The Ethics

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PROP. XXIV. If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an
object of our hate, we shall feel hatred towards him also. If we
conceive that he painfully affects that said object, we shall
feel love towards him.
Proof.-This proposition is proved in the same way as III.
xxii., which see.
Note.-These and similar emotions of hatred are attributable
to envy, which, accordingly, is nothing else but hatred, in so
far as it is regarded as disposing a man to rejoice in another's
hurt, and to grieve at another's advantage.

PROP. XXV. We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves, and
concerning what we love, everything that we can conceive to
affect pleasurably ourselves, or the loved object. Contrariwise,
we endeavour to negative everything, which we conceive to affect
painfully ourselves or the loved object.
Proof.-That, which we conceive to affect an object of our
love pleasurably or painfully, affects us also pleasurably or
painfully (III. xxi.). But the mind (III. xii.) endeavours, as
far as possible, to conceive those things which affect us
pleasurably ; in other words (II. xvii. and Coroll.), it
endeavours to regard them as present. And, contrariwise (III.
xiii.), it endeavours to exclude the existence of such things as
affect us painfully ; therefore, we endeavour to affirm
concerning ourselves, and concerning the loved object, whatever
we conceive to affect ourselves, or the love object pleasurably.
Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVI. We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we
hate, everything which we conceive to affect it painfully ; and,
contrariwise, we endeavour to deny, concerning it, everything
which we conceive to affect it pleasurably.
Proof.-This proposition follows from III. xxiii., as the
foregoing proposition followed from III. xxi.
Note.-Thus we see that it may readily happen, that a man may
easily think too highly of himself, or a loved object, and,
contrariwise, too meanly of a hated object. This feeling is
called pride, in reference to the man who thinks too highly of
himself, and is a species of madness, wherein a man dreams with
his eyes open, thinking that he can accomplish all things that
fall within the scope of his conception, and thereupon accounting
them real, and exulting in them, so long as he is unable to
conceive anything which excludes their existence, and determines
his own power of action. Pride, therefore, is pleasure springing
from a man thinking too highly of himself. Again, the pleasure
which arises from a man thinking too highly of another is called
over-esteem. Whereas the pleasure which arises from thinking too
little of a man is called disdain.

PROP. XXVII. By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which is
like ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion,
to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a
like emotion (affectus).
Proof.-The images of things are modifications of the human
body, whereof the ideas represent external bodies as present to
us (II. xvii.) ; in other words (II. x.), whereof the ideas
involve the nature of our body, and, at the same time, the nature
of the external bodies as present. If, therefore, the nature of
the external body be similar to the nature of our body, then the
idea which we form of the external body will involve a
modification of our own body similar to the modification of the
external body. Consequently, if we conceive anyone similar to
ourselves as affected by any emotion, this conception will
express a modification of our body similar to that emotion.
Thus, from the fact of conceiving a thing like ourselves to be
affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like
emotion. If, however, we hate the said thing like ourselves, we
shall, to that extent, be affected by a contrary, and not
similar, emotion. Q.E.D.
Note I.-This imitation of emotions, when it is referred to
pain, is called compassion (cf. III. xxii. note) ; when it is
referred to desire, it is called emulation, which is nothing else
but the desire of anything, engendered in us by the fact that we
conceive that others have the like desire.
Corollary I.-If we conceive that anyone, whom we have
hitherto regarded with no emotion, pleasurably affects something
similar to ourselves, we shall be affected with love towards him.
If, on the other hand, we conceive that he painfully affects the
same, we shall be affected with hatred towards him.
Proof.-This is proved from the last proposition in the same
manner as III. xxii. is proved from III. xxi.
Corollary II.-We cannot hate a thing which we pity, because
its misery affects us painfully.
Proof.-If we could hate it for this reason, we should rejoice
in its pain, which is contrary to the hypothesis.
Corollary III.-We seek to free from misery, as far as we can,
a thing which we pity.
Proof.-That, which painfully affects the object of our pity,
affects us also with similar pain (by the foregoing proposition)
; therefore, we shall endeavour to recall everything which
removes its existence, or which destroys it (cf. III. xiii.) ; in
other words (III. ix. note), we shall desire to destroy it, or we
shall be determined for its destruction ; thus, we shall
endeavour to free from misery a thing which we pity. Q.E.D.
Note II.-This will or appetite for doing good, which arises
from pity of the thing whereon we would confer a benefit, is
called benevolence, and is nothing else but desire arising from
compassion. Concerning love or hate towards him who has done
good or harm to something, which we conceive to be like
ourselves, see III. xxii. note.

PROP. XXVIII. We endeavour to bring about whatsoever we conceive
to conduce to pleasure ; but we endeavour to remove or destroy
whatsoever we conceive to be truly repugnant thereto, or to
conduce to pain.
Proof.-We endeavour, as far as possible, to conceive that
which we imagine to conduce to pleasure (III. xii.) ; in other
words (II. xvii.) we shall endeavour to conceive it as far as
possible as present or actually existing. But the endeavour of
the mind, or the mind's power of thought, is equal to, and
simultaneous with, the endeavour of the body, or the body's power
of action. (This is clear from II. vii. Coroll. and II. xi.
Coroll.). Therefore we make an absolute endeavour for its
existence, in other words (which by III. ix. note, come to the
same thing) we desire and strive for it ; this was our first
point. Again, if we conceive that something, which we believed
to be the cause of pain, that is (III. xiii. note), which we
hate, is destroyed, we shall rejoice (III. xx.). We shall,
therefore (by the first part of this proof), endeavour to destroy
the same, or (III. xiii.) to remove it from us, so that we may
not regard it as present ; this was our second point. Wherefore
whatsoever conduces to pleasure, &c. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXIX. We shall also endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive
men6 to regard with pleasure, and contrariwise we shall shrink
from doing that which we conceive men to shrink from.
Proof.-From the fact of imagining, that men love or hate
anything, we shall love or hate the same thing (III. xxvii.).
That is (III. xiii. note), from this mere fact we shall feel
pleasure or pain at the thing's presence. And so we shall
endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive men to love or regard with
pleasure, etc. Q.E.D.
Note.-This endeavour to do a thing or leave it undone, solely
in order to please men, we call ambition, especially when we so
eagerly endeavour to please the vulgar, that we do or omit
certain things to our own or another's hurt : in other cases it
is generally called kindliness. Furthermore I give the name of
praise to the pleasure, with which we conceive the action of
another, whereby he has endeavoured to please us ; but of blame
to the pain wherewith we feel aversion to his action.

PROP. XXX. If anyone has done something which he conceives as
affecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected by pleasure,
accompanied by the idea of himself as cause ; in other words, he
will regard himself with pleasure. On the other hand, if he has
done anything which he conceives as affecting others painfully,
he will regard himself with pain.
Proof.-He who conceives, that he affects others with pleasure
or pain, will, by that very fact, himself be affected with
pleasure or pain (III. xxvii.), but, as a man (II. xix. and
xxiii.) is conscious of himself through the modifications whereby
he is determined to action, it follows that he who conceives,
that he affects others pleasurably, will be affected with
pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause ; in other
words, he will regard himself with pleasure. And so mutatis
mutandis in the case of pain. Q.E.D.
Note.-As love (III. xiii.) is pleasure accompanied by the
idea of an external cause, and hatred is pain accompanied by the
idea of an external cause ; the pleasure and pain in question
will be a species of love and hatred. But, as the terms love and
hatred are used in reference to external objects, we will employ
other names for the emotions now under discussion : pleasure
accompanied by the idea of an external cause7 we will style
Honour, and the emotion contrary thereto we will style Shame : I
mean in such cases as where pleasure or pain arises from a man's
belief, that he is being praised or blamed : otherwise pleasure
accompanied by the idea of an external cause8 is called
self-complacency, and its contrary pain is called repentance.
Again, as it may happen (II. xvii. Coroll.) that the pleasure,
wherewith a man conceives that he affects others, may exist
solely in his own imagination, and as (III. xxv.) everyone
endeavours to conceive concerning himself that which he conceives
will affect him with pleasure, it may easily come to pass that a
vain man may be proud and may imagine that he is pleasing to all,
when in reality he may be an annoyance to all.

PROP. XXXI. If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hates
anything which we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall
thereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfast love,
&c. On the contrary, if we think that anyone shrinks from
something that we love, we shall undergo vacillations of soul.
Proof.-From the mere fact of conceiving that anyone loves
anything we shall ourselves love that thing (III. xxvii.) : but
we are assumed to love it already ; there is, therefore, a new
cause of love, whereby our former emotion is fostered ; hence we
shall thereupon love it more steadfastly. Again, from the mere
fact of conceiving that anyone shrinks from anything, we shall
ourselves shrink from that thing (III. xxvii.). If we assume
that we at the same time love it, we shall then simultaneously
love it and shrink from it ; in other words, we shall be subject
to vacillation (III. xvii. note). Q.E.D.
Corollary.-From the foregoing, and also from III. xxviii. it
follows that everyone endeavours, as far as possible, to cause
others to love what he himself loves, and to hate what he himself
hates : as the poet says : "As lovers let us share every hope
and every fear : ironhearted were he who should love what the
other leaves."9
Note.-This endeavour to bring it about, that our own likes
and dislikes should meet with universal approval, is really
ambition (see III. xxix. note) ; wherefore we see that everyone
by nature desires (appetere), that the rest of mankind should
live according to his own individual disposition : when such a
desire is equally present in all, everyone stands in everyone
else's way, and in wishing to be loved or praised by all, all
become mutually hateful.

PROP. XXXII. If we conceive that anyone takes delight in
something, which only one person can possess, we shall endeavour
to bring it about that the man in question shall not gain
possession thereof.
Proof.-From the mere fact of our conceiving that another
person takes delight in a thing (III. xxvii. and Coroll.) we
shall ourselves love that thing and desire to take delight
therein. But we assumed that the pleasure in question would be
prevented by another's delight in its object ; we shall,
therefore, endeavour to prevent his possession thereof (III.
xxviii.). Q.E.D.
Note.-We thus see that man's nature is generally so
constituted, that he takes pity on those who fare ill, and envies
those who fare well with an amount of hatred proportioned to his
own love for the goods in their possession. Further, we see that
from the same property of human nature, whence it follows that
men are merciful, it follows also that they are envious and
ambitious. Lastly, if we make appeal to Experience, we shall
find that she entirely confirms what we have said ; more
especially if we turn our attention to the first years of our
life. We find that children, whose body is continually, as it
were, in equilibrium, laugh or cry simply because they see others
laughing or crying ; moreover, they desire forthwith to imitate
whatever they see others doing, and to possess themselves of
whatever they conceive as delighting others : inasmuch as the
images of things are, as we have said, modifications of the human
body, or modes wherein the human body is affected and disposed by
external causes to act in this or that manner.

PROP. XXXIII. When we love a thing similar to ourselves we
endeavour, as far as we can, to bring about that it should love
us in return.
Proof.-That which we love we endeavour, as far as we can, to
conceive in preference to anything else (III. xii.). If the
thing be similar to ourselves, we shall endeavour to affect it
pleasurably in preference to anything else (III. xxix.). In
other words, we shall endeavour, as far as we can, to bring it
about, that the thing should be affected with pleasure
accompanied by the idea of ourselves, that is (III. xiii. note),
that it should love us in return. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXIV. The greater the emotion with which we conceive a
loved object to be affected towards us, the greater will be our
complacency.
Proof.-We endeavour (III. xxxiii.), as far as we can, to
bring about, that what we love should love us in return : in
other words, that what we love should be affected with pleasure
accompanied by the idea of ourself as cause. Therefore, in
proportion as the loved object is more pleasurably affected
because of us, our endeavour will be assisted.-that is (III. xi.
and note) the greater will be our pleasure. But when we take
pleasure in the fact, that we pleasurably affect something
similar to ourselves, we regard ourselves with pleasure (III. 30)
; therefore the greater the emotion with which we conceive a
loved object to be affected, &c. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXV. If anyone conceives, that an object of his love
joins itself to another with closer bonds of friendship than he
himself has attained to, he will be affected with hatred towards
the loved object and with envy towards his rival.
Proof.-In proportion as a man thinks, that a loved object is
well affected towards him, will be the strength of his
self-approval (by the last Prop.), that is (III. xxx. note), of
his pleasure ; he will, therefore (III. xxviii.), endeavour, as
far as he can, to imagine the loved object as most closely bound
to him : this endeavour or desire will be increased, if he thinks
that someone else has a similar desire (III. xxxi.). But this
endeavour or desire is assumed to be checked by the image of the
loved object in conjunction with the image of him whom the loved
object has joined to itself ; therefore (III. xi. note) he will
for that reason be affected with pain, accompanied by the idea of
the loved object as a cause in conjunction with the image of his
rival ; that is, he will be (III. xiii.) affected with hatred
towards the loved object and also towards his rival (III. xv.
Coroll.), which latter he will envy as enjoying the beloved
object. Q.E.D.
Note.-This hatred towards an object of love joined with envy
is called Jealousy, which accordingly is nothing else but a
wavering of the disposition arising from combined love and
hatred, accompanied by the idea of some rival who is envied.
Further, this hatred towards the object of love will be greater,
in proportion to the pleasure which the jealous man had been wont
to derive from the reciprocated love of the said object ; and
also in proportion to the feelings he had previously entertained
towards his rival. If he had hated him, he will forthwith hate
the object of his love, because he conceives it is pleasurably
affected by one whom he himself hates : and also because he is
compelled to associate the image of his loved one with the image
of him whom he hates. This condition generally comes into play
in the case of love for a woman : for he who thinks, that a woman
whom he loves prostitutes herself to another, will feel pain, not
only because his own desire is restrained, but also because,
being compelled to associate the image of her he loves with the
parts of shame and the excreta of another, he therefore shrinks
from her.
We must add, that a jealous man is not greeted by his beloved
with the same joyful countenance as before, and this also gives
him pain as a lover, as I will now show.

PROP. XXXVI. He who remembers a thing, in which he has once
taken delight, desires to possess it under the same circumstances
as when he first took delight therein.
Proof.-Everything, which a man has seen in conjunction with
the object of his love, will be to him accidentally a cause of
pleasure (III. xv.) ; he will, therefore, desire to possess it,
in conjunction with that wherein he has taken delight ; in other
words, he will desire to possess the object of his love under the
same circumstances as when he first took delight therein. Q.E.D.
Corollary.-A lover will, therefore, feel pain if one of the
aforesaid attendant circumstances be missing.
Proof.-For, in so far as he finds some circumstance to be
missing, he conceives something which excludes its existence. As
he is assumed to be desirous for love's sake of that thing or
circumstance (by the last Prop.), he will, in so far as he
conceives it to be missing, feel pain (III. xix.). Q.E.D.
Note.-This pain, in so far as it has reference to the absence
of the object of love, is called Regret.

PROP. XXXVII. Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or
love, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater.
Proof.-Pain diminishes or constrains a man's power of
activity (III. xi. note), in other words (III. vii.), diminishes
or constrains the effort, wherewith he endeavours to persist in
his own being ; therefore (III. v.) it is contrary to the said
endeavour : thus all the endeavours of a man affected by pain are
directed to removing that pain. But (by the definition of pain),
in proportion as the pain is greater, so also is it necessarily
opposed to a greater part of man's power of activity ; therefore
the greater the pain, the greater the power of activity employed
to remove it ; that is, the greater will be the desire or
appetite in endeavouring to remove it. Again, since pleasure
(III. xi. note) increases or aids a man's power of activity, it
may easily be shown in like manner, that a man affected by
pleasure has no desire further than to preserve it, and his
desire will be in proportion to the magnitude of the pleasure.
Lastly, since hatred and love are themselves emotions of pain
and pleasure, it follows in like manner that the endeavour,
appetite, or desire, which arises through hatred or love, will be
greater in proportion to the hatred or love. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXVIII. If a man has begun to hate an object of his love,
so that love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being
equal, regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it,
and his hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his
former love.
Proof.-If a man begins to hate that which he had loved, more
of his appetites are put under restraint than if he had never
loved it. For love is a pleasure (III. xiii. note) which a man
endeavours as far as he can to render permanent (III. xxviii.) ;
he does so by regarding the object of his love as present, and by
affecting it as far as he can pleasurably ; this endeavour is
greater in proportion as the love is greater, and so also is the
endeavour to bring about that the beloved should return his
affection (III. xxxiii.). Now these endeavours are constrained
by hatred towards the object of love (III. xiii. Coroll. and III.
xxiii.) ; wherefore the lover (III. xi. note) will for this cause
also be affected with pain, the more so in proportion as his love
has been greater ; that is, in addition to the pain caused by
hatred, there is a pain caused by the fact that he has loved the
object ; wherefore the lover will regard the beloved with greater
pain, or in other words, will hate it more than if he had never
loved it, and with the more intensity in proportion as his former
love was greater. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXIX. He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him an
injury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue
to himself ; on the other hand, he who loves anyone will, by the
same law, seek to benefit him.
Proof.-To hate a man is (III. xiii. note) to conceive him as
a cause of pain ; therefore he who hates a man will endeavour to
remove or destroy him. But if anything more painful, or, in
other words, a greater evil, should accrue to the hater
thereby-and if the hater thinks he can avoid such evil by not
carrying out the injury, which he planned against the object of
his hate-he will desire to abstain from inflicting that injury
(III. xxviii.), and the strength of his endeavour (III. xxxvii.)
will be greater than his former endeavour to do injury, and will
therefore prevail over it, as we asserted. The second part of
this proof proceeds in the same manner. Wherefore he who hates
another, etc. Q.E.D.
Note.-By good I here mean every kind of pleasure, and all
that conduces thereto, especially that which satisfies our
longings, whatsoever they may be. By evil, I mean every kind of
pain, especially that which frustrates our longings. For I have
shown (III. ix. note) that we in no case desire a thing because
we deem it good, but, contrariwise, we deem a thing good because
we desire it : consequently we deem evil that which we shrink
from ; everyone, therefore, according to his particular emotions,
judges or estimates what is good, what is bad, what is better,
what is worse, lastly, what is best, and what is worst. Thus a
miser thinks that abundance of money is the best, and want of
money the worst ; an ambitious man desires nothing so much as
glory, and fears nothing so much as shame. To an envious man
nothing is more delightful than another's misfortune, and nothing
more painful than another's success. So every man, according to
his emotions, judges a thing to be good or bad, useful or
useless. The emotion, which induces a man to turn from that
which he wishes, or to wish for that which he turns from, is
called timidity, which may accordingly be defined as the fear
whereby a man is induced to avoid an evil which he regards as
future by encountering a lesser evil (III. xxviii.). But if the
evil which he fears be shame, timidity becomes bashfulness.
Lastly, if the desire to avoid a future evil be checked by the
fear of another evil, so that the man knows not which to choose,
fear becomes consternation, especially if both the evils feared
be very great.

PROP. XL. He, who conceives himself to be hated by another, and
believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate
that other in return.
Proof.-He who conceives another as affected with hatred, will
thereupon be affected himself with hatred (III. xxvii.), that is,
with pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause. But, by
the hypothesis, he conceives no cause for this pain except him
who is his enemy ; therefore, from conceiving that he is hated by
some one, he will be affected with pain, accompanied by the idea
of his enemy ; in other words, he will hate his enemy in return.
Q.E.D.
Note.-He who thinks that he has given just cause for hatred
will (III. xxx. and note) be affected with shame ; but this case
(III. xxv.) rarely happens. This reciprocation of hatred may
also arise from the hatred, which follows an endeavour to injure
the object of our hate (III. xxxix.). He therefore who conceives
that he is hated by another will conceive his enemy as the cause
of some evil or pain ; thus he will be affected with pain or
fear, accompanied by the idea of his enemy as cause ; in other
words, he will be affected with hatred towards his enemy, as I
said above.
Corollary I.-He who conceives, that one whom he loves hates
him, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love. For, in so
far as he conceives that he is an object of hatred, he is
determined to hate his enemy in return. But, by the hypothesis,
he nevertheless loves him : wherefore he will be a prey to
conflicting hatred and love.
Corollary II.-If a man conceives that one, whom he has
hitherto regarded without emotion, has done him any injury from
motives of hatred, he will forthwith seek to repay the injury in
kind.
Proof.-He who conceives, that another hates him, will (by the
last proposition) hate his enemy in return, and (III. xxvi.) will
endeavour to recall everything which can affect him painfully ;
he will moreover endeavour to do him an injury (III. xxxix.).
Now the first thing of this sort which he conceives is the injury
done to himself ; he will, therefore, forthwith endeavour to
repay it in kind. Q.E.D.
Note.-The endeavour to injure one whom we hate is called
Anger ; the endeavour to repay in kind injury done to ourselves
is called Revenge.

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