent
polities counter by saying that leaders are meant to mold common
perceptions, not merely follow them expediently. The mob opposed the
war against Hitler, they remind us, somewhat non-germanely.
But the political elite of Europe is, indeed, divided.
France is trying to reassert its waning authority over an increasingly
unruly and unmanageably expanding European Union. Yet, the new members
do not share its distaste for American hegemony.
On the contrary, they regard it as a guarantee of their own security.
They still fear the Russians, France's and Germany's new found allies
in the "Axis of Peace" (also known as the Axis of Weasels).
The Czechs, for instance, recall how France (and Britain) sacrificed
them to Nazi Germany in 1938 in the name of realpolitik and the
preservation of peace. They think that America is a far more reliable
sponsor of their long-term safety and prosperity than the fractured
European "Union".
Their dislike of what they regard as America's lightweight leadership
and overt - and suspect - belligerence notwithstanding, the central and
east Europeans are grateful to the United States for its unflinching -
and spectacularly successful - confrontation with communism.
France and Germany - entangled in entente and Ostpolitik, respectively
- cozied up to the Kremlin, partly driven by their Euro-communist
parties. So did Italy. While the Europeans were busy kowtowing to a
repressive USSR and castigating the USA for its warmongering, America
has liberated the Soviet satellites and bankrolled their painful and
protracted transition.
Historical debts aside, America is a suzerain and, as such, it is
irresistible. Succumbing to the will of a Big Power is the rule in east
and central Europe. The nations of the region have mentally substituted
the United States for the Soviet Union as far as geopolitics are
concerned. Brussels took the place of Moscow with regards to economic
issues. The Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, assorted Balkanians, even the
Balts - have merely switched empires.
There are other reasons for these countries' pro-Americanism. The
nations of central, east and southeast (Balkans) Europe have sizable
and economically crucial diasporas in the united States. They admire
and consume American technology and pop culture. Trade with the USA and
foreign direct investment are still small but both are growing fast.
Though the EU is the new and aspiring members' biggest trading partner
and foreign investor - it has, to borrow from Henry Kissinger, no
"single phone number". While France is enmeshed in its Byzantine
machinations, Spain and Britain are trying to obstruct the ominous
re-emergence of French-German dominance.
By catering to popular aversion of America's policies, Germany's
beleaguered Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, is attempting to score
points domestically even as the German economy is imploding.
The euro-Atlantic structures never looked worse. The European Union is
both disunited and losing its European character. NATO has long been a
dysfunctional alliance in search of a purpose. For a while, Balkan
skirmishes provided it with a new lease on life. But now the
Euro-Atlantic alliance has become the Euro-Atlantic divide.
The only clear, consistent and cohesive voice is America's. The new
members of NATO are trying to demonstrate their allegiance - nay,
obsequiousness - to the sole identifiable leader of the free world.
France's bid at European helmsmanship failed because both it and Russia
are biased in favor of the current regime in Iraq. French and Russian
firms have signed more than 1700 commercial contracts with Saddam's
murderous clique while their British and American competitors were
excluded by the policies of their governments.
When sanctions against Iraq are lifted - and providing Saddam or his
hand-picked successor are still in place - Russian energy behemoths are
poised to explore and extract billions of barrels of oil worth dozens
of billions of dollars. Iraq owes Russia $9 billion which Russia wants
repaid.
But the United States would be mistaken to indulge in Schadenfreude or
to gleefully assume that it has finally succeeded in isolating the
insolent French and the somnolent Germans. Public opinion - even where
it carries little weight, like in Britain, or in the Balkans - cannot
be ignored forever.
Furthermore, all the countries of Europe share real concerns about the
stability of the Middle East. A divided Iraq stands to unsettle
neighbours near and far. Turkey has a large Kurdish minority as does
Iran. Conservative regimes in the Gulf fear Iraq's newfound and
American-administered democracy. In the wake of an American attack on
Iraq, Islamic fundamentalism and militancy will surely surge and lead
to a wave of terror. Europe has vested historical, economic and
geopolitical interests in the region, unlike America.
Persistent, unmitigated support for the USA in spite of French-German
exhortations will jeopardize the new and aspiring members' position in
an enlarged EU. Accession is irreversible but they can find themselves
isolated and marginalized in decision making processes and dynamics
long after the Iraqi dust has settled. EU officials already gave public
warnings to this effect.
It is grave error to assume that France and Germany have lost their
pivotal role in the EU. Britain and Spain are second rank members -
Britain by Europhobic choice and Spain because it is too small to
really matter. Russia - a smooth operator - chose to side with France
and Germany, at least temporarily. The new and aspiring members would
have done well to follow suit.
Instead, they have misconstrued the signs of the gathering storm: the
emerging European rapid deployment force and common foreign policy; the
rapprochement between France and Germany at the expense of the
pro-American but far less influential Britain, Italy and Spain; the
constitutional crisis setting European federalists against traditional
nationalists; the growing rupture between "Old Europe" and the American
"hyperpower".
The new and aspiring members of NATO and the EU now face a moment of
truth and are being forced to reveal their hand. Are they pro-American,
or pro-German (read: pro federalist Europe)? Where and with whom do
they see a common, prosperous future? What is the extent of their
commitment to the European Union, its values and its agenda?
The proclamations of the European eight (including the three central
European candidates) and the Vilnius Ten must have greatly disappointed
Germany - the unwavering sponsor of EU enlargement. Any further
flagrant siding with the United States against the inner core of the EU
would merely compound those errors of judgment. The EU can punish the
revenant nations of the communist bloc with the same dedication and
effectiveness with which it has hitherto rewarded them.
THE WAR IN IRAQ
Bulgaria - The Quiet American
By: Dr. Sam Vaknin
Also published by United Press International (UPI)
Last week, Bulgaria, currently sitting on the Security Council, was one
of ten east and southeast European countries - known as the Vilnius
Group - to issue a strongly worded statement in support of the United
States' attempt to disarm Iraq by military means. This followed a
similar, though much milder, earlier statement by eight other European
nations, including Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland, the EU's
prospective members in central Europe.
The Vilnius Ten - including Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia - called
the evidence presented to the Security Council by Colin Powell, the US
Secretary of State - "compelling". Iraq posed a "clear and present
danger" - they concluded.
Bulgaria and Romania pledged free access to their air spaces and
territorial waters. The first US military plane has landed today in the
Safarovo airport in the Black Sea city of Burgas in Bulgaria. Other
members are poised to provide medical staff, anti-mine units and
chemical protection gear.
Such overt obsequiousness did not go unrewarded.
Days after the common statement, the IMF - considered by some to be a
long arm of America's foreign policy - clinched a standby arrangement
with Macedonia, the first in two turbulent years. On the same day,
Bulgaria received glowing - and counterfactual - reviews from yet
another IMF mission, clearing the way for the release of a tranche of
$36 million out of a loan of $330 million.
Partly in response, six members of parliament from the ruling Simeon II
national Movement joined with four independents to form the National
Ideal for Unity. According to Novinite.com, a Bulgarian news Web site,
they asserted that "the new political morale was seriously harmed" and
"accused the government of inefficient economic program of the
government that led to the bad economic situation in the country."
Following the joint Vilnius Group declaration, Albania, Croatia,
Bulgaria and Macedonia received private and public assurances that
their NATO applications now stand a better chance. Bulgaria started the
second round of negotiations with the military alliance yesterday and
expects to become full member next year. The head of the US Committee
on NATO Enlargement Bruce Jackson stated: "I'm sure that Bulgaria has
helped itself very much this week."
Yet, the recent rift in NATO (over Turkish use of the Alliance's
defense assets) pitted Germany, France and Belgium against the rest of
the organization and opposite other EU member states. It casts in doubt
the wisdom of the Vilnius Group's American gambit. The countries of
central and east Europe may admire the United States and its superpower
clout - but, far more vitally, they depend on Europe, economically as
well as politically.
Even put together, these polities are barely inconsequential. They are
presumptuous to assume the role of intermediaries between a
disenchanted Franco-German Entente Cordiale and a glowering America.
Nor can they serve as "US Ambassadors" in the European corridors of
power.
The European Union absorbs two thirds of their exports and three
quarters of their immigrants. Europe accounts for nine tenths of
foreign direct investment in the region and four fifths of aid. For the
likes of the Czech Republic and Croatia to support the United states
against Germany is nothing short of economic suicide.
Moreover, the United States is a demanding master. It tends to
micromanage and meddle in everything, from election outcomes to
inter-ethnic relations. James Purdew, America's ambassador to Sofia and
a veteran Balkan power broker, spent the last few weeks exerting
pressure on the Bulgarian government, in tandem with the aforementioned
Bruce Jackson, to oust the country's Prosecutor General and reinstate
the (socialist) head of the National Investigation Services.
Bulgaria is already by far the most heavily enmeshed in US military
operations in Asia. It served as a launch pad for US planes during the
Afghanistan campaign in 2001-2. It stands to be affected directly by
the looming war.
Bulgaria is on the route of illicit immigration from Iraq, Palestine
and Iran, via Turkey, to Greece and therefrom to the EU. Last Friday
alone, it detained 43 Iraqi refugees caught cruising Sofia in two
Turkish trucks on the way to the Greek border.
The Ministry of Interior admitted that it expects a "massive flow of
(crossing) refugees" if an armed conflict were to erupt.
The Minister of Finance, Milen Velchev, intends to present to the
Council of Ministers detailed damage scenarios based on a hike in the
price of oil to $40 per barrel and a 3-4 months long confrontation. He
admitted to the Bulgarian National Radio that inflation is likely to
increase by at least 1-1.5 percentage points.
The daily cost of a single 150-member biological and chemical defense
unit stationed in the Gulf would amount to $15,000, or c. $500,000 per
month, said the Bulgarian news agency, BTA. The Minister of Defense,
Nikolai Svinarov, told the Cabinet that he expects "maximum (American)
funding and logistical support" for the Bulgarian troops. The United
States intends to base c. 400 soldiers-technicians and 18 planes on the
country's soil and will pay for making use of the infrastructure, as
they have done during operation "Enduring Freedom" (the war in
Afghanistan).
Bulgaria stands to benefit in other ways. The country's Deputy Foreign
Minister, Lyubomir Ivanov, confirmed in another radio interview that
the Americans pledged that Iraqi debts to Bulgaria will be fully paid.
This can amount to dozens of millions of US dollars in fresh money.
Is this Bulgaria's price? Unlikely. Bulgaria, like the other countries
of the region, regards America as the first among equals in NATO. The
EU is perceived in east Europe as a toothless, though rich, club,
corrupted by its own economic interests and inexorably driven by its
bloated bureaucracy.
The EU and its goodwill and stake in the region are taken for granted -
while America has to be constantly appeased and mollified.
Still, the members of the Vilnius Groups have misconstrued the signs of
the gathering storm: the emerging European rapid deployment force and
common foreign policy; the rapprochement between France and Germany at
the expense of the pro-American but far less influential Britain, Italy
and Spain; the constitutional crisis setting European federalists
against traditional nationalists; the growing rupture between "Old
Europe" and the American "hyperpower".
The new and aspiring members of NATO and the EU now face a moment of
truth and are being forced to reveal their hand. Are they pro-American,
or pro-German (read: pro federalist Europe)? Where and with whom do
they see a common, prosperous future? What is the extent of their
commitment to the European Union, its values and its agenda?
The proclamations of the European eight (including the three central
European candidates) and the Vilnius Ten must have greatly disappointed
Germany - the unwavering sponsor of EU enlargement. Any further
flagrant siding with the United States against the inner core of the EU
would merely compound those errors of judgment. The EU can punish the
revenant nations of the communist bloc with the same dedication and
effectiveness with which it has hitherto rewarded them. Ask Israel, it
should know.
THE WAR IN IRAQ
Russia Straddles the Euro-Atlantic Divide
By: Dr. Sam Vaknin
Also published by United Press International (UPI)
Also Read
The Janus Look
Russia's Second Empire
Russian Roulette - The Security Apparatus
Russia as a Creditor
Let My People Go - The Jackson-Vanik Controversy
The Chechen Theatre Ticket
Russia's Israeli Oil Bond
Russia's Idled Spies
Russia in 2003
Russian President Vladimir Putin warned on Tuesday, in an interview he
granted to TF1, a French television channel, that unilateral
American-British military action against Iraq would be a "grave
mistake" and an "unreasonable use of force".
Russia might veto it in the Security Council, he averred. In a joint
declaration with France and Germany, issued the same day, he called to
enhance the number of arms inspectors in Iraq as an alternative to war.
Only weeks ago Russia was written off, not least by myself, as a
satellite of the United States. This newfound assertiveness has
confounded analysts and experts everywhere. Yet, appearances aside, it
does not signal a fundamental shift in Russian policy or worldview.
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