The Thirty Years War, Book IV.
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Frederich Schiller >> The Thirty Years War, Book IV.
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THE WORKS
OF
FREDERICK SCHILLER
Translated from the German
Illustrated
HISTORY OF THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR IN GERMANY.
BOOK IV.
The weak bond of union, by which Gustavus Adolphus contrived to hold
together the Protestant members of the empire, was dissolved by his
death: the allies were now again at liberty, and their alliance, to
last, must be formed anew. By the former event, if unremedied, they
would lose all the advantages they had gained at the cost of so much
bloodshed, and expose themselves to the inevitable danger of becoming
one after the other the prey of an enemy, whom, by their union alone,
they had been able to oppose and to master. Neither Sweden, nor any of
the states of the empire, was singly a match with the Emperor and the
League; and, by seeking a peace under the present state of things, they
would necessarily be obliged to receive laws from the enemy. Union was,
therefore, equally indispensable, either for concluding a peace or
continuing the war. But a peace, sought under the present
circumstances, could not fail to be disadvantageous to the allied
powers. With the death of Gustavus Adolphus, the enemy had formed new
hopes; and however gloomy might be the situation of his affairs after
the battle of Lutzen, still the death of his dreaded rival was an event
too disastrous to the allies, and too favourable for the Emperor, not to
justify him in entertaining the most brilliant expectations, and not to
encourage him to the prosecution of the war. Its inevitable
consequence, for the moment at least, must be want of union among the
allies, and what might not the Emperor and the League gain from such a
division of their enemies? He was not likely to sacrifice such
prospects, as the present turn of affairs held out to him, for any
peace, not highly beneficial to himself; and such a peace the allies
would not be disposed to accept. They naturally determined, therefore,
to continue the war, and for this purpose, the maintenance of the
existing union was acknowledged to be indispensable.
But how was this union to be renewed? and whence were to be derived the
necessary means for continuing the war? It was not the power of Sweden,
but the talents and personal influence of its late king, which had given
him so overwhelming an influence in Germany, so great a command over the
minds of men; and even he had innumerable difficulties to overcome,
before he could establish among the states even a weak and wavering
alliance. With his death vanished all, which his personal qualities
alone had rendered practicable; and the mutual obligation of the states
seemed to cease with the hopes on which it had been founded. Several
impatiently threw off the yoke which had always been irksome; others
hastened to seize the helm which they had unwillingly seen in the hands
of Gustavus, but which, during his lifetime, they did not dare to
dispute with him. Some were tempted, by the seductive promises of the
Emperor, to abandon the alliance; others, oppressed by the heavy burdens
of a fourteen years' war, longed for the repose of peace, upon any
conditions, however ruinous. The generals of the army, partly German
princes, acknowledged no common head, and no one would stoop to receive
orders from another. Unanimity vanished alike from the cabinet and the
field, and their common weal was threatened with ruin, by the spirit of
disunion.
Gustavus had left no male heir to the crown of Sweden: his daughter
Christina, then six years old, was the natural heir. The unavoidable
weakness of a regency, suited ill with that energy and resolution, which
Sweden would be called upon to display in this trying conjuncture. The
wide reaching mind of Gustavus Adolphus had raised this unimportant, and
hitherto unknown kingdom, to a rank among the powers of Europe, which it
could not retain without the fortune and genius of its author, and from
which it could not recede, without a humiliating confession of weakness.
Though the German war had been conducted chiefly on the resources of
Germany, yet even the small contribution of men and money, which Sweden
furnished, had sufficed to exhaust the finances of that poor kingdom,
and the peasantry groaned beneath the imposts necessarily laid upon
them. The plunder gained in Germany enriched only a few individuals,
among the nobles and the soldiers, while Sweden itself remained poor as
before. For a time, it is true, the national glory reconciled the
subject to these burdens, and the sums exacted, seemed but as a loan
placed at interest, in the fortunate hand of Gustavus Adolphus, to be
richly repaid by the grateful monarch at the conclusion of a glorious
peace. But with the king's death this hope vanished, and the deluded
people now loudly demanded relief from their burdens.
But the spirit of Gustavus Adolphus still lived in the men to whom he
had confided the administration of the kingdom. However dreadful to
them, and unexpected, was the intelligence of his death, it did not
deprive them of their manly courage; and the spirit of ancient Rome,
under the invasion of Brennus and Hannibal, animated this noble
assembly. The greater the price, at which these hard-gained advantages
had been purchased, the less readily could they reconcile themselves to
renounce them: not unrevenged was a king to be sacrificed. Called on
to choose between a doubtful and exhausting war, and a profitable but
disgraceful peace, the Swedish council of state boldly espoused the side
of danger and honour; and with agreeable surprise, men beheld this
venerable senate acting with all the energy and enthusiasm of youth.
Surrounded with watchful enemies, both within and without, and
threatened on every side with danger, they armed themselves against them
all, with equal prudence and heroism, and laboured to extend their
kingdom, even at the moment when they had to struggle for its existence.
The decease of the king, and the minority of his daughter Christina,
renewed the claims of Poland to the Swedish throne; and King Ladislaus,
the son of Sigismund, spared no intrigues to gain a party in Sweden. On
this ground, the regency lost no time in proclaiming the young queen,
and arranging the administration of the regency. All the officers of
the kingdom were summoned to do homage to their new princess; all
correspondence with Poland prohibited, and the edicts of previous
monarchs against the heirs of Sigismund, confirmed by a solemn act of
the nation. The alliance with the Czar of Muscovy was carefully
renewed, in order, by the arms of this prince, to keep the hostile Poles
in check. The death of Gustavus Adolphus had put an end to the jealousy
of Denmark, and removed the grounds of alarm which had stood in the way
of a good understanding between the two states. The representations by
which the enemy sought to stir up Christian IV. against Sweden were no
longer listened to; and the strong wish the Danish monarch entertained
for the marriage of his son Ulrick with the young princess, combined,
with the dictates of a sounder policy, to incline him to a neutrality.
At the same time, England, Holland, and France came forward with the
gratifying assurances to the regency of continued friendship and
support, and encouraged them, with one voice, to prosecute with activity
the war, which hitherto had been conducted with so much glory. Whatever
reason France might have to congratulate itself on the death of the
Swedish conqueror, it was as fully sensible of the expediency of
maintaining the alliance with Sweden. Without exposing itself to great
danger, it could not allow the power of Sweden to sink in Germany. Want
of resources of its own, would either drive Sweden to conclude a hasty
and disadvantageous peace with Austria, and then all the past efforts to
lower the ascendancy of this dangerous power would be thrown away; or
necessity and despair would drive the armies to extort from the Roman
Catholic states the means of support, and France would then be regarded
as the betrayer of those very states, who had placed themselves under
her powerful protection. The death of Gustavus, far from breaking up
the alliance between France and Sweden, had only rendered it more
necessary for both, and more profitable for France. Now, for the first
time, since he was dead who had stretched his protecting arm over
Germany, and guarded its frontiers against the encroaching designs of
France, could the latter safely pursue its designs upon Alsace, and thus
be enabled to sell its aid to the German Protestants at a dearer rate.
Strengthened by these alliances, secured in its interior, and defended
from without by strong frontier garrisons and fleets, the regency did
not delay an instant to continue a war, by which Sweden had little of
its own to lose, while, if success attended its arms, one or more of the
German provinces might be won, either as a conquest, or indemnification
of its expenses. Secure amidst its seas, Sweden, even if driven out of
Germany, would scarcely be exposed to greater peril, than if it
voluntarily retired from the contest, while the former measure was as
honourable, as the latter was disgraceful. The more boldness the
regency displayed, the more confidence would they inspire among their
confederates, the more respect among their enemies, and the more
favourable conditions might they anticipate in the event of peace. If
they found themselves too weak to execute the wide-ranging projects of
Gustavus, they at least owed it to this lofty model to do their utmost,
and to yield to no difficulty short of absolute necessity. Alas, that
motives of self-interest had too great a share in this noble
determination, to demand our unqualified admiration! For those who had
nothing themselves to suffer from the calamities of war, but were rather
to be enriched by it, it was an easy matter to resolve upon its
continuation; for the German empire was, in the end, to defray the
expenses; and the provinces on which they reckoned, would be cheaply
purchased with the few troops they sacrificed to them, and with the
generals who were placed at the head of armies, composed for the most
part of Germans, and with the honourable superintendence of all the
operations, both military and political.
But this superintendence was irreconcileable with the distance of the
Swedish regency from the scene of action, and with the slowness which
necessarily accompanies all the movements of a council.
To one comprehensive mind must be intrusted the management of Swedish
interests in Germany, and with full powers to determine at discretion
all questions of war and peace, the necessary alliances, or the
acquisitions made. With dictatorial power, and with the whole influence
of the crown which he was to represent, must this important magistrate
be invested, in order to maintain its dignity, to enforce united and
combined operations, to give effect to his orders, and to supply the
place of the monarch whom he succeeded. Such a man was found in the
Chancellor Oxenstiern, the first minister, and what is more, the friend
of the deceased king, who, acquainted with all the secrets of his
master, versed in the politics of Germany, and in the relations of all
the states of Europe, was unquestionably the fittest instrument to carry
out the plans of Gustavus Adolphus in their full extent.
Oxenstiern was on his way to Upper Germany, in order to assemble the
four Upper Circles, when the news of the king's death reached him at
Hanau. This was a heavy blow, both to the friend and the statesman.
Sweden, indeed, had lost but a king, Germany a protector; but
Oxenstiern, the author of his fortunes, the friend of his soul, and the
object of his admiration. Though the greatest sufferer in the general
loss, he was the first who by his energy rose from the blow, and the
only one qualified to repair it. His penetrating glance foresaw all the
obstacles which would oppose the execution of his plans, the
discouragement of the estates, the intrigues of hostile courts, the
breaking up of the confederacy, the jealousy of the leaders, and the
dislike of princes of the empire to submit to foreign authority. But
even this deep insight into the existing state of things, which revealed
the whole extent of the evil, showed him also the means by which it
might be overcome. It was essential to revive the drooping courage of
the weaker states, to meet the secret machinations of the enemy, to
allay the jealousy of the more powerful allies, to rouse the friendly
powers, and France in particular, to active assistance; but above all,
to repair the ruined edifice of the German alliance, and to reunite the
scattered strength of the party by a close and permanent bond of union.
The dismay which the loss of their leader occasioned the German
Protestants, might as readily dispose them to a closer alliance with
Sweden, as to a hasty peace with the Emperor; and it depended entirely
upon the course pursued, which of these alternatives they would adopt.
Every thing might be lost by the slightest sign of despondency; nothing,
but the confidence which Sweden showed in herself, could kindle among
the Germans a noble feeling of self-confidence. All the attempts of
Austria, to detach these princes from the Swedish alliance, would be
unavailing, the moment their eyes became opened to their true interests,
and they were instigated to a public and formal breach with the Emperor.
Before these measures could be taken, and the necessary points settled
between the regency and their minister, a precious opportunity of action
would, it is true, be lost to the Swedish army, of which the enemy would
be sure to take the utmost advantage. It was, in short, in the power of
the Emperor totally to ruin the Swedish interest in Germany, and to this
he was actually invited by the prudent councils of the Duke of
Friedland. Wallenstein advised him to proclaim a universal amnesty, and
to meet the Protestant states with favourable conditions. In the first
consternation produced by the fall of Gustavus Adolphus, such a
declaration would have had the most powerful effects, and probably would
have brought the wavering states back to their allegiance. But blinded
by this unexpected turn of fortune, and infatuated by Spanish counsels,
he anticipated a more brilliant issue from war, and, instead of
listening to these propositions of an accommodation, he hastened to
augment his forces. Spain, enriched by the grant of the tenth of the
ecclesiastical possessions, which the pope confirmed, sent him
considerable supplies, negociated for him at the Saxon court, and
hastily levied troops for him in Italy to be employed in Germany. The
Elector of Bavaria also considerably increased his military force; and
the restless disposition of the Duke of Lorraine did not permit him to
remain inactive in this favourable change of fortune. But while the
enemy were thus busy to profit by the disaster of Sweden, Oxenstiern was
diligent to avert its most fatal consequences.
Less apprehensive of open enemies, than of the jealousy of the friendly
powers, he left Upper Germany, which he had secured by conquests and
alliances, and set out in person to prevent a total defection of the
Lower German states, or, what would have been almost equally ruinous to
Sweden, a private alliance among themselves. Offended at the boldness
with which the chancellor assumed the direction of affairs, and inwardly
exasperated at the thought of being dictated to by a Swedish nobleman,
the Elector of Saxony again meditated a dangerous separation from
Sweden; and the only question in his mind was, whether he should make
full terms with the Emperor, or place himself at the head of the
Protestants and form a third party in Germany. Similar ideas were
cherished by Duke Ulric of Brunswick, who, indeed, showed them openly
enough by forbidding the Swedes from recruiting within his dominions,
and inviting the Lower Saxon states to Luneburg, for the purpose of
forming a confederacy among themselves. The Elector of Brandenburg,
jealous of the influence which Saxony was likely to attain in Lower
Germany, alone manifested any zeal for the interests of the Swedish
throne, which, in thought, he already destined for his son. At the
court of Saxony, Oxenstiern was no doubt honourably received; but,
notwithstanding the personal efforts of the Elector of Brandenburg,
empty promises of continued friendship were all which he could obtain.
With the Duke of Brunswick he was more successful, for with him he
ventured to assume a bolder tone. Sweden was at the time in possession
of the See of Magdeburg, the bishop of which had the power of assembling
the Lower Saxon circle. The chancellor now asserted the rights of the
crown, and by this spirited proceeding, put a stop for the present to
this dangerous assembly designed by the duke. The main object, however,
of his present journey and of his future endeavours, a general
confederacy of the Protestants, miscarried entirely, and he was obliged
to content himself with some unsteady alliances in the Saxon circles,
and with the weaker assistance of Upper Germany.
As the Bavarians were too powerful on the Danube, the assembly of the
four Upper Circles, which should have been held at Ulm, was removed to
Heilbronn, where deputies of more than twelve cities of the empire, with
a brilliant crowd of doctors, counts, and princes, attended. The
ambassadors of foreign powers likewise, France, England, and Holland,
attended this Congress, at which Oxenstiern appeared in person, with all
the splendour of the crown whose representative he was. He himself
opened the proceedings, and conducted the deliberations. After
receiving from all the assembled estates assurances of unshaken
fidelity, perseverance, and unity, he required of them solemnly and
formally to declare the Emperor and the league as enemies. But
desirable as it was for Sweden to exasperate the ill-feeling between the
emperor and the estates into a formal rupture, the latter, on the other
hand, were equally indisposed to shut out the possibility of
reconciliation, by so decided a step, and to place themselves entirely
in the hands of the Swedes. They maintained, that any formal
declaration of war was useless and superfluous, where the act would
speak for itself, and their firmness on this point silenced at last the
chancellor. Warmer disputes arose on the third and principal article of
the treaty, concerning the means of prosecuting the war, and the quota
which the several states ought to furnish for the support of the army.
Oxenstiern's maxim, to throw as much as possible of the common burden on
the states, did not suit very well with their determination to give as
little as possible. The Swedish chancellor now experienced, what had
been felt by thirty emperors before him, to their cost, that of all
difficult undertakings, the most difficult was to extort money from the
Germans. Instead of granting the necessary sums for the new armies to
be raised, they eloquently dwelt upon the calamities occasioned by the
former, and demanded relief from the old burdens, when they were
required to submit to new. The irritation which the chancellor's demand
for money raised among the states, gave rise to a thousand complaints;
and the outrages committed by the troops, in their marches and quarters,
were dwelt upon with a startling minuteness and truth.
In the service of two absolute monarchs, Oxenstiern had but little
opportunity to become accustomed to the formalities and cautious
proceedings of republican deliberations, or to bear opposition with
patience. Ready to act, the instant the necessity of action was
apparent, and inflexible in his resolution, when he had once taken it,
he was at a loss to comprehend the inconsistency of most men, who, while
they desire the end, are yet averse to the means. Prompt and impetuous
by nature, he was so on this occasion from principle; for every thing
depended on concealing the weakness of Sweden, under a firm and
confident speech, and by assuming the tone of a lawgiver, really to
become so. It was nothing wonderful, therefore, if, amidst these
interminable discussions with German doctors and deputies, he was
entirely out of his sphere, and if the deliberateness which
distinguishes the character of the Germans in their public
deliberations, had driven him almost to despair. Without respecting a
custom, to which even the most powerful of the emperors had been obliged
to conform, he rejected all written deliberations which suited so well
with the national slowness of resolve. He could not conceive how ten
days could be spent in debating a measure, which with himself was
decided upon its bare suggestion. Harshly, however, as he treated the
States, he found them ready enough to assent to his fourth motion, which
concerned himself. When he pointed out the necessity of giving a head
and a director to the new confederation, that honour was unanimously
assigned to Sweden, and he himself was humbly requested to give to the
common cause the benefit of his enlightened experience, and to take upon
himself the burden of the supreme command. But in order to prevent his
abusing the great powers thus conferred upon him, it was proposed, not
without French influence, to appoint a number of overseers, in fact,
under the name of assistants, to control the expenditure of the common
treasure, and to consult with him as to the levies, marches, and
quarterings of the troops. Oxenstiern long and strenuously resisted
this limitation of his authority, which could not fail to trammel him in
the execution of every enterprise requiring promptitude or secrecy, and
at last succeeded, with difficulty, in obtaining so far a modification
of it, that his management in affairs of war was to be uncontrolled.
The chancellor finally approached the delicate point of the
indemnification which Sweden was to expect at the conclusion of the war,
from the gratitude of the allies, and flattered himself with the hope
that Pomerania, the main object of Sweden, would be assigned to her, and
that he would obtain from the provinces, assurances of effectual
cooperation in its acquisition. But he could obtain nothing more than a
vague assurance, that in a general peace the interests of all parties
would be attended to. That on this point, the caution of the estates
was not owing to any regard for the constitution of the empire, became
manifest from the liberality they evinced towards the chancellor, at the
expense of the most sacred laws of the empire. They were ready to grant
him the archbishopric of Mentz, (which he already held as a conquest,)
and only with difficulty did the French ambassador succeed in preventing
a step, which was as impolitic as it was disgraceful. Though on the
whole, the result of the congress had fallen far short of Oxenstiern's
expectations, he had at least gained for himself and his crown his main
object, namely, the direction of the whole confederacy; he had also
succeeded in strengthening the bond of union between the four upper
circles, and obtained from the states a yearly contribution of two
millions and a half of dollars, for the maintenance of the army.
These concessions on the part of the States, demanded some return from
Sweden. A few weeks after the death of Gustavus Adolphus, sorrow ended
the days of the unfortunate Elector Palatine. For eight months he had
swelled the pomp of his protector's court, and expended on it the small
remainder of his patrimony. He was, at last, approaching the goal of
his wishes, and the prospect of a brighter future was opening, when
death deprived him of his protector. But what he regarded as the
greatest calamity, was highly favourable to his heirs. Gustavus might
venture to delay the restoration of his dominions, or to load the gift
with hard conditions; but Oxenstiern, to whom the friendship of England,
Holland, and Brandenburg, and the good opinion of the Reformed States
were indispensable, felt the necessity of immediately fulfilling the
obligations of justice. At this assembly, at Heilbronn, therefore, he
engaged to surrender to Frederick's heirs the whole Palatinate, both the
part already conquered, and that which remained to be conquered, with
the exception of Manheim, which the Swedes were to hold, until they
should be indemnified for their expenses. The Chancellor did not
confine his liberality to the family of the Palatine alone; the other
allied princes received proofs, though at a later period, of the
gratitude of Sweden, which, however, she dispensed at little cost to
herself.
Impartiality, the most sacred obligation of the historian, here compels
us to an admission, not much to the honour of the champions of German
liberty. However the Protestant Princes might boast of the justice of
their cause, and the sincerity of their conviction, still the motives
from which they acted were selfish enough; and the desire of stripping
others of their possessions, had at least as great a share in the
commencement of hostilities, as the fear of being deprived of their own.
Gustavus soon found that he might reckon much more on these selfish
motives, than on their patriotic zeal, and did not fail to avail himself
of them. Each of his confederates received from him the promise of some
possession, either already wrested, or to be afterwards taken from the
enemy; and death alone prevented him from fulfilling these engagements.
What prudence had suggested to the king, necessity now prescribed to his
successor. If it was his object to continue the war, he must be ready
to divide the spoil among the allies, and promise them advantages from
the confusion which it was his object to continue. Thus he promised to
the Landgrave of Hesse, the abbacies of Paderborn, Corvey, Munster, and
Fulda; to Duke Bernard of Weimar, the Franconian Bishoprics; to the Duke
of Wirtemberg, the Ecclesiastical domains, and the Austrian counties
lying within his territories, all under the title of fiefs of Sweden.
This spectacle, so strange and so dishonourable to the German character,
surprised the Chancellor, who found it difficult to repress his
contempt, and on one occasion exclaimed, "Let it be writ in our records,
for an everlasting memorial, that a German prince made such a request of
a Swedish nobleman, and that the Swedish nobleman granted it to the
German upon German ground!"