The Ethics

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POSTULATES
I. The human body is composed of a number of individual
parts, of diverse nature, each one of which is in itself
extremely complex.
II. Of the individual parts composing the human body some
are fluid, some soft, some hard.
III. The individual parts composing the human body, and
consequently the human body itself, are affected in a variety of
ways by external bodies.
IV. The human body stands in need for its preservation of a
number of other bodies, by which it is continually, so to speak,
regenerated.
V. When the fluid part of the human body is determined by an
external body to impinge often on another soft part, it changes
the surface of the latter, and, as it were, leaves the impression
thereupon of the external body which impels it.
VI. The human body can move external bodies, and arrange
them in a variety of ways.

PROP. XIV. The human mind is capable of perceiving a great
number of things, and is so in proportion as its body is capable
of receiving a great number of impressions.
Proof.-The human body (by Post. iii. and vi.) is affected in
very many ways by external bodies, and is capable in very many
ways of affecting external bodies. But (II. xii.) the human
mind must perceive all that takes place in the human body ; the
human mind is, therefore, capable of perceiving a great number of
things, and is so in proportion, &c. Q.E.D.

PROP. XV. The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the
human mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great number of
ideas.
Proof.-The idea constituting the actual being of the human
mind is the idea of the body (II. xiii.), which (Post. i.) is
composed of a great number of complex individual parts. But
there is necessarily in God the idea of each individual part
whereof the body is composed (II. viii. Coroll.) ; therefore
(II. vii.), the idea of the human body is composed of these
numerous ideas of its component parts. Q.E.D.

PROP. XVI. The idea of every mode, in which the human body is
affected by external bodies, must involve the nature of the human
body, and also the nature of the external body.
Proof.-All the modes, in which any given body is affected,
follow from the nature of the body affected, and also from the
nature of the affecting body (by Ax. i., after the Coroll. of
Lemma iii.), wherefore their idea also necessarily (by I. Ax.
iv.) involves the nature of both bodies ; therefore, the idea of
every mode, in which the human body is affected by external
bodies, involves the nature of the human body and of the external
body. Q.E.D.
Corollary I.-Hence it follows, first, that the human mind
perceives the nature of a variety of bodies, together with the
nature of its own.
Corollary II.-It follows, secondly, that the ideas, which we
have of external bodies, indicate rather the constitution of our
own body than the nature of external bodies. I have amply
illustrated this in the Appendix to Part I.

PROP. XVII. If the human body is affected in a manner which
involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will
regard the said external body as actually existing, or as present
to itself, until the human body be affected in such a way, as to
exclude the existence or the presence of the said external body.
Proof.-This proposition is self-evident, for so long as the
human body continues to be thus affected, so long will the human
mind (II. xii.) regard this modification of the body-that is (by
the last Prop.), it will have the idea of the mode as actually
existing, and this idea involves the nature of the external body.
In other words, it will have the idea which does not exclude, but
postulates the existence or presence of the nature of the
external body ; therefore the mind (by II. xvi., Coroll. i.) will
regard the external body as actually existing, until it is
affected, &c. Q.E.D.
Corollary.-The mind is able to regard as present external
bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, even
though they be no longer in existence or present.
Proof.-When external bodies determine the fluid parts of the
human body, so that they often impinge on the softer parts, they
change the surface of the last named (Post. v.) ; hence (Ax. ii.,
after the Coroll. of Lemma iii.) they are refracted therefrom in
a different manner from that which they followed before such
change ; and, further, when afterwards they impinge on the new
surfaces by their own spontaneous movement, they will be
refracted in the same manner, as though they had been impelled
towards those surfaces by external bodies ; consequently, they
will, while they continue to be thus refracted, affect the human
body in the same manner, whereof the mind (II. xii.) will again
take cognizance-that is (II. xvii.), the mind will again regard
the external body as present, and will do so, as often as the
fluid parts of the human body impinge on the aforesaid surfaces
by their own spontaneous motion. Wherefore, although the
external bodies, by which the human body has once been affected,
be no longer in existence, the mind will nevertheless regard them
as present, as often as this action of the body is repeated.
Q.E.D.
Note.-We thus see how it comes about, as is often the case,
that we regard as present many things which are not. It is
possible that the same result may be brought about by other
causes ; but I think it suffices for me here to have indicated
one possible explanation, just as well as if I had pointed out
the true cause. Indeed, I do not think I am very far from the
truth, for all my assumptions are based on postulates, which
rest, almost without exception, on experience, that cannot be
controverted by those who have shown, as we have, that the human
body, as we feel it, exists (Coroll. after II. xiii.).
Furthermore (II. vii. Coroll., II. xvi. Coroll. ii.), we clearly
understand what is the difference between the idea, say, of
Peter, which constitutes the essence of Peter's mind, and the
idea of the said Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul. The
former directly answers to the essence of Peter's own body, and
only implies existence so long as Peter exists ; the latter
indicates rather the disposition of Paul's body than the nature
of Peter, and, therefore, while this disposition of Paul's body
lasts, Paul's mind will regard Peter as present to itself, even
though he no longer exists. Further, to retain the usual
phraseology, the modifications of the human body, of which the
ideas represent external bodies as present to us, we will call
the images of things, though they do not recall the figure of
things. When the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say
that it imagines. I will here draw attention to the fact, in
order to indicate where error lies, that the imaginations of the
mind, looked at in themselves, do not contain error. The mind
does not err in the mere act of imagining, but only in so far as
it is regarded as being without the idea, which excludes the
existence of such things as it imagines to be present to it. If
the mind, while imagining non-existent things as present to it,
is at the same time conscious that they do not really exist, this
power of imagination must be set down to the efficacy of its
nature, and not to a fault, especially if this faculty of
imagination depend solely on its own nature-that is (I. Def.
vii.), if this faculty of imagination be free.

PROP. XVIII. If the human body has once been affected by two or
more bodies at the same time, when the mind afterwards imagines
any of them, it will straightway remember the others also.
Proof.-The mind (II. xvii. Coroll.) imagines any given body,
because the human body is affected and disposed by the
impressions from an external body, in the same manner as it is
affected when certain of its parts are acted on by the said
external body ; but (by our hypothesis) the body was then so
disposed, that the mind imagined two bodies at once ; therefore,
it will also in the second case imagine two bodies at once, and
the mind, when it imagines one, will straightway remember the
other. Q.E.D.
Note.-We now clearly see what Memory is. It is simply a
certain association of ideas involving the nature of things
outside the human body, which association arises in the mind
according to the order and association of the modifications
(affectiones) of the human body. I say, first, it is an
association of those ideas only, which involve the nature of
things outside the human body : not of ideas which answer to the
nature of the said things : ideas of the modifications of the
human body are, strictly speaking (II. xvi.), those which involve
the nature both of the human body and of external bodies. I say,
secondly, that this association arises according to the order and
association of the modifications of the human body, in order to
distinguish it from that association of ideas, which arises from
the order of the intellect, whereby the mind perceives things
through their primary causes, and which is in all men the same.
And hence we can further clearly understand, why the mind from
the thought of one thing, should straightway arrive at the
thought of another thing, which has no similarity with the first
; for instance, from the thought of the word pomum (an apple), a
Roman would straightway arrive at the thought of the fruit apple,
which has no similitude with the articulate sound in question,
nor anything in common with it, except that the body of the man
has often been affected by these two things ; that is, that the
man has often heard the word pomum, while he was looking at the
fruit ; similarly every man will go on from one thought to
another, according as his habit has ordered the images of things
in his body. For a soldier, for instance, when he sees the
tracks of a horse in sand, will at once pass from the thought of
a horse to the thought of a horseman, and thence to the thought
of war, &c. ; while a countryman will proceed from the thought of
a horse to the thought of a plough, a field, &c. Thus every man
will follow this or that train of thought, according as he has
been in the habit of conjoining and associating the mental images
of things in this or that manner.

PROP. XIX. The human mind has no knowledge of the body, and does
not know it to exist, save through the ideas of the modifications
whereby the body is affected.
Proof.-The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the
human body (II. xiii.), which (II. ix.) is in God, in so far as
he is regarded as affected by another idea of a particular thing
actually existing : or, inasmuch as (Post. iv.) the human body
stands in need of very many bodies whereby it is, as it were,
continually regenerated ; and the order and connection of ideas
is the same as the order and connection of causes (II. vii.) ;
this idea will therefore be in God, in so far as he is regarded
as affected by the ideas of very many particular things. Thus
God has the idea of the human body, or knows the human body, in
so far as he is affected by very many other ideas, and not in so
far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind ; that is (by
II. xi. Coroll.), the human mind does not know the human body.
But the ideas of the modifications of body are in God, in so far
as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, or the human
mind perceives those modifications (II. xii.), and consequently
(II. xvi.) the human body itself, and as actually existing ;
therefore the mind perceives thus far only the human body.
Q.E.D.

PROP. XX. The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also in
God, following in God in the same manner, and being referred to
God in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the human
body.
Proof.-Thought is an attribute of God (II. i.) ; therefore
(II. iii.) there must necessarily be in God the idea both of
thought itself and of all its modifications, consequently also of
the human mind (II. xi.). Further, this idea or knowledge of the
mind does not follow from God, in so far as he is infinite, but
in so far as he is affected by another idea of an individual
thing (II. ix.). But (II. vii.) the order and connection of
ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes ;
therefore this idea or knowledge of the mind is in God and is
referred to God, in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of
the body. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXI. This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the
same way as the mind is united to the body.
Proof.-That the mind is united to the body we have shown from
the fact, that the body is the object of the mind (II. xii. and
xiii.) ; and so for the same reason the idea of the mind must be
united with its object, that is, with the mind in the same manner
as the mind is united to the body. Q.E.D.
Note.-This proposition is comprehended much more clearly from
what we have said in the note to II. vii. We there showed that
the idea of body and body, that is, mind and body (II. xiii.),
are one and the same individual conceived now under the attribute
of thought, now under the attribute of extension ; wherefore the
idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing,
which is conceived under one and the same attribute, namely,
thought. The idea of the mind, I repeat, and the mind itself are
in God by the same necessity and follow from him from the same
power of thinking. Strictly speaking, the idea of the mind, that
is, the idea of an idea, is nothing but the distinctive quality
(forma) of the idea in so far as it is conceived as a mode of
thought without reference to the object ; if a man knows
anything, he, by that very fact, knows that he knows it, and at
the same time knows that he knows that he knows it, and so on to
infinity. But I will treat of this hereafter.

PROP. XXII. The human mind perceives not only the modifications
of the body, but also the ideas of such modifications.
Proof.-The ideas of the ideas of modifications follow in God
in the same manner, and are referred to God in the same manner,
as the ideas of the said modifications. This is proved in the
same way as II. xx. But the ideas of the modifications of the
body are in the human mind (II. xii.), that is, in God, in so far
as he constitutes the essence of the human mind ; therefore the
ideas of these ideas will be in God, in so far as he has the
knowledge or idea of the human mind, that is (II. xxi.), they
will be in the human mind itself, which therefore perceives not
only the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of such
modifications. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXIII. The mind does not know itself, except in so far as
it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body.
Proof.-The idea or knowledge of the mind (II. xx.) follows in
God in the same manner, and is referred to God in the same
manner, as the idea or knowledge of the body. But since (II.
xix.) the human mind does not know the human body itself, that is
(II. xi. Coroll.), since the knowledge of the human body is not
referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the nature of the
human mind ; therefore, neither is the knowledge of the mind
referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the
human mind ; therefore (by the same Coroll. II. xi.), the human
mind thus far has no knowledge of itself. Further the ideas of
the modifications, whereby the body is affected, involve the
nature of the human body itself (II. xvi.), that is (II. xiii.),
they agree with the nature of the mind ; wherefore the knowledge
of these ideas necessarily involves knowledge of the mind ; but
(by the last Prop.) the knowledge of these ideas is in the human
mind itself ; wherefore the human mind thus far only has
knowledge of itself. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXIV. The human mind does not involve an adequate
knowledge of the parts composing the human body.
Proof.-The parts composing the human body do not belong to
the essence of that body, except in so far as they communicate
their motions to one another in a certain fixed relation (Def.
after Lemma iii.), not in so far as they can be regarded as
individuals without relation to the human body. The parts of the
human body are highly complex individuals (Post. i.), whose
parts (Lemma iv.) can be separated from the human body without in
any way destroying the nature and distinctive quality of the
latter, and they can communicate their motions (Ax. i., after
Lemma iii.) to other bodies in another relation ; therefore (II.
iii.) the idea or knowledge of each part will be in God,
inasmuch (II. ix.) as he is regarded as affected by another idea
of a particular thing, which particular thing is prior in the
order of nature to the aforesaid part (II. vii.). We may affirm
the same thing of each part of each individual composing the
human body ; therefore, the knowledge of each part composing the
human body is in God, in so far as he is affected by very many
ideas of things, and not in so far as he has the idea of the
human body only, in other words, the idea which constitutes the
nature of the human mind (II. xiii) ; therefore (II. xi.
Coroll.), the human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge
of the human body. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXV. The idea of each modification of the human body does
not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body.
Proof.-We have shown that the idea of a modification of the
human body involves the nature of an external body, in so far as
that external body conditions the human body in a given manner.
But, in so far as the external body is an individual, which has
no reference to the human body, the knowledge or idea thereof is
in God (II. ix.), in so far as God is regarded as affected by the
idea of a further thing, which (II. vii.) is naturally prior to
the said external body. Wherefore an adequate knowledge of the
external body is not in God, in so far as he has the idea of the
modification of the human body ; in other words, the idea of the
modification of the human body does not involve an adequate
knowledge of the external body. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVI. The human mind does not perceive any external body
as actually existing, except through the ideas of the
modifications of its own body.
Proof.-If the human body is in no way affected by a given
external body, then (II. vii.) neither is the idea of the human
body, in other words, the human mind, affected in any way by the
idea of the existence of the said external body, nor does it in
any manner perceive its existence. But, in so far as the human
body is affected in any way by a given external body, thus far
(II. xvi. and Coroll.) it perceives that external body. Q.E.D.
Corollary.-In so far as the human mind imagines an external
body, it has not an adequate knowledge thereof.
Proof.-When the human mind regards external bodies through
the ideas of the modifications of its own body, we say that it
imagines (see II. xvii. note) ; now the mind can only imagine
external bodies as actually existing. Therefore (by II. xxv.),
in so far as the mind imagines external bodies, it has not an
adequate knowledge of them. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVII. The idea of each modification of the human body
does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself.
Proof.-Every idea of a modification of the human body
involves the nature of the human body, in so far as the human
body is regarded as affected in a given manner (II. xvi.). But,
inasmuch as the human body is an individual which may be affected
in many other ways, the idea of the said modification, &c.
Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVIII. The ideas of the modifications of the human body,
in so far as they have reference only to the human mind, are not
clear and distinct, but confused.
Proof.-The ideas of the modifications of the human body
involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies
(II. xvi.) ; they must involve the nature not only of the human
body but also of its parts ; for the modifications are modes
(Post. iii.), whereby the parts of the human body, and,
consequently, the human body as a whole are affected. But (by
II. xxiv., xxv.) the adequate knowledge of external bodies, as
also of the parts composing the human body, is not in God, in so
far as he is regarded as affected by the human mind, but in so
far as he is regarded as affected by other ideas. These ideas of
modifications, in so far as they are referred to the human mind
alone, are as consequences without premisses, in other words,
confused ideas. Q.E.D.
Note.-The idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind
is, in the same manner, proved not to be, when considered in
itself alone, clear and distinct ; as also is the case with the
idea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas of the
modifications of the human body, in so far as they are referred
to the mind only, as everyone may easily see.

PROP. XXIX. The idea of the idea of each modification of the
human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human
mind.
Proof.-The idea of a modification of the human body (II.
xxvii.) does not involve an adequate knowledge of the said body,
in other words, does not adequately express its nature ; that is
(II. xiii.) it does not agree with the nature of the mind
adequately ; therefore (I. Ax. vi) the idea of this idea does not
adequately express the nature of the human mind, or does not
involve an adequate knowledge thereof.
Corollary.-Hence it follows that the human mind, when it
perceives things after the common order of nature, has not an
adequate but only a confused and fragmentary knowledge of itself,
of its own body, and of external bodies. For the mind does not
know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the
modifications of body (II. xxiii.). It only perceives its own
body (II. xix.) through the ideas of the modifications, and only
perceives external bodies through the same means ; thus, in so
far as it has such ideas of modification, it has not an adequate
knowledge of itself (II. xxix.), nor of its own body (II.
xxvii.), nor of external bodies (II. xxv.), but only a
fragmentary and confused knowledge thereof (II. xxviii. and
note). Q.E.D.
Note.-I say expressly, that the mind has not an adequate but
only a confused knowledge of itself, its own body, and of
external bodies, whenever it perceives things after the common
order of nature ; that is, whenever it is determined from
without, namely, by the fortuitous play of circumstance, to
regard this or that ; not at such times as it is determined from
within, that is, by the fact of regarding several things at once,
to understand their points of agreement, difference, and
contrast. Whenever it is determined in anywise from within, it
regards things clearly and distinctly, as I will show below.

PROP. XXX. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the
duration of our body.
Proof.-The duration of our body does not depend on its
essence (II. Ax. i.), nor on the absolute nature of God (I.
xxi.). But (I. xxviii.) it is conditioned to exist and operate
by causes, which in their turn are conditioned to exist and
operate in a fixed and definite relation by other causes, these
last again being conditioned by others, and so on to infinity.
The duration of our body therefore depends on the common order of
nature, or the constitution of things. Now, however a thing may
be constituted, the adequate knowledge of that thing is in God,
in so far as he has the ideas of all things, and not in so far as
he has the idea of the human body only. (II. ix. Coroll.)
Wherefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is in God
very inadequate, in so far as he is only regarded as constituting
the nature of the human mind ; that is (II. xi. Coroll.), this
knowledge is very inadequate to our mind. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXI. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the
duration of particular things external to ourselves.
Proof.-Every particular thing, like the human body, must be
conditioned by another particular thing to exist and operate in a
fixed and definite relation ; this other particular thing must
likewise be conditioned by a third, and so on to infinity. (I.
xxviii.) As we have shown in the foregoing proposition, from
this common property of particular things, we have only a very
inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body ; we must draw a
similar conclusion with regard to the duration of particular
things, namely, that we can only have a very inadequate knowledge
of the duration thereof. Q.E.D.
Corollary.-Hence it follows that all particular things are
contingent and perishable. For we can have no adequate idea of
their duration (by the last Prop.), and this is what we must
understand by the contingency and perishableness of things. (I.
xxxiii., Note i.) For (I. xxix.), except in this sense, nothing
is contingent.

PROP. XXXII. All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God,
are true.
Proof.-All ideas which are in God agree in every respect with
their objects (II. vii. Coroll.), therefore (I. Ax. vi.) they are
all true. Q.E.D.

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